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WEST EUROPE REPORT

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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

FDP POLITICIAN ON EUROPEAN NUCLEAR FORCE

DW300925 Frankfurt FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 30 Apr 80 p 2

[Article by Moe]

[Text] William Borm, Berlin FDP politician and member of the FDP federal executive board, who has repeatedly caused attention with extravagant contributions to Germany policy and Ostpolitik, and who is considered particularly by the Young Democrats as a "progressive" detente politician, is creating an uproar with new theses on a "1990 European peace order." European nuclear arms have suddenly become possible for Borm in the nineties. At the Gummersbach Theodor Heuss Academy, Borm argued with a view to the 1979 Brussels speech of Henry Kissinger that the American security guarantee for Europe has become "more than doubtful." As a consequence, therefore, "the United States will offer us Euroestrategic arms via closing the arms gap." It is no exaggeration to conclude also "that the United States can only conditionally be termed a nuclear guarantor of our security." A further resulting consequence is that a so-called war by proxy can no longer be completely ruled out in Europe.

Borm continued verbatim: "The consequence of what has been said and of the framework conditions is that Western Europe can and may no longer renounce a security policy of its own if it does not want to entrust itself come what may to American security guarantees, the implementation of which has become doubtful. According to American statements..the European community cannot maintain forever the current security policy nuclear taboo. The main argument that is being used against an independent security policy identity for Europe, namely division of labor with European self-curtailment regarding conventional defense and the commitment of the United States in the nuclear field, will be impossible to maintain in the long run, because this regulation cannot remain credible in view of changing prerequisites. In an examination of European options the nuclear option must eventually also be included."

CSO: 3103

THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

FRANCE

BRIEFS

S3 MISSILE--On 24 May the new S3 nuclear missile is to be officially put in service. This missile is equipped with a warhead with an explosive power of more than 150 kilotons and a range greater than 3,500 km. The S3 will replace the S2's of the first firing unit on the Albion plateau beginning this year. The second firing unit will be provided with the new missile beginning in 1982. The S3 has a much shorter readying time: 30 seconds, as opposed to the 3 minutes required for the S2. [Text] [Paris DEFENSE INTERARMES in French May 80 p 6]

PONIATOWSKI FOR BOMB--France absolutely must provide itself with the neutron bomb; such is the opinion of Michel Poniatowski, who affirms that there is no reason to give way to the Soviet veto in this matter. To fail to do so means "a gradual Finlandization of Europe." [Text] [Paris LE POINT in French 5 May 80 p 55]

CSO: 3100

POLICY ON ARMS PRODUCTION, SALES EXAMINED

Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 2-3, 9-10 Mar 80

[Article by Giulio Mazzocchi]

[2-3 Mar 80, p 26]

[Text] An Enormous and Hidden Market--the Artillery Industry Brings Italy 4 Trillion Lire

Rome--In the world ranking of the countries that export weapons, is Italy really in fourth place? That is, does it sell fewer weapons abroad than the United States, the USSR and France, but more than Great Britain, the FRG, China and Israel? At the Ministry of Foreign Trade, at the Institute of Statistics, they know nothing about this. There is no statistical category that describes the phenomenon. However, there is a committee that regulates these exports, granting or not granting the export permit. The committee is an interministerial one, but in reality, its principle official is a man of the secret services, and he does not speak with journalists. So, then--is there no one in Italy acquainted with the phenomenon? No, there really is no one.

The problem does not lie in secrecy. As regards arms sales, there is practically no secrecy for the "experts" in this sector. The point lies in this other problem: what is a weapon and what is not? At Aeritalia, at Aermacchi, at Siai Marchetti, at Agusta, at SNIA [expansion unknown], at FIAT, at Montedison, they all answer us in the same way: "We do not make weapons." But the "specialists," who publish sumptuous magazines in English, French, Spanish, Arabic, do not see things this way. In these magazines one reads the names of various of our firms.

Fourth Place in the Rankings

Let us give the reader an idea of the scope of this phenomenon right away. We declare, that is, that within the last 2 years, Algeria has ordered 10 coastal patrol boats from Baglietto. Egypt, 30 Oto-Melara missiles and 2 "Lupo" frigates from IRI [Industrial Reconstruction Institute]. Gabon, a

coastal patrol boat. Ghana, nine Aermacchis. Libya, 20 aircraft from Aeritalia, 240 from Siai Marchetti, various missiles from Orlikon-SNIA, 4 corvettes from IRI, 28 helicopters from Agusta. Morocco, another six helicopters. Nigeria, another few missiles and 15 patrol boats from Intermarina di Sarzana. Uganda, four helicopters. Somalia, four airplanes from Aeritalia and a number of FIAT-Oto Melara tanks. Tunisia, 12 Aermacchis, a few Siai Marchettis, 18 Agustas and a good 100 FIAT-Oto Melara armored cars. And then Tanzania, Zaire, Zambia.

The above list barely covers the African continent, but it is enough in itself to yield a larger amount than the 650 billion lire worth of weaponry that we are said to have exported in 1978 to be in fourth place in the world ranking of countries that sell the most weapons. This ranking (the latest one done by an international body) puts the world total solely for arms purchases in 1978 at more than 100 trillion lire, while for foreign trade in weapons (that is, sale between countries), it is reported to have totaled nearly 16 trillion lire.

But at FIAT and Aeritalia, they reply to us: "We make civilian transport aircraft, and then if someone wants to transport soldiers in them...." But in the foreign-language military magazines, there are pages of beautiful ads for the Italian firms, and the means of transport advertised have characteristics and accessories that rarely could serve "civilian" purposes!

Well, yes--the arms market is a complicated one. Yet when the weapons manufacturer needs to, he talks clearly. Very clearly, indeed, in a categorical manner, such as when he had occasion to ask for "rapid approval of the two draft promotional laws with 10-year extraordinary allocation for the Army and the Air Force." We quote from the 1976 study prepared by Efim (a public agency coming under State Participations), with the title "Modernization of Defense Means and Systems and Its Correlation with the Development of Industry, Employment and Exportation."

It fell to Efim, among all the Italian industries that produce means usable by the armed forces (which are not only armed but fed, clothed, trained, transported), to take on the task of informing the Parliament that in 1975 "there were about 150 firms involved, even if partially, in production of weapons and defense systems, with capital of more than 900 billion lire, about 300,000 employees, and 4.5 trillion lire in orders annually."

A White Paper on Defense

And Efim added: "In particular, the development--of the utmost importance for its foreign-exchange contribution--of exports, which for the approximately 150 firms considered represent more than 30 percent of their billing (with a top of 60 percent for the aeronautical industry and more than 40 percent for missiles, conventional weapons and ammunition), seems strictly connected with a flow of orders adequate to the potentiality of Italian industry."

According to a Defense "white paper," in 1975 we exported 2.3 trillion lire worth of armaments--an amount barely less than what we spent for our armed

forces. But one of our country's few military experts in Parliament, former Navy officer Falco Accame, now a PSI [Italian Socialist Party] deputy, maintains that this last figure "masks the true extent of the phenomenon, because when we export arms we export very little added value. The major part of the price, perhaps even 60 percent, is actually composed of imported raw materials, and especially, foreign patents."

At this point we can infer an initial definite indication: the figure relative to our exportation of weapons that appears in the international statistics is certainly lower than the reality, because it refers, perhaps, only to the export licenses granted by the relevant committee. But the supplies provided to foreign armed forces are extremely more vast, and in 1979 probably reached more than 4 trillion lire. It is probable, though, that at least in part, the same criterion of judgment should be applied to the other European countries, such as Great Britain, France and the FRG, which, in contrast to the United States, exercise very attentive parliamentary control over military exportation (in Italy, however, such control does not exist-- whence the profound difference between the official figure and the real figure for our military exportation).

But then we must immediately downgrade the importance that this exportation is supposed to have for our overseas accounts, applying the corrective suggested by the Honorable Accame: let us say, in sum, that the services rendered to foreign armed forces by our industry produce for our balance of overseas payments a net credit of at least 1 trillion lire. The figure is a considerable one; what is the government doing to ensure its flow? The answer is that it does very little, if anything.

Just this week, for example, the president of Iran, Bani Sadr, repeated to Prof Loris Corbi, president of the Italian company Condotta d'Acqua (IRI), an episode already known to all the weapons "experts": Agusta is guilty of having supplied his country with helicopters without spare parts, which is not sending, so that those helicopters are grounded. While it awaits the spares, Iran is also suspending the payments to Condotta for the Bandar Abbas work.

It is probable that Agusta is not defaulting through its own fault. It is probable that it cannot export the spares for lack of a license. Since Agusta is not giving an answer to either us or anyone else, we can only advance the hypothesis of a late ban by the interministerial committee on licenses for exportation of military materiel. In addition, the committee cannot give answers either: and in the absence of a reply, there is no exportation. At Beretta we were told that this happens frequently.

The committee's guiding criterion should indeed be the following (the criterion set by the United Nations): do not sell arms to those countries on which the United Nations has placed an embargo (for example, racist South Africa), and in any case, not to countries prey to turbulence. The criterion is very elastic. Beretta, for example, used to obtain licenses to sell revolvers to the Israeli agents, but for some time now, it has not obtained any more.

We give another example: Iraq asked IRI's Cantieri Navali Riuniti for six fast frigates (an order close to 1 trillion lire), but the order was put in question by an American senator, who is asking his government to prevent IRI from using, for this sale, the indispensable fast engines, which are American. And this because America has placed an embargo on arms sales to Iraq, which is notorious for arming guerrillas all over the world, including, it seems, the Italian terrorists or a fraction of them, as is supposed to be demonstrated by the famous missile found in the possession of Pifano.

We have presented three cases, three delicate problems: is it possible that those decisions which in America are requested by a senator of his government should in Italy be entrusted to an interministerial committee that includes functionaries now pensioned off, functionaries who are advisors to industry, and officials who often end up becoming presidents or advisors of military industries? We refer to episodes that are well-documented, even if they never appeared in the press. They involve facts recounted in many of the 14 interrogatories by Parliament member Falco Accame, which never had a reply from the government.

Accame is also the author of a bill supported by Parliament members of all the other forces of the left (including Giancarla Codrignani, an independent Communist, but otherwise excluding the Communists only, who are beginning now to study the problem), a bill that asks the introduction by law in Italy of the recommendations of the European Parliamentary Union, which were applied for the first time recently in the FRG.

It is not, indeed, aimed at prohibiting, but rather at adequately disciplining foreign trade in materials usable by armed forces and guerrillas. It is probably the best way to aid our military industry too, whose development is very recent. At the advent of the center-left--that is, the arrival of the Socialists in the government--we were practically producing small arms only, and under American license, importing all the rest. It was Nenni himself who brought about a change, promoting the development of the first European weapons systems.

Political Policy Is Necessary

One of the elements of European cohesion, and also of its independence from the NATO superpower, the United States (as the Afghanistan affair is now demonstrating), is now the unification of European armaments, and the production in Europe of almost all its armament, also largely under patents gradually being achieved in these countries. On the other hand, the fact that the weapons of these turbulent years of ours are made in Europe always with a need for contributions by several industries, and industries in several countries, avoids reckless exportation well enough.

Nevertheless, without a precise political guideline for our industries, they might happen to supply Mauritania with lots of missiles, obviously aimed at Algeria--to which, however, we are tied by deep and by now well-rooted interests of great import. Or supply Zaire. Or even (but France and the FRG are also guilty of this) to supply South Africa.

What do our principal industries in this sector think about these problems of exportation? This is what we went to find out.

[9-10 Mar 80 p 31]

[Text] The Warships Will Bring IRI the Dividend It Has Waited For

Rome--Our dependence on the United States for patents for military use was further demonstrated in recent days. Last Sunday, in the first part of this inquiry into Italian exportation of arms, we told how Iran has blocked several payments for work done by Italian firms while it waits to receive from Agusta (Efim group--that is, a State Participations company) the spare parts for a group of helicopters--parts already paid for, and without which the helicopters remain grounded.

Well, Iranian president Bani Sadr went around telling this same story to several persons in Europe until the truth emerged: Agusta builds the helicopters under conditional American license, and the Americans, in retaliation for the Tehran seizure, have forbidden Agusta to deliver any more materiel to Iran. The negative consequences of this are many and can be serious. This case is the best demonstration of the principle that all exportation of materiel for foreign armed forces should be the affair of the government and of the Parliament, which is the object of the Accame bill, and not of a humble interministerial committee.

But not all of our weapons industry is so dependent on foreign powers. The individual-weapons industry, for example, is not: "But attention today is focused almost exclusively on the weapons that massacre, not on those that fire one shot at a time," Dr Carlo Peroni of the "Fabbrica d'Armi Pietro Beretta SpA" says disconsolately.

Though Beretta is famous, it is not the only Italian firm that makes pistols and rifles. The valley where the company is located, Val Trompia, opens at the gates of Brescia and runs straight toward the Alps, where its stream has its source. The water used to power the spinning mills, but the textile industry is now dead in this valley also. There was water and there was iron ore. But the last of the steel mills of Gardone Val Trompia, Radaelli, recently went into crisis also. There were water, iron, and lots of wood, both for melting the iron and for making wooden implements: the famous walnut for rifle stocks.

Val Trompia is the Italian capital of individual weapons. The phenomenon of concentration of the manufacture of these weapons in a single place is not only Italian but also French, Spanish, English, German, American and Russian. In Val Trompia, the Beretta family was making weapons (halberds, mortars, rifles) at the beginning of the 16th century. Now there are 200 firms here that make rifles and pistols. There are a little more than 30,000 persons

in the Valle, 7,000 of whom do work at home for the gunsmiths, while another 7,000 work directly in the weapons factories.

Beretta has 1,500 employees. Some are very high-level craftsmen: they engrave the metal or the wood of certain pistols and certain rifles, the price of which goes as high as 5 million lire, among the models made entirely by hand and most highly personalized. The workers are very highly specialized.

They are paid quite well; they no longer work by the Ford system of repetitive assembly-line motions: each works at the center of a group of highly automated machines which they themselves run, control and command.

What would this Valle do, what would these people do if the weapons sector went into crisis? This is not at all a rhetorical question. The tension created by Afghanistan has created no new orders for Beretta. Its billings last year came to 47 billion lire, of which 30 billion was for export sales; and the figure includes only 4 billion lire in weapons, sold in Italy for barely 2 billion [as published]. In fact, although Beretta is the only supplier of portable firearms to our armed forces, only in the last 2 years (1978-79) have these forces ordered from it a certain quantity of a new weapon.

The new weapon being supplied to our security forces is a long semiautomatic double-action Beretta with one round in the barrel and a 13-round magazine, costing a little more than 200,000 lire for export. Every round fired costs, in large quantities, about 100 lire; thus, another 50 percent of its purchase price is needed in order to learn to use it. Too bad that even the Italian munitions factories that we questioned (such as SNIA) say they have sold very little ammunition in Italy for the new weapon.

'Very Old Ammunition'

But even in past years our munitions factories sold very little to our military forces: "This is the reason why Berettas jam often--the ammunition is very old." Beretta models that date back to 1935. Under such conditions, the Brescia factory has nevertheless succeeded in selling its "assault rifle" to many foreign armies--perhaps the only case in the world of a "national" weapon not used by its own army but sold to others.

Thus it could well happen that when doing security duty for the United Nations in far-off countries, some Italian soldiers might find themselves fighting with a very old Beretta against very new Berettas, faster and more deadly: how true it is that there is nothing new under the sun. If Beretta is still managing to stay on its feet, it is not thanks to the army but rather thanks to the hunters, especially Italians, and especially those who go rapidly from the "single-barrel 12-gauge with plastic stock," costing 114,000 lire, including added-value tax, to the "12-gauge over-and-under with case," which costs more than 5 million lire, or the "12-gauge side-by-side double-barrel" with a price tag of 6,758,000 lire. And to the collectors--very numerous abroad also--who buy the "reprints"--that is, perfect reproductions of very old rifles, to hang on the wall.

But the antiterrorism laws have begun to impose the limit of six rifles on the Italian collector (when even the Mafia has gone from the sawed-off shotgun to the automatic and Pifano went on to missiles). And now the radicals' antihunting referendum (an extreme remedy for a problem that should be brought under control gradually) has had the effect of choking off the gunsmiths' orders: "If the market in Italy should collapse and we have to reduce production, we have to close down, because the Japanese rifles--whose technology is very far from ours but which have the usual slashed prices--are arriving everywhere. No one can export without certain minimum sales in his own market." Thus many in Gardone Val Trompia are thinking about what other product they could make in a future that is feared to be very close. Not a future without weapons, but a future with low-priced Japanese weapons, which will naturally get to the terrorists first and then to our special corps.

Let us leave Beretta and go to visit another place that is working successfully in military exportation: a small bay east of Genoa, two spurs of rock covered with pine and olive trees, and a beach marked off by the ways of the Cantieri Navali Riuniti. The age-old shipyard was taken in tow by IRI in the middle of the crisis in this sector in the 1970's. But it has now come out of the crisis, and it has come out building frigates and corvettes, while the other related shipyards (Trieste, Ancona, Muggiano) receive their orders from Riva Trigoso for these same ships, or else build military hydro-planes or submarines and finally, a helicopter-carrier.

Once again, in history, then, the armaments industry is having a positive effect on the economy. It should be said, though, that this time, or at least in this case, the positive outcome is not so much in favor of "capital." Private capital, in fact, had already ceded all the shipyards to IRI--that is, to the state. The outcome is favorable for employment: 2,100 employees at Riva, a like number at Ancona, more than twice as many at Trieste, more at Palermo, whose docks are on the point of getting into the black, thanks to the fact that all the repair activity will be shunted to it, in view of the fact that the other yards work on new ships for the navies of many continents.

Many Contracts Have Been Signed

In fact, while IRI's shipyards have been hitting the break-even point thanks to our Navy's orders (as a consequence of the 10-year modernization plan) the outlooks are for going back to "remunerating the stockholder" through the exportation of warships. Cantieri Navali Riuniti have already signed contracts for four "Lupo" frigates for Peru, six for Venezuela and two for Egypt, while they are building another six frigates for the Italian Navy, called "Maestrale" this time, with displacement a little greater than the "Lupo." There is already some interest in the "Maestrale" abroad, as there is also for Trieste's submarines and helicopter-carriers. In addition, IRI's shipyards have already received orders from abroad for 10 600-ton corvettes (4 for Libya and 6 for Ecuador); this is the first time in the world, with these corvettes, that a country has sold abroad a warship of which it has built no prototype for its own Navy.

The cost of these warships runs very high: a helicopter-carrier goes for almost 250 billion lire, the corvettes at least 60 billion, and the "Lupo" frigates at least 120 billion.

The "Lupos" are 106 meters long and displace 2,400 tons when fully laden; their speed is a good 36 knots, equal to 65 kilometers per hour. There is only one blemish: while they normally move with entirely Italian engines, maximum speed is reached with certain gas turbines that FIAT build with much of its own technology, but unfortunately on the basis of a patent belong to the American firm General Motors--a detail that compels IRI's shipyards to be authorized by the United States to sell the frigates to third countries. This fact raises once again the problem of the connection between this industry, technological research, and foreign policy. That is, it makes it a political problem, one over which Parliament has ultimate jurisdiction, and Parliament has so far left everything more or less to the officials of the secret services--the same ones who in large part go on to finish their careers in industries such as Selenia.

This field is all the more deserving of political control inasmuch as these ships have so much Italian work in them, and very highly skilled work, which now puts them above the level of all the competitors.

But our shipbuilding competitiveness is not based on the final price only, but rather on two technical factors that also have a positive effect on the price. IRI exports ships that are "sea-ready and battle-ready." This means that it delivers the hulls with crews trained on the new ships in Italy, even if they are foreign crews. In the price of "finished" warships, 40 percent is accounted for by the "weapons systems," in which Elsac, Selenia, Elmar (Montedison) and Elettronica have a part (and only the last-named is effectively privately owned). In addition to the weapons as such (missiles, torpedoes, machine guns), these industries make the radar, the "fire-control centers," and the "electronic warfare" devices--that is, the devices that pick up and jam the equipment of others. As for the "platform"--a term that stands for "ship"--it is built with FIAT, in addition to various other IRI industries.

The most notable feature, "invented" at Riva Trigoso and developed by engineer Orlando, is that these platforms are almost entirely prefabricated in the yard and then mounted on the hull. A ship is normally built by bringing to the hull various groups of plates that are like "U's," to be welded, with a bow in the front and a stern in the rear. Then the inside work begins: the engines, bulkheads, decks, pipes, etc, are lowered in. It takes 6 years to build a warship.

But at Riva Trigoso, for the first time in the world, it takes 30 months. The "U's" come to the hull like so many slices of cake, each one already with its "filling": one with the engine, another with the antiroll stabilizers, each with almost all its piping: 20,000 pieces of pipe. Each is first drawn on paper, and almost 10,000 "appointments" are programmed between pieces and between the fabrication operations and the assembly workers.

STATUS OF NAVAL MODERNIZATION PROGRAM

Paris DEFENSE NATIONALE in French Feb 80 pp 165-166

[Article by Jean Labayle]

[Text] In March 1975, the Italian parliament passed a naval law which granted a special 1,000 billion lire credit to the navy, beyond the regular budget, for a 10-year fleet modernization program. It quickly became apparent that this financial package was not enough to properly implement this project and unless those credits were increased by at least 600 billion lire, it would be necessary to forgo construction of several vessels nevertheless considered necessary, namely two missile-launching destroyers and two frigates. Thus the program now includes only the following constructions. Efforts are being made to complete them between now and 1985: one 13,250-tpc [expansion unknown] aircraft carrier, the "Garibaldi"; two high-performance attack submarines, the "Leonardo da Vinci" and the "Guglielmo Marconi"; six 3,040-tpc frigates of the Maestrale type; five Sparviero-type light missile-launching hydrofoils; five 502-tpc minesweepers; one light supply tanker, the "Vesuvio"; one rescue ship, the "Anteo."

The status of this program's progress is as follows:

The "Garibaldi" is in the first stage of its construction at Italcantieri [United Shipyards] in Monfalcone. This ship will be able to handle either 12 "Sea King" ASM [antisubmarine] helicopters or 10 STOL/VTOL [short takeoff and landing/vertical takeoff and landing] airplanes such as the British "Sea Harrier" or a mixture of these types of aircraft. Its weaponry will include four antisurface missiles and antiaircraft weapons. In principle, it should be delivered to the navy within 4 years.

The submarine "Leonardo da Vinci" was launched on 7 November 1979 at Monfalcone. The "Guglielmo Marconi" is in the building dock. These submarines are the same type as the "Nazario Sauro" and the "Fecia di Cossato," built and financed with the regular budget under a previous program. The "Sauro," prototype of the series whose development has proved more difficult than expected, is still being tested. On the other hand, the "Fecia di Cossato" was recently put into service. These vessels, which displace 1,641 tons when diving, are armed with six 533-mm TLT [expansion unknown] and a total of 12 torpedoes and can reach nearly 20 knots while submerged for several minutes.

The frigate "Maestrale," ordered in 1978, is 20 percent complete at the Riva Trigoso CNR [United Shipyards] (Castellamare). The "Grecale" is being built at the same shipyards, which will construct the other four ships: "Libeccio," "Scirocco," "Aliseo" and "Euro." These 30-knot, 3,040-tpc frigates will have four antisurface missiles, antiaircraft and ASM (including two helicopters) weapons. They are an improvement of the 2,500-tpc Lupo type from a previous program. The Lupo group includes 4 ships: the "Lupo" and "Sagittario" in service, the "Perseo" undergoing tests and the "Orsa" nearing completion. It may be recalled that Peru and Venezuela have respectively ordered four and six variants of the Lupo type from Italian shipyards.* Weaponry of the Italian frigates includes eight antisurface missiles, antiaircraft and ASM (including one helicopter) weapons.

The five hydrofoils are being built at the Muggiano CNR. The first three should be delivered between now and 1981. They are derived from the prototype "Sparviero," which has been in service since 1974. Their displacement will be about 63 tpc and their speed will reach or even exceed 50 knots in calm seas. Their weaponry will include two antisurface missiles and 1/76 CA [expansion unknown].

Of the four minesweepers ordered from Intermarine in La Spezia, only one is under construction at that firm.

The supply tanker "Vesuvio" has been in service since 25 March 1979.

The rescue ship "Anteo," launched on 11 November 1978, is being completed at Breda in Venice.

*Two frigates were recently delivered to Peru: the other two will be built in Callao with the assistance of Italian shipyards. The "Mariscal Sucre," first of the Venezuelan vessels, has also been delivered.

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PERIN, TINDEMANS DISAGREE ON REGIONALIZATION PROBLEM

Perin Calls Tindemans Anti-Belgian

Brussels SPECIAL-L'EVANTAIL in French 4 Apr 80 pp 5-8

[Interview with Francois Perin: "Tindemans Is the Most Anti-Belgian"]

[Text] The spectacular resignation of PRL [Party of Liberty and Walloon Reform] Senator Francois Perin --who had at one time been one of the founders of the Walloon Rally--produced a lively sensation. We asked the former minister of institutional reforms in the Tindemans I administration to tell us the reasons for this move.

SPECIAL-EVENTAIL: You told the Senate: "There is no room in this small kingdom for competing nations: the Flemish nation and the Belgian nation." Why line up a Flemish nation against a Belgian nation? Should you not rather have spoken in terms of a Walloon nation or, by the same token, of a French-speaking Belgium?

Mr. Francois Perin: There is no Walloon nation! I am not saying that there is an eternal and sacrosanct Belgian nation. No more so than any other nation elsewhere. I am not a nationalist. I find nevertheless that nations are formed and are then diluted due to the hazards of war and diplomacy.

As far as Belgium is concerned, everybody knows that its birth was quite fortuitous. There was no Belgian national sentiment prior to the insurrectional movement against the Kingdom of the Low Countries created by the Congress of Vienna.

The industrial revolution, social gains, universal suffrage, World War I--they all produced the birth of a Belgian patriotism in all social classes.

In France, this national sentiment was the product of a long evolution and especially mandatory education which resulted in the fact that the French were turned from subjects of a king into citizens of a nation.

In Belgium, there was a Belgian sentiment, which was even quite virulent, under the reign of Albert I. But there was already a challenge which was manifested in the front movement of World War I and through the famous letter of Jules Destree--"Sire, there are no Belgians..."--dating back to 1912. You must note furthermore that after the war, Destree never again took up the topic of that letter and that, like everybody else, if I may say so, he became a minister of the king!

Why? Because the German occupation, the victory of the Allies, and the image of King Albert had produced the birth of a collective feeling of belonging to one nation; and that went on for a long time.

Right now, this nation has not totally disappeared but it is profoundly divided and full of conflicts.

All Belgians, But...

The results of a survey which remains confidential have been communicated to me and those results are always highly indicative! It turns out that 80 percent of the Walloons said that they were Belgians, above all; that does not mean that they do not feel that they are Walloons; but it also means that 80 percent--in other words, a large portion of the same people--proclaimed that there was no need for making any further concessions to the Flemish. They furthermore demanded Fourons and the outskirts of Brussels, in short, demands considered unacceptable by the Flemish.

In Flemish country there is still a much stronger anti-Belgian tradition than in Wallonia where it is quite recent and there the people likewise proclaim themselves to be Belgians above all by asserting that one must no longer make the slightest concession to the French-speaking section. Today they even add: and not one penny more!

We thus find ourselves facing a nation whose citizens of all social categories assert their common identity but with contradictory and even conflicting motivations, with a kind of antagonism toward the others!

Federalism

I would say right now that the Belgians are broken up among themselves. They are in conflict and they have no desire for association which is the moral definition that can produce a federal-type legal-political structure.

I am a federalist and I find that we are not at all in an atmosphere featuring a federal structure. Except of course if federalism is camouflage for our conflicts. This would seem to be the contrary of what federalism is, by definition, that is to say, a way of asserting an identity by associating oneself with another identity, other than one's own, with which one wishes to share a common fate.

This is the very soul of federalism on which the political-legal structures, varying depending upon the peoples involved, are built. There is no ready-made pattern for this; everything is always tailor-made. But look at the United States, Germany, or Switzerland; there we find a desire for original identity on the part of the different components but also the recognition of the identity of the others. This association for the sake of the common interest presupposes sympathy; we are what we are but we sympathize since we associate with each other.

Antifederalism

In Belgium we have the exact opposite and we have had that for many years. Our nationality exists but it is torn and betrayed by its antagonisms.

It would not be loyal to blame this situation on the community parties. This antagonism exists in all political formations. The rupture between the CVP [Social Christian Party] and the PSC [Social Christian Party] dates back to 1968 and between the PVV [Party of Liberty and Progress] and the PLP [Party of Liberty and Progress] it dates back to before the failure of Omer Vanaudenhove in 1972. Among the socialists, it goes back only to 1978, after the failure of Egmont-Stuyvenberg and the resignation of Leo Tindemans.

And the characteristic thing here is that this rupture, this breakup never took place on the basis of an agreement, with a concern of, at the same time, asserting different identities and the desire to associate oneself; it always came about amid dispute and confrontation.

And this was done overwhelmingly by the traditional parties!

Leo Tindemans' Responsibility

Leo Tindemans had managed to pull off a real miracle by getting the FDF [Francophone Democratic Front] and the VU [People's Union] to get together in the government. This was a remarkable performance. If he had persevered, he would have been the greatest man in the history of Belgium.

SP.-EV. [SPECIAL-EVENTAIL]: The PRL, to which you switched, however refused to give him a vote of confidence!

F.P. [Francois Perin]: And, as far as I am concerned, he is the biggest separatist in our history; he is the most anti-Belgian although he maintains the exact opposite.

And I will tell you why. Because he did not promote a coalition encompassing the FDF and the VU in order to arrive at a national compromise through association by reconciling them to each other but for the purpose of destroying those parties.

Here he has manifested a rather unsound Machiavellianism. He wanted a coalition in 1977-1978 not only to level the VU, which was the competitor of the CVP, and the FDF, which was an obstacle in his eyes to the progressive control of the Flemish over Brussels. He thought that the FDF and the VA [as published] were going to sign a compromise, that this compromise would be published, and that the two community parties, having had to make concessions, would be discredited in the eyes of the fanatical rank and file, a stubborn public hostile to the other community.

In the meantime, the CVP press unleashed an anti-Egmont campaign which was so violent that the party was made to tremble and that Tindemans decided no longer to advocate a bill signed by him and the other CVP ministers. His Machiavellian plan has succeeded magnificently, except for two details: while the CVP seriously damaged the VU, the FDF emerged stronger and in the end it was PVV which benefited from the crisis, and not the CVP.

SP.-EV.: Mr. Tindemans always maintained that his reticence regarding the Egmont and Stuyvenberg agreement derived from the fact that certain provisions were unconstitutional and that they would render Belgium ungovernable.

F.P.: He is a profoundly incoherent and contradictory personage. I do not doubt his sincerity when he says that we are in the process of destroying the state. He is thus a unity supporter. But his party is precisely behind all of the political-legislative actions which destroyed Belgian unity.

The Resistible Rise of the Flemish Movement

The first blow struck against the country's unity is obviously the geographic division represented by the language boundary.

SP.-EV.: It existed administratively in fact.

F.P.: Yes, but it was not immovable. A country which wants unity does not draw a boundary line across its middle.

Latest census showed a Flemish decline. The law eliminated the 1961 language census and specified the border in 1962.

SP.-EV.: This was a recommendation of the Harmel Center where politicians and representatives of French-speaking and Dutch-speaking cultural circles are equally represented.

F.P.: Be that as it may. But Walloon and Brussels opinion was profoundly hostile to the suppression of the language census. For them, it was a liberal act, in the etymological sense of the word, marking the primacy of the individual human will over the concept of the community.

Be that as it may, this was one demand of the Flemish movement and Theo Lefevre, who was a Belgian unity supporter, was quite naive in believing that he was thus putting an end to the quarrels between the Belgians.

Above all, he did not gauge the significance of his acts. If there is a border, it is there because there are two distinct peoples there and because we have duality and not unity. We are thus no longer dealing with a problem of languages, a problem of persons, but a problem of populations considered as collective entities having their own territory.

This is the denial of unitarism.

Here is the second point: in the name of the homogeneity of the Flemish people on its own territory, the Walloons are given the shaft at the gates of Louvain. This was a gesture of hatred which profoundly shocked, annoyed, and humiliated the Walloons. And it was the CVP which held power--not the VU!

The Flemish had gotten many things but private enterprise still escaped them and the Constitution did not permit them to control it. Their objective then was to create the cultural councils and the least one can say of them is that they were not at all permitted by virtue of the famous list of constitutional provisions drawn up in 1965. They began by placing the BRT [Belgian Radio and Television--Dutch Service] under the control of a homogeneous Flemish board of directors which was thus dominated by the CVP. And, by deduction the French-speaking people did the same thing.

That left us with the job of resolving this "social-cultural drama" of Flanders whose enterprises were under the control of French-speaking employers. Since the Flemish movement did not have any confidence in its own people, it believed in the restraint deriving from the law. And that was the so-called "September" decree which--if I am not mistaken--in reality dates back to July.

This juridical monster was not applied legally but rather practically because the employers wanted to avoid any trouble.

Marx Was Wrong

Through the Flemishization of the enterprises, the Flemish movement attained one of its fundamental objectives because this was the only sector which was still beyond the homogenization of the Flemish people.

Contrary to the Marxist scheme, it is the people who Neverlandized its bourgeoisie whereas Marx had said that it is the ruling class which imposes its culture and its language on the dominated classes.

In this entire evolution, it was the CVP which carried the heaviest weight but it was followed--in one way or another--by all of the other Flemish political formations. One must not forget the action taken at the time by Kamiel Huysmans and August Vermeylen!

And here we now have the CVP inventing personalizable subject matter whose concept will play only in Brussels.

Territorially speaking, the Flemish know that they cannot conquer Brussels. Only a few enlightened individuals, who played the game of the FDF, speak in terms of a Flemish Brussels. The others only want to reintegrate the Flemish people of Brussels into the Flemish community. They consider them to be weaklings and softies who allow themselves to be Frenchified and whom they want to get a hold on again. This can be done through cultural and material advantages granted in the schools, through social welfare work, through the organizations in favor of the third age, the young people, and even through public health. This is where we come to the personalizable subjects which are supposed to make it possible to regroup those Flemish of Brussels, to get them organized from birth to death.

Is this not really constituting a nation rather than wanting, on the basis of priority, to rebuild the unity of the Flemish people, including the Flemish of Brussels?

It is true that the FDF, by putting the Flemish in the local government--it gave them jobs without any real functions--contributed to the refining of the technique of the Flemish movement. The smart moves by the FDF reflect that situation; but it will take guarantees to prevent that same trick from being pulled off again.

Internal Contradictions

Mr Tindemans keeps repeating that there are contradictions in this attitude, saying: "I am a patriot. I want to save the franc. We must concern ourselves with essential problems, such as the fight against unemployment, budget restoration, etc. The parallelism between the program-law and institutional reforms is just a lot of nonsense." And the CVP--through the amendments of Mr Lindemans--blocks everything in the light of the 1982 communal elections in Brussels.

The homogeneity of the Flemish community comes ahead of everything else.

I say that this is an objective which is incompatible with the concept of a Belgian nation. This is why I talked about the impossibility of the co-existence of a Flemish nation and a Belgian nation.

By deduction, there follows now a phenomenon which people are not yet sufficiently aware of and that is that the French-speaking people of Brussels and the Walloons--since another people has been constituted with its own national community--are going to find themselves to be Belgians all by themselves without having wanted this. The purpose of my action is to make them aware of that.

SP.-EV.: Your analysis is apparently logical but the Flemish, the French-speaking people of Brussels, and the Walloons are just the same doomed to live together by virtue of geography. So, what now?

F.P.: If you inject geography, then I will tell you that we are doomed to live together from Amsterdam all the way down to Marseille! As for the Belgian frontiers, they are all aberrant and that is all we want of geography here!

The Belgian state exists and that is a fact. But those who are not Flemish in this state are beginning to ask themselves what they are. At least to the extent that are not sticking their heads into the sand and do not want to see what the Flemish are doing. They are experiencing a feeling of irritation but they can no longer blame that situation on those who, for many generations, were called "the extremists of Flemish Nationalism ." To calm the Walloons, they were given to understand that these were just "bad, anti-Belgian and uncivil characters."

I find--and this is not a reproach but merely an observation--that, due to the action of the Flemish, one must of course admit that Belgium is made up of collectivities with different identities. The federalist theories would have permitted us to find formulas of association but we made them fail, one after the other. And in the end, it was the stab in the back by Leo Tindemans, for the Machiavellian reasons I mentioned earlier.

Difficult Succession

SP.-EV.: Let us assume that your analysis is correct and that the Belgian nation is dead. Are not the heirs going to quarrel over the spoils?

F.P.: This is indeed a troublesome question. Because it has come up, everybody is experiencing some kind of dull anxiety, everybody is in disarray and everybody is angry. With the exception of the political class, of course. It continues to play with fire and to knock the state to the ground.

Because we not only have Flemish nationalism which I have challenged. There was also what we call party rule and there were labor unions of all kinds.

This process of disintegration of the state in effect was all mixed up with the worst aspects of party rule. And there is nothing uglier with its intrigues and its backhanded blows! A political party is organized partiality!

Now we suddenly have a state that it is so weak that it is incapable of pushing through the draconian and in-depth reforms against the pressure groups which it somehow cannot offer any resistance to and which have been able to organize themselves in a quite considerable fashion. I have been talking about doctors and labor union organizations but there also are the others, the car drivers and even the paper-hangers. They demand all the rights that have been gained so far for themselves and this weak government does not have the strength to cope with the crisis and to implement the

reforms that are absolutely indispensable in straightening out the budget and solving the problems of INAMI [National Institute for Illness and Disability Insurance]. It needs an iron will!

The labor union wants to defend the rights they gained against this vacuum. This is a situation which is certainly becoming Kafkaesque! In view of this vacuum, people keep demanding as if we were still facing a bunch of bosses full of wealth and profit, from whom we wrested advantages over a whole century of "workers struggles." People do not realize that these employers are failing, that the government treasury is empty, and that the treasuries of the ONSS [National Office of Social Security] and of the Department of Ret'rements are in the process of being emptied!

The labor union leaders know that but, as they keep pushing their demands, they undergo a mental distortion so that they cannot stop the machines any more. It becomes a part of their psychology. If they were not to keep demanding more and more, they would cease to exist. They thus act in order to justify their existence and not any longer to obtain objectives which they know no longer can be attained.

So, there is my diagnosis!

SP.-EV.: You have been bopping people left and right and ...

F.P.: ... And they have been applauding me. I am still welcome.

SP.-EV.: One last question: at one time you said that regionalization was indispensable to enable the Walloons to assume their responsibilities and to cease to shift to the others, especially the Flemish, the cause of all their troubles. What do you think today?

F.P.: If they do not assume their responsibilities, they will be left standing at the post. Or they will remain Belgian in disgrace. Bowing to the coattails of the Flemish who will spit their contempt at them.

Tindemans Refutes Accusations

Brussels SPECIAL-L'EVANTAIL in French 11 Apr 80 p 8

[Text] Following the interview we published last week with Mr Francois Perin, in which Mr Perin took Mr Leo Tindemans apart, the CVP chairman also let us know his responses to these attacks.

1. I do not want to go along with the concept of the nation held by Mr Perin. One could easily demonstrate that there is no state without "community" facing you. Just look at Great Britain, Spain, and even France and Germany. Language is not always the decisive factor in these conflicts. Regarding Belgium, I always pleaded in favor of a viable and livable state

and consequently a governable state. On paper, "solutions" sometimes satisfy their authors but the latter forget that you have to have a certain measure of experience in managing public services, a department, a government in order to know that, in the institutional field, there is a world of difference between the "theoretical" viewpoints of the political scientists and every day national and international reality.

When recently on television I drew attention to the monetary consequences of the application of two economic models in Belgium, many pure jurists were astonished over this reaction. They had never thought about it and they did not see that this was bound to come.

I belong to that category--well-known in Flanders--of those who fought (and still fight) for a broader "state" awareness. Theo Lefevre just about every day repeated that, in Flanders, this dimension was often absent in many intellectuals.

2. I would also like to remind Mr Perin that, in 1932, the Flemish leaders proposed a generalized bilingual system, a proposal which was rejected by the French-speaking group. There spokesman, Mr Bovese, fortunately opposed the creation of little linguistic islands in Belgium.

Then I would also remind Mr Perin that, under the Lefevre administration, Interior Minister Arthur Gilson proposed to enlarge Brussels-Capital by incorporating into it several Flemish communities and three communities in Walloon Brabant. The Walloon opposition to that was total. Now, does Mr Perin consider it normal that we are starting community tension all over again every 5 years? You might recall here the 1962-1963 language laws, the revision of the Constitution in 1970, the crisis in 1978, and our present-day difficulties.

Is parliament still taking itself serious, as well as the laws it passes?

3. Mr Perin talks about federalism and declares that he is a federalist. In my book entitled "Une charte pour une Belgique agitée" I wrote that, if federalism were a good solution to our Belgian problems, we would really be crazy not to accept it.

The only trouble is--and this is where Professor Perin becomes a polemicist in this profession of faith--he suddenly loses his scientific qualities because all specialists agree in saying that a two-way or three-way federalism is a contradiction in terms. You do not have to be a learned scholar to realize that. But it is also clear that some people preach federalism because they see something else behind this mask. One might ask oneself whether they do not want to destroy Belgium while accusing "the others" of disloyalty or intolerance.

4. Mr Perin accuses me of having wanted to destroy the community parties. Mr Perin has already distinguished himself several times through fits of

anger in whose course he defiles himself by shouting uncontrolled things which are contrary to the truth. We might remember his diatribe against the king, Mr Harmel, and other well-known personalities during the formation of the government in 1974.

What has now happened in the PRL is something I do not know but he is once again in a state of excitation which causes him to make senseless statements. The trouble with him is that he never listens and he goes on with his monologs without stopping.

Then I would remind you that I was the first one to invite the community parties to Steenokkerzeel Castle in 1974 in order to determine with them whether they could accept government responsibilities and in order thus to emerge from their isolation. The RW [Walloon Rally] did so and if the RW delegation in the Chamber had approved the economic affairs budget in 1977, we would have governed together for 4 years. Mr Perin knows that because in the meantime he has left his party to join the Walloon Liberals.

Under Tindemans II, the big government reform (it remains to be seen whether it was really good) would have been approved if certain politicians had not wanted to force a vote of confidence especially on the articles of Bill 461 of which the Council of State had said that they were in conflict with the Constitution. I do not want to go down in my country's history as the man who consciously wanted to violate the Constitution, to which I have sworn fidelity. Besides, there were other solutions if parliament had been allowed to do what it was supposed to do.

Mr Perin charges me with "unsound Machiavellianism." This is a rather gratuitous accusation. But he claims to forget that the fanatics in the PDF--and that is his term--declared in public and even in writing in their newspapers that Egmont and Stuyvenberg were only "phases" with which their voters were supposed to be content provisionally. Is it then astonishing that Flemish opinion came out in protest?

On 11 October 1978, the day of my resignation, Mr Wilfried Martens met his colleagues--the party chairmen--in order to talk to them about the five constitutional difficulties he saw.

On that same day, a few minutes before 1400, the vice premier let me know that there would be no challenge. In the morning, during the restricted cabinet meeting, I said that challenges by the premier, by the majority party chairmen would probably signify the end of the government.

Several ministers approved what I said. They insisted that each member urgently inform his party.

So, where is this premeditation or this ambush?

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BACKGROUND OF GOVERNMENT CRISIS DETAILED

Brussels KNACK in Dutch 9 Apr 80 pp 26-29

[*"This Week on the Cover"* column by Johan Struye and Frans Verleyen: *"The Passion Play According to Martens;"* items in slantlines published in italics.]

[Text] For perhaps the 500th time during the 15-day debate on the state reform, the score board was filling up with little red, green and white lights: the senators were voting on article 5. A hall filled to capacity, including the galleries, was waiting anxiously. A little later the laconic voice of Chairman Ward Leemans was heard: "117 in favor, 61 against, 2 abstentions, 2 absences. Thus the criterion of the two-thirds majority clearly has not been met." Faint applause from the opposition. Prime Minister Martens slowly rose from his government bench and softly asked for the debate to be adjourned for an indefinite period. For the first time since 1948 and since Achille Van Acker, a government was downed by parliament barehandedly. As Martens had wanted, but had not initially foreseen on that Ash Wednesday. However, the collision in the afternoon between Senator Lindemans (CVP) [Social Christian Party] and PS [francophone Socialist Party] Parliamentary Group Leader Fernand Delmotte shipwrecked the Martens cabinet after exactly 1 year of unrelenting work with the missing of the result right before the finish line as the only result.

It was a strange day, that 2 April, after a strange debate and a strange denouement. A prime minister who ultimately has to rush to the head of state who was called back from vacation, because a former Walloon minister said literally that the Flemish in Brussels form a minority "just like all other minorities in this country . . ." A dirty trick by a moody PS bureau which is tired of being teased by 2 weeks of "dissident behavior" of the big CVP partner who nevertheless had been able to wrest a number of concessions during the past year.

Also an unreal atmosphere. Cools [PS chairman] was absent during the big moment of crisis (he was detained in Liege), just like [CVP Chairman] Tindemans for that matter. But all the other party chairmen were present in the visitors' gallery. The royal cabinet chief also attends, sitting near a military chief of staff. A Walloon senator with a serious heart disease has been literally brought into the senate arena in order to enable him to vote for the government. The same is true for Van Herreweghe from Ghent, his face masked behind a big bandage and a shawl. Scattered among them the full number of team messengers wearing their gold necklaces of state, the military policemen understanding nothing, the voting machine operators, the heat of the TV spots . . . Thus functions a national polity.

Pale people in the corridors. An uneasy feeling that something unreal has happened, something unreasonable and dangerous. The chief of staff watching silently makes an almost ominous impression. First the reaction of shock of the no-voters (Mrs Staels cried), and immediately afterward the vigorous reaction of the defense: "Delmotte is to blame . . ." Karel van Miert is walking around pensively; he doesn't feel like saying anything. Ferdinand de Bondt is beaming; he has worked hard for this collapse of a government into which a year ago he was /not/ admitted. Senator Storne, in a good mood behind his half-moon glasses, knows that a package of academic constitutionalism has been "saved." Simonet looks a little somber; he does not ridicule.

During the recess, Martens, Ricka de Backer [minister of Flemish community affairs] and Chabert [minister of communications] sit quite alone in the hollow-sounding senate hall. The prime minister calls up Cabinet Chief Jan Grauls, holding the palm of his hand over his mouth. Then he walks around slowly and pensively on the red, stained carpet. Fortunately at this hour of the day the stock market is already closed and the Belgian franc has retired, for someone sick goes to sleep early. The erosion will not start until the next day. That of the CVP also? What is still true in this plundered, cheated and unemployed country? Which political leader still has something to offer to the people?

Marc Eyskens [minister of cooperation for development] can hardly believe it all. The francophones should be able to get Martens out of trouble with a concession in a new bill within or outside of articles 260 and 261. And actually that entire state reform ought to be able to remain outside of the work of government in order to lie exclusively in the hands of parliament, as is indeed professed officially. Thus /father/ Eyskens had settled things at the time.

Chabert, Geens [minister of finance] and Claes [minister of economic affairs] later walk to the Sixteen. To think and talk. To find a solution. But Tindemans slipped in and out of the senate building just before them, with the grave expression of a coroner. "What a party, what a party . . ." mutters a CVP minister who wants to remain anonymous. "They don't want it. They don't want the state reform." And [Vice Prime Minister] Guy Spitaels states callously that the PS ministers aren't willing to consider any new

"formula." Wilfried Martens should once again bridle his CVP dissidents. And what else should Martens do? "Have the ambiguous stopped altogether," he says boldly.

The aftermath of Ash Wednesday became clear already on Good Friday. SP Chairman Karel van Miert appeared to stick to the most logical analysis. He and his party were not going to get rid of Wilfried Martens for the time being, contrary to at least eight senators of the latter's own party. Dissidences are no novelty in the CVP. Theo Lefevre in his days already had to reckon with a dozen opposition voters. But in this year of 1980 one cannot even speak of rebels any longer, because those deviating mandataries had the idea given to them psychologically by their party chairman, Leo Tindemans, before and after their deed.

The BSP [(Flemish) Belgian Socialist Party] and its parliamentary group leader Jos Wijninckx in the senate have been maintaining a straight course since last week. The CVP has to abandon its ambiguousness; it has to admit its split. Its communiquees are no longer welcome. Perhaps that will prove to be the best objective of the Flemish socialists during these months: every time they force the CVP to be clear, they themselves score a point. That was already the case in the matter of the missiles, in the Zaire affair and in fact in everything. The socialist party loses all those quarrels, but it improves through them. The only Easter message from Karel van Miert was that the CVP now ought to admit openly that it was its own fault, that it should not blame Delmotte of the Walloon socialists. A week ago the country didn't even know that man's name.

For the umpteenth time since 1968 and longer ago the crisis was born in the bosom of the CVP. This time, however, the government did not pine away in a villa in Ukkel or elsewhere. It did not fall apart from inner weakness or trip up over a strike. The government leader has tendered his team's resignation by asking for the confidence of two-thirds of the senate votes, which technically he did not even need. That confidence was needed for PS Chairman Andre Cools who had gone all out in the government work, but normally the cabinet still had a normal majority at its disposal for any conceivable measures it would have to take.

Thus the cabinet was not cut down in a dark corner, but it lost the high roll it had thrown itself. Prime Minister Martens thus did not run to the king in an excited state, as we have seen happen before, but he called his government colleagues together, as is correct, in order to agree upon their joint action. The king also acted correctly. Confronted with a prime minister who lacked a few votes precisely in his own party, but who otherwise did not have to settle any differences of opinion in his cabinet which was not a minority cabinet, for that matter, he did not accept that resignation on the spot. On the Thursday before Easter politics were in shreds, but the government alone was still standing.

Acting as if in politics one didn't work with agreements and accords rather than with impervious, ultrapersonalized data, CVP Chairman Leo Tindemans defended his dissident senators against the outside world with the argument of their /conscience/. Except for the six no-voters and the two abstainers, an overwhelming majority of 42 CVP senators had voted yes, however. Then what about the conscience of those senators? Will the CVP remain professionally undersized in politics if it is not capable of at least possessing a coherent conscience?

In fact, if from now on one has to work with the politician's conscience, we can hardly progress. Management of public affairs is built on accords, agreements and compromises. The difficulty is that similar conventions then can be concluded also with the CVP alone, with its official spokesman, to the degree that his word is his word with Chairman Tindemans. How would the rest of the political world get to agree with the diverse moods of those eight men: three co-opted ones of whom one is not even a member of the CVP, three provincial senators and two Brussels-elected ones. No one knew under which inspiration precisely the Brussels Senator Leo Lindemans acted. Once again Chairman Tindemans has personalized the latter's reaction to Delmotte to the extreme and thereby brought it into the non-political movings of the mind. He knew the family well; the family had a lot of respect in the Flemish movement in Brussels, etc.

On the other hand there was Delmotte who indeed spoke on behalf of the executive committee of his party. The Walloon socialists had seen the CVP parliamentary group display its deviating behavior for several weeks, which caused irritation. Delmotte's sin was that you can ask anyone in this country for his standpoint, except the CVP. Lindemans and his few regional associates then supposedly changed their vote intention because Delmotte unkindly equated the Flemish community in Brussels with the other "respectable minorities" in Belgium. These days, if you call a child by its name, the government falls down. The impossibility for fertile political work also is evident from the circumstance that no government text whould have been able to satisfy those dissidents, for each of them wanted something else. One wanted to change the date of applicability of the law, the other wanted measures for the assembly council, while yet another wanted nothing to do with any state reform whatsoever. Perhaps Prime Minister Martens might better have never altered the initial text of his government accord, congresses or not. Now he had indeed done that about a half dozen times, but in vain. Article 5 in fact inspired CVP dissidence because it did not specify what had already been worded in full 2 years ago in Stuyvenberg: political Flemish guarantees in Brussels.

Only one thing was sure last week: Leo Tindemans has escaped the moment at which he himself as a member of the chamber would have to cast his vote on Martens' state reform. Thus we were able to learn from him within 24 hours of the Lindemans incident that Lindemans' previous vote in favor in the Commission did not need to bind him in the public session, which view definitely doesn't contribute to a confidence-inspiring picture

of dependability of that party. On television Tindemans expressed yet another surprising thought. After 15 days of the biggest parliamentary debate in years, he casually mentioned that the government bill had to be practically rejected because parliament had the feeling "of not being allowed to have a say in deciding anything!" He also expressed his indignation at the fact that others, through economic pressure, wanted to have his dissident senators approve a "bad" state reform. Louis XIV, Richelieu, Talleyrand or Stresemann would have been rather surprised by Tindemans' theory that in politics it is not proper to couple the Rhine border to pepper from the Venetian shipping companies, or whatever. Coupling of whatever anyone wants, of parallelisms, is just as old as the concluding of treaties and the mutual negotiating of social forces, in short, as old as the trade of politics itself. The parallelism between state reform and social-economic measures was just as respectable as the oil price of the Arabs which increases because the Palestinians do not get their land back. Still, the senate vote now has indicated limits of the political coupling tactic. Nothing restrains the conscience of some Flemish CVP senators: not the franc, not the public debt of 173,000 francs per Belgian citizen and not even the impossibility in which their own Minister, Gaston Geens of Finances, will presently find himself in collecting taxes. During the senate debate the franc had remained stable and had even increased a little because the newspapers had started to suggest that the prime minister "was getting through," but on 3 April the National Bank suddenly had to come up with 3 billion francs in foreign currency. If this situation continues for a while, the Lindemans-Tindemans conscience will shortly cost our community a multiple of many years of Flemish "sustenance" to Wallonia. What we experienced last week and what the outside world is observing with increasing surprise, is no less than a mortgage on our prosperity.

While People's Union Chairman /Vic Anciaux/ couldn't think of anything better than propose a front with all the Flemish political parties plus non-political pressure groups which are already so busy in Fourons, the francophone front was reborn already in the early morning between the politicians Cools and [former Minister of Defense] Paul Vanden Boeynants. A francophone front can become really solid only with Jean Gol in it. If the senate had voted on 261, the PRL [Liberal Reform Party] chairman would have had the situation in hand. He could have supported the bill in order not to receive Cools' mortal reproach that the liberals had stopped the carrying out of 107-4, while a similar complaisance could have paved the path for the Walloon socialists to regress a little from their allergic reaction to liberalness. Nothing in Wilfried Martens' behavior prevented admittance of a third partner in a like manner. The CVP senators really didn't have to vote in the conviction that they gave their approval to a text which had to fall through completely in the second chamber.

A few fascinating questions remain unanswered. How would Leo Tindemans himself have voted last week if he happened to have been a senator?

If elections will result from it, what sort of campaign will the CVP then take to the voting booth? Only for Wilfried Martens himself will the theme of his proclamations not become a problem. Since the time of his government statement just a year ago, which was approved by the CVP, he has helped his party to a maximum extent. That which was called irreversible, was made meaningfully reversible for Flanders. The idea of partial governments outside of the national cabinet was launched; no autonomous Brussels power can arise. Finally, the FDF [Francophone Democratic Front] was thrown out in a hardly polite manner. Wasn't that enough? And does the Flemish community demand even further concessions from the francophones? That isn't obvious from the most recent MU opinion poll: the national and Flemish popularity of Wilfried Martens is right behind that of Tindemans according to the figures and in Flanders it is just ahead of that of Karel van Miert. Possible elections would at least show up important shifts in the personal weight of some prominent CVP members.

The prime minister went into the Easter weekend detached from these considerations, for in no way did he steer toward an electoral test, which could bring him only personal success. [He went] with dossiers and texts in order to be able to submit a new bill to the majority of the parliamentary senate groups, in order to arrive at an effective and in advance guaranteed protection of the communities in the capital ("Flemish minority" was expressed indelicately, for this term is too reminiscent of the people of Fourons and the francophones in the Brussels fringe area).

All those who call themselves "observers" in and around the Wetstraat [government buildings location] have seldom been so unified in their denunciation of a lengthy cabinet crisis. Undoubtedly the CVP has noticed it also and it can only stimulate this party to arrive once again at a coherent action.

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JORGENSEN PRESENTS CRISIS PLAN; INDUSTRY, LO ATTACK

Opposition Demands Changes

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 9 Apr 80 p 5

[Article by Lisbeth Knudsen]

[Text] The economic grip on the Danish people will be tightened year by year throughout the 1980's so that by the end of the decade the Danish economy will be in balance. That is the government's economic goal in connection with the spring plan that has now been made public. The disposable real income of those in the labor force will decline 5 percent this year and the grip will be tightened in the years ahead with annual declines of 1.5-2.0 percent until the end of 1984. Therefore the government has stressed that its spring plan is just the first step in a long list of economic interventions.

After a meeting of ministers and a meeting of the Social Democratic group in parliament yesterday in which the plan received a final polish but underwent very few real changes in relation to the first draft from last Tuesday, the plan was presented to all the parties represented in Folketing and to a number of organizations. The major features can be summarized in this way:

Business policy: An industrial policy contact organ between the government and business life will be set up with reference to analysis and investigation and there will be a planning secretariat for the contact organ in the Industrial Ministry. The price and profit law will be moderated so that firms will be able to include higher interest costs and depreciation on new investments in their calculations. In the upcoming session of Folketing the government will present a bill to ease taxes on stock profits and eliminate equalization taxes. A voluntary agreement will be sought with insurance companies and pension funds on transferring risk capital to business in return for a government pledge not to tax capital accumulation by these institutions. A working group

from the Economic Affairs Ministry and the parties concerned will try to arrive at an agreement before the summer vacation to transfer 20 billion kroner from passive investments to active business investments in return for a special low beginning interest rate on invested capital and a later share in any surplus that might result.

More Guaranteed Exchange Rate Loans

The temporary increase in building depreciations for business firms will be continued. The rules for immediate depreciation will be improved so that the limit is raised from 1800 kroner to 3000 kroner. State subsidies for product development will be tax-free. At the same time the government is proposing spreading taxes on aid from the Fund to Promote Technical and Industrial Development over a 10-year period. The so-called K loans, foreign business loans at guaranteed exchange rates, will be increased by 600 million kroner, bringing them up to a total of 2.1 billion kroner. A single industrial institute for handling real credit will be set up along the lines of the Agricultural Real Credit Fund. The regional technological information centers for businesses will be gradually expanded with the goal being one center for each county. Public purchasing of Danish products instead of imported products should give extra sales of 1 billion kroner to Danish firms and lead to the creation of several thousand jobs. An effective organization will be built up to channel and develop contacts in a cooperation between the state and business interests under the Industrial Affairs Ministry. The foreign sales activities of firms will be strengthened with state support and other measures.

Employment

Labor policy: In 1981 and the following 2 years an employment plan costing 4.5 billion kroner will be implemented. It contains a strong element of retraining courses, refresher training, courses for people unemployed for longer periods of time, reinforcement of job referrals, introductory trade courses for young people and the introduction of equal status consultants at a total cost of 598 million kroner. Some 90 million kroner will go to expansion of the youth guarantee system, 240 million will go to expanded vocational training, and there will be special offers of many state teaching and student teaching jobs for academicians who have been out of work for extended periods. The plan includes 351 million kroner for an urban renewal project. There will be 20 million kroner for new vacation centers. Some 400 million kroner have been earmarked for special insulation grants to low-income families and pension recipients. Special subsidies will go toward the promotion of building exports and the plan includes a total of 666 million kroner for various subsidy arrangements for industrial exports and tourism in Denmark. Agriculture will get 388 million kroner in the government's

employment plan and mass transit will receive 155 million kroner for new materiel.

Benefits

To insure better job distribution there will be a nationwide campaign to clarify the labor needs of individual firms conducted jointly by the major organizations and the employment exchange offices. The temporary arrangement under which employers received a refund for the fourth and fifth weeks of employee illness is being terminated. Instead firms will not assume responsibility for new employees until they have been there for 3 weeks. The government plan calls for employers as a general rule to pay for the first day of unemployment for wage earners. The rules on refusing job offers will be tightened to make sure at all times that unemployed workers are really available for work. The job offer system will be changed starting 1 April next year so that offers are made a half year earlier than is the case under the current arrangement. There will also be a gradual tightening of the requirement for membership in an unemployment fund group in connection with early retirement payments.

Energy Consumption

Energy policy: In all 1-2 billion kroner must be saved on payments for imported energy. Use of the Danish natural gas in the North Sea will be pushed up and a state oil pipeline will be built. Direct state oil imports will be introduced. Rules will be worked out concerning maximum energy consumption in buildings and the measurement of energy consumption in collective facilities. Hooking up to existing district heating plants will be encouraged. All sources of energy should be utilized including nuclear energy as soon as waste disposal and safety problems have been solved satisfactorily, according to the plan.

Income development: The government is assuming that the labor market factions will find their own solution in the approaching contract negotiations without political intervention and "within the limits imposed by the serious socioeconomic situation."

Taxes

Consumer taxes: The electric tax will be raised 4.5 ore per kWh to 12.5 ore. The tax on gas and diesel oil, including heating oil, will be increased by 6 ore per liter to 36 ore per liter and the tax on fuel oil will be raised by 7 ore to 41 ore per liter. The gasoline tax will go up 10 ore per liter to 192 ore. Gas taxes will be reduced 20 percent. The automobile weight tax will increase 25 percent and charter taxes will increase 55 kroner to 180 kroner per trip.

Other taxes: A temporary state property tax of 3 per mil on 16 units of the regular assessment will be introduced on all land and real

property. The tax can be deducted if the property is used for business purposes, otherwise it cannot. For people on pensions there is a prospect of freezing taxes as a public priority. In the first round the tax will be levied in 1981 while the government tries to get a more permanent solution on property taxes and rental values. Rental values for 1981 will be set at the same level as this year. And the Tax Minister will try to get a regulation of the rates for deductions on driving between home and job.

Cuts

Savings: Only the savings of 2.5 billion kroner will be implemented in 1980. In 1981 2.2 billion kroner will be saved on state spending and 3.6 billion kroner on municipal spending. The major savings areas are these: limited increases in aid to developing countries, withdrawal of money from the value-added tax fund and disengagement and compensation funds, regulation of the basic social security pension payment and introduction of a social income concept. There will also be a reduction of child support payments for incomes 110,000 kroner and more instead of 144,000 kroner, a limited pregnancy leave proposal, a delay in introducing the second phase of the pension reform, income-regulated disability payments, an increase in many fees under the Justice Ministry and the Tax Ministry, postponement of improvements in student grants and in construction on the Royal Theater. And finally the plan proposes to step up the job offer system, reduce the increase in hospital expenses, tighten up the Assistance Act with a fixed limit to the amount of cash assistance, increase the size of after-school classes and raise the maximum norms for spending in the public library sector.

Disappointment in All Political Parties

Disappointment, anxiety and demands for fundamental changes were characteristic of all the political comments on the government's crisis plan. Demands for total rejection could be heard from both wings of the political spectrum. The other parties want to negotiate. But the expectations of results from this are small.

Liberal Henning Christophersen: "The government's plan is just headlines. We have to know more about its real content to evaluate it. We are especially interested in the relationship of the government plan to the proposals made by the Liberal Party." Liberal Uffe Ellemann-Jensen: "This is a disappointing move that does not suggest a real determination on the part of the Social Democrats to take strong enough steps to deal with the economic problems. Talks will show if it is possible to put pressure on the government to pursue a responsible policy. The Liberal goal is to insure an economic policy that will turn developments in the right direction. This will call for big changes."

Solid Majority Behind Plan?

Conservative Poul Schluter: "It is a very weak plan that won't do the job. We must now find out if the government intends to work with a solid majority. If it includes us the plan will have to be changed extensively. The plan is too resigned, passive and negative. It is wrong to work on the basis of large tax increases and small spending cuts. The excessive tax hikes must be eliminated along with the taxes on condominiums and owner-occupied houses and an agreement should be made to save 10 billion kroner in expenditures. At the same time we want a policy to promote business activity, especially in branches competing with foreign products. Now we must see if the government is prepared to make decisive changes."

Progressive Mogens Glistrup: "The government plan closely resembles the August and September compromises that have worsened Denmark's situation time after time--more public spending, more restrictions and more taxes. Since our foreign debt has to be repaid it would be better to benefit export branches with lower taxes and fewer restrictions."

Big Changes Needed

Ebba Strange and Gert Petersen of the Socialist People's Party: "The government plan includes very diverse elements. We would like to discuss some of the energy policy ideas but the thought of slashing spending in the areas of education and social policy is quite unacceptable to us. We can live with business subsidies if there are guarantees that they will be used to promote employment and reduce the balance of payments but the plan doesn't mention this. We are prepared to negotiate but there must be a social redistribution that will benefit ordinary people and there must be real control over business life to promote employment opportunities and greater self-sufficiency in this country."

Radical Liberal Niels Helveg Petersen: "We can't go along with destroying social security pensions. There is too little that can promote production in the rest of the plan. The plan would have to undergo vital changes to give it some value. All in all the total solution must be much stronger in dealing with the balance of payments deficit." **Radical Liberal Ole Vig Jensen:** "There are not enough savings and too many taxes while we should be going the other way. Both the business policy and the labor market section are too weak. We view the plan as a draft for negotiation. That's the way the prime minister presented it. But in general I must say that the plan is not nearly concrete enough."

Leftist Socialists Choose Election

Democratic Center (CD) parliamentary group: "CD is very glad that the plan is formed like an open catalog. On that basis the party will meet for discussions. We cannot go along with any item taxes that have an

arbitrary and inequitable impact. We are opposed to new double burdens on citizens who have cars or own their own homes. The business support is not wholehearted. CD favors saving but warns against cutting social security pensions. The public spending share of the national product should be reduced 1 percent annually over a 10-year period."

Leftist Socialist Preben Wilhjelm: "Tax increases of 5 billion kroner a year and graduated savings up to 8 billion kroner by 1983 will inevitably make unemployment much worse. Capital has to be buttered up and ordinary taxpayers will pay several thousand kroner more in taxes while getting less in return. The government plan is so friendly to capital and so hostile to workers that we would prefer an election to passage of this plan."

Niels Molgaard, Single-tax Party: "We are in favor of savings but some individual items must be rejected. However we would replace these with others. We oppose increased public spending on things like business subsidies but we approve of higher property taxes. These should not be on buildings though as the government proposes but on land. We cannot take a stand on the pension proposals until we have seen more detailed figures. The government should utilize the real majority that can be assembled in Folketing from one area to another."

Families and Home Owners Affected

Christian Christensen of the Christian People's Party: "The savings in the plan are too low and the taxes are too high. Both will have a heavy impact on small home owners, families with children and the elderly. The biggest savings are on pension, the biggest tax hikes on real property. That's certainly not the direction we want things to go."

Communist Jorgen Jensen: "The government proposal contains a number of asocial savings measures and a tangled bunch of ideas on cheap capital for businesses which would paralyze construction and increase unemployment. We must reject the government plan and call on workers to block implementation of these reactionary proposals."

Government Needs Rescue

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 10 Apr 80 p 10

[Editorial]

[Text] During the big TV hearing on Denmark's economic problems the day before yesterday the assembled experts were very cautious in speaking of the economic plan presented by the government. This is understandable

since this is a comprehensive complex of proposals first made public a few hours before the broadcast. Despite this caution in making judgments it was hard for the experts to conceal that the so-called economic policy action program presented by the government is not very convincing in light of the country's economic problems.

A closer analysis of the proposals shows in fact that we are dealing once more with an inadequate government policy. As announced the government intends to save around 8 billion kroner in state budgets for 1981 to which must be added estimated revenues of 5 billion kroner from increased excise and property taxes along with spending increases on a so-called employment plan the exact details of which are not yet known. In other words the fiscal austerity proposed should involve a good 10 billion kroner when allowances are made for the employment plan. Even at best this can scarcely be expected to produce an improvement in the balance of payments of more than approximately 5 billion kroner. This should be viewed in relation to an anticipated balance of payments deficit of 15-20 billion kroner in 1981 with prospects of an increase in subsequent years.

On the face of it then even if the government's plan is carried out in its entirety it will be unable to bring the balance of payments deficit down to an acceptable level and thus check the explosive growth in interest costs that is paralyzing the nation's economy. How the government in this connection was able to figure out that the proposed policy would reduce the balance of payments deficit to between 5 and 10 billion kroner by the middle of the 1980's and make total balance possible by the end of the decade remains unclear. The only way these calculated improvements can occur is through future competitive improvements and extremely favorable export developments that have absolutely no connection with the proposed economic policy. The government says itself that it doesn't feel it is possible to make more precise estimates of the proposed policy's effects on the balance of payments but at the same time it has set its civil servants to figure out that the results would be exactly as good as they need to be. Now the government has evidently gone so far in its defeatist policy that it has abandoned attempts at realistic economic planning in favor of political incantations and wishful thinking.

It is completely unrealistic to think that the so-called business-stimulating proposals the government intends to carry out will be able to correct the situation and give business the necessary incentive to increase production and exports. The entire aim of this group of steps is distorted in relation to the actual problems of business as can be seen most clearly in the plan to transfer 20 billion kroner of pension fund and life insurance company reserves from passive to active capital investment. As far as we can judge such an operation would be quite unworkable in practice and it would in no way solve the problem of

excessive domestic cost levels. On the contrary it would cause problems for construction and the stock market. Compulsory intervention of the kind the government is proposing here can be expected to lead to economic waste of considerable proportions.

Some other business-stimulating proposals, especially in the tax area, are more positive. But in the vital area of costs the government is sticking to generalities. In spite of all the talk about promoting business the fact that they have given up on doing something about sharp wage increases in the private labor market in the future and are actually going to increase cost pressures through new energy taxes--that will hardly lead to any major energy savings in addition to those already on the way--make a future prospects for Danish business appear quite bleak. And there is no doubt, as the LO [Danish Federation of Trade Unions] chairman predicted that unemployment will rise even more sharply.

The government's plan cannot provide an adequate shove in the direction of the desired improvement in the balance of payments. The government needs to be rescued.

Budget Savings Explained

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 19 Apr 80 p 11

[Article by Frank Dahlgaard]

[Text] According to the government's proposed plan the state and the municipalities should save about 8 billion kroner in 1981.

This figure for public spending has produced violent discussion among the parties at Christiansborg, not without reason. For when the government says it intends to save 8 billion kroner in the public sector next year this does not mean--as one might think--that expenditures in 1981 will be 8 billion kroner less in fixed prices than in 1980. It means that public spending will be reduced by 8 billion in relation to budgeted growth.

And as we will see below even this description does not convey the reality of the situation.

Two Kinds of Consumption

The government's own economists in the Finance Ministry have presented figures showing how public and private consumption will develop up to and including 1984 if the government's "multi-year economic policy action program" is carried out. BERLINGSKE TIDENDE "translated" these figures in the graph reproduced here [not included].

As it shows the government is planning a growth in public consumption of 11.3 percent in fixed prices in the next 5 years while private consumption would decline 3-4 percent in the same period.

That private consumption will decline in the years ahead is an understandable consequence of the decline in real wages and the planned tax increases. It is a little harder to understand why public consumption will grow so much despite the planned savings in the public sector.

And it is not immediately clear from the government's figures (see illustration) that there is any basis for the claim that private business activity is being stimulated and the public sector is being checked. Why not switch the curves around in that case?

Delays

The government could say with perfect justice that public consumption would rise even more if savings steps were not taken. To a large extent the "savings" represent delays in planned projects and "reforms." The government would also be justified in saying that the planned savings in public spending are concentrated primarily on public investments and income transfers (pensions, assistance payments, etc.) rather than on public consumption. A choice has been made to spare the existing public institutions and their personnel. In other words according to the government public consumption should be allowed to grow perceptibly while private consumption must be held in check.

Reusing Figures

When the government speaks of saving 8 billion kroner in 1981 this figure is achieved only by reusing public savings figures previously agreed on. In June 1979 the parties agreed to save 2.5 billion kroner in the budget and to limit growth in municipal spending to 2 percent from 1980 to 1981. That calls for municipal savings of 3.6 billion kroner in 1981 and these already agreed-upon savings figures are reappearing now in the government's new plan.

In other words a good 75 percent of the 1981 savings the government wants were agreed on already last June.

Along with the government savings plan a so-called "Employment Plan III" is also being presented, at a cost of 4.6 billion kroner. (With this the spending limit of 4.5 billion kroner agreed on in December will be exceeded by 68 million kroner but this is only a small amount in the larger context.)

Of course the 4.6 billion employment and business plan must be subtracted from the planned savings, making the whole thing much less impressive.

And the fact is that the government itself expects the state budget deficit to increase from 12.3 billion kroner this year to 16.1 billion kroner in 1981--a 30 percent increase in the deficit.

To date the National Bank has remained silent but there is no doubt as to the bank's evaluation of the government's savings plan. In an interview on 5 March director Erik Hoffmeyer said straight out that a state deficit of 12-13 billion kroner "is much too large."

As we said the deficit will go over 16 billion kroner in 1981.

Finally it should be mentioned that much of what the government calls "savings" actually represents increases in rates and fees.

More Spending

Thus we must conclude that the savings plan presented by the government will merely moderate a terrific hike in public spending, that most of the savings stem from an agreement back in June 1979, that to a large extent the savings are revenue increases, that the announced Employment Plan III works against the savings plan and that the state deficit will rise sharply next year.

It is easy enough to say that the savings plans presented for the public sector are inadequate to solve the deficit and indebtedness problems of the nation. But the above analysis documents that inadequacy.

Budget Plan Criticized

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 18 Apr 80 p 8

[Editorial]

[Text] The socioeconomic information in the government's review of the budget (BR 80) will come as no surprise to those who take an interest in the Danish economy but it is a frightening indication of how far Denmark has gone in the economic morass. If there is no change in our economic policy it is estimated that our net foreign debt will increase from around 80 billion kroner at the end of 1979 to approximately 180 billion in 1984. The deficit in the state's operating, investment and loan budget also shows a marked rising tendency.

The figures show very clearly that a very comprehensive economic intervention is needed. In this connection it must be stated plainly that the plan presented by the government right after Easter is totally inadequate in relation to the problems that exist. The government does also say that the plan must be supplemented each year with extensive fiscal policy measures, exchange rate regulation and so forth.

In an article yesterday the finance minister deplored the criticism in BERLINGSKE TIDENDE of the calculations by government economists in Pamphlet 13 B from the Budget Ministry. The minister called on us to take a stand instead on the government's economic policy goals, but in this context the request is of no interest. For years the best of intentions concerning economic policy have been shown on the political scene. The perspective plans were aimed at a rapid elimination of the balance of payments deficit, the goal of the August compromise I in 1976 was to have wages rise by no more than 6 percent a year for the next 2 years, the Marienborg declaration set an upper limit for the 1979 balance of payments deficit at 6.5 billion kroner, etc. In the course of time the goal desired has declined in significance, actions are what count.

Therefore it is also misleading when the government plan in Pamphlet 13 B is accompanied by economic calculations based on a number of assumptions quite outside the proposal announced by the government. Among other things it assumes an annual improvement of 2-3 percent in competitiveness which is necessary to achieve the desired reduction in the balance of payments deficit, but the assumption is completely divorced from the realities and the government's own policy. For example the budget review notes that there are only limited opportunities for utilizing the currency exchange policy and the government itself has said that it has no further plans in the area of income policy.

What is needed is an indication of the effects of the proposed economic policy, not wishful thinking about how one would like things to work out.

State Has Good Credit Rating

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 1 Apr 80 p 12

[Article by Frank Dahlgaard]

[Text] There is now concrete documentation that Denmark's credit rating abroad has not suffered serious damage as a result of the talk in recent months of the "economic abyss."

Finance Minister Svend Jacobsen will soon sign a new state loan for \$225 million, almost 1.4 billion kroner. The loan was obtained on the same fine terms as the enormous \$600 million loan obtained last summer.

Director Steen Rasborg of Privatbank, the spokesman for the consortium of Danish banks that is negotiating the loan on behalf of the state, told BERLINGSKE TIDENDE that the good lending terms on the new loan show that Denmark's credit standing has apparently not declined since last year.

Interest at 20 Percent

The loan will run for 8 years with a variable interest rate only 1/2 percent above the so-called LIBOR (London Interbank Offer Rate). At the moment this rate amounts to around 20 percent on an annual basis if the loan is taken out in dollars--which is the customary thing to do.

A rate of 20 percent is very high but this is simply an expression of the unusually high interest level on the international market. But what bank people and officials in the Finance Ministry are stressing is that Denmark is still paying excess interest of only 1/2 percent--the same as it did last summer.

The state loan of \$225 million will be granted by five big banks. Which banks are involved has not yet been disclosed.

Hoffmeyer-Hjortnaes Case

After the Hoffmeyer-Hjortnaes case in January many Danish bank people feared that the case would damage the country's credit standing. National Bank director Erik Hoffmeyer said then that Denmark was already on the way into the "abyss" and that we were approaching the point when it would be harder for us to get loans from foreign lenders. Tax Minister Karl Hjortnaes criticized the National Bank director for these public admissions which he felt would in themselves hurt Denmark's borrowing opportunities but the government dissociated itself from this criticism.

The case had reverberations in the international financial press but the new state loan that has just been negotiated on excellent terms for Denmark shows that Danish credit is still good.

Director Steen Rasborg of Privatbank said however that liquidity on the international capital market is very good at the moment and naturally that is a factor enabling us to borrow now on such good terms.

Borrowing Needs This Year

Rasborg also said that in addition to currency reserves Denmark has big untapped loans in reserve abroad so that there is absolutely no urgency about taking out new loans.

"It is our strategy to take out loans on the market when conditions are good whether or not there is an immediate need for the money," said Steen Rasborg.

The total state need for getting foreign loans this year is estimated at around 10 billion kroner, Rasborg revealed.

The latest state loan was signed on 8 January for 200 million German marks. Thus that loan was signed just before director Erik Hoffmeyer wrote his controversial "abyss article" in BERLINGSKE TIDENDE.

The new \$225 million loan shows that this article and the debate that followed did not have much influence on our credit standing.

Jobless Rate Would Rise

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 2 Apr 80 p 12

[Article by Frank Dahlgaard]

[Text] The government's Easter plan to increase a number of taxes and fees and save on public spending will increase unemployment by 40-50,000 jobs.

That is the opinion of Economics Professor Gunnar Thorlund Jepsen of Aarhus University who said the financial policy cuts outlined would reduce the payments deficit by only 2-3 billion kroner.

"Compared to the anticipated payments deficit of between 15 and 20 billion kroner this year an improvement of 2 or 3 billion is not much," Thorlund Jepsen said and went on:

"I am well aware that the employment plan presented and the ideas on supporting business would counteract the increase in unemployment that would result from the fiscal policy itself (taxes and savings measures, Ed.). All that can be said to that is that the business and employment plan will also reduce the improvement in the payments balance that would result from the financial austerity plan itself."

Camouflaged Taxes

Professor Thorlund Jepsen did not find many positive elements in the government plans that have leaked to the mass media so far.

"The important thing for the Danish economy is to improve our competitiveness in relation to other countries and there is nothing in the government's plans that will really do the trick here."

Thorlund Jepsen noted that a large part of the planned public savings actually represent camouflaged tax increases:

"The graduated reduction of child subsidies and social security pensions at higher income levels is a tax increase and not a saving in public spending. Incidentally the proposals will call for more public employees

at municipal social assistance and tax offices. But I think the announced new property tax is a good way to limit housing demand though it will probably prove impossible to get this proposal through Folketing. The higher energy taxes will inevitably increase business costs when what is needed is the exact opposite."

Superficial Plans

The government's plans to transfer risk capital to business from pension funds and insurance companies are regarded as unrealistic by Thorlund Jepsen. Instead taxfree institutions should be taxed in the same way as ordinary stock companies, he said.

"In general my objection to the Easter move is that it is superficial and lacking in an analysis of the administrative and spending consequences. There simply is no consideration of the long-range aspects," said Thorlund Jepsen.

As an example the professor mentioned the proposal to reduce subsidies for children and pensions which in reality means a tax increase for many people as well as a change in the principles governing social security pensions. "We're going back to the old age pension principle," said Thorlund Jepsen who asked how many politicians really want that to happen.

Some Praise for Anker J.

The Arhus professor warned politicians in conclusion against going into a selective credit policy of the type obviously planned within the framework of the announced business policy.

"What is needed is a policy to moderate costs and here it must be noted to Anker Jorgensen's credit that he actually did try to implement such a policy in connection with the December intervention. Ideas were presented then concerning a larger devaluation than the one that was enacted and a total wage freeze," Thorlund Jepsen concluded.

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CSO: 3106

COMMUNIST PARTY CONGRESS WEIGHS ELECTION DEFEAT**Chairman Addresses Meeting**

Copenhagen LAND OG FOLK in Danish 8 Apr 80 p 3

[Text] After a lot of talking had been done, with 120 delegates taking part in the discussion, the re-elected chairman of the Danish CP, Jorgen Jensen, held his concluding speech on Sunday morning. He asked the delegates to continue the discussion in the party on the basis of what had been done at the congress.

"We have to present a unified point of view. With the confusion there is in politics we cannot become a unifying force if we ourselves don't believe that we are right. Others must be convinced that our party is a force that can pull things together--a force that can pave the way for a new policy," Jorgen Jensen said.

More Political

The background for these remarks came from criticism that Danish CP discussions have not had enough political content. Extensive tasks should not prevent us from political discussions--on the contrary, such discussions are a prerequisite for getting the work done, Jorgen Jensen said.

"The leaders have the responsibility but the doctrine belongs to the party. Therefore collective decisions are always correct. It weakens us if some people are not involved in the decision. That is a problem we have to work on too."

There should be criticism of the leadership but such criticism must not destroy respect in the leadership. Jorgen Jensen also rejected the anxiety expressed about popularizing some comrades. "That is part of the effort to popularize our policies. We have shown we can do this in the past, so let's do it."

Openness

In Jorgen Jensen's opinion the large participation in discussion at the congress, while encouraging also led to some problems since the need to cut the length of speeches led to rather superficial treatment of the problems.

He mentioned the possibility of assigning a certain length of time for speeches to each delegation which would then allocate the time within its group, making sure that all viewpoints could be expressed. That would make it possible to have a more thorough discussion and provide greater openness.

"Each comrade must feel that he has some influence. There shouldn't be any clenched fists in our pockets after a discussion like the one we have had here but that means taking an interest in the problems and taking an active part."

One speaker had asked who was responsible for holding up information about the conflict with Preben Moller Hansen so it did not get out to the membership. "I'd like to know the same thing," Jorgen Jensen said.

"We have discussed publicly the need for unified work, our stand on work in joint organizations and many other issues involved in the disagreements with Preben Moller Hansen."

In this connection Jorgen Jensen pointed to the information meetings held by the Central Committee and at the congress in which there was complete openness about the problems and where members could obtain all the information they needed for their political activity.

Union Movement

LAND OG POLK has begun to report more about Central Committee meetings and that line should be continued. The party and the public must be won over to our way of thinking and we must make every party comrade capable of propagandizing for these views.

Jorgen Jensen did not think it was a good idea to cut back on activities in order to provide more funds.

"For example some people think the LAND OG POLK festival should be eliminated. I don't think that would give us more resources--on the contrary. We might risk diminishing our resources because our contacts and inspiration might diminish also."

The same thing applies to other activities. For example we have our own printing house to free ourselves from possible outside pressures. Thus

these activities are a tool in the struggle. If they stop being that we might just as well get rid of them.

To those voices that have been heard saying that the Danish CP doesn't get enough out of its union positions when it comes to voter influence Jorgen Jensen had this to say:

"This kind of thing is never the essential issue for us. We take part in the struggle because there is work to do, we have to give the working class confidence in itself, we have to give direction to the struggle. If the important thing for us was to use the union movement to get votes for ourselves we would lose both."

Goal of the Struggle

Each aspect of the struggle has a goal. Our struggle for an anti-monopolistic democracy must have a place in each one of these efforts. A labor struggle against a layoff is also a struggle for the anti-monopolistic democracy, for example.

Communists are needed in these struggles. If we had not always participated in these minor efforts we would be living in a very different country today.

Therefore we should learn something from the small actions that have produced results. The Danish CP was not pursuing egoistic party interests in our efforts against EEC and our contribution to the Popular Movement. This gave strength to the struggle and provided our party with experience.

We must look at what is essential in the struggle. This also applies to OD [Economic Democracy]. This struggle must be fought in concrete terms by attacking the positions of big capital. We must demonstrate that the Social Democrats are leading the working class astray on this issue but we must not present the Social Democrats or OD as the main enemy for that would obscure our goal.

Overcome Power

"At the moment LO [Danish Federation of Trade Unions] is spending millions on propaganda for OD. It is issuing pamphlets, hiring consultants and giving dinners. Even so most of the workers are against it.

"That in itself does not mean that we have won. We have not won unless the working class is won over to our views. Economic democracy means overcoming power, attacking the financial institutions.

"We should use their discussions of OD to show this perspective--and win the working class over to something else. This means arguing for socialism, not for buying shares. In this connection we should use the other side's information in our arguments.

"We should be able to influence the Social Democrats. That would erode their ties to big capital. The masses must be made to realize that reforms of the OD type are helping to hold them tightly--keeping them from making any progress."

Of the basis for the progress to be made Jorgen Jensen said: "We will continue to discuss our attitudes--even after this congress is over--but the discussions must be held on the basis of decisions made at this congress. Take what you have learned at this congress back to the party. That way we can create a strong party."

Fewer Worker Members

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 8 Apr 80 p 10

[Text] There was sharp criticism of the Danish CP's participation in some city budget compromises.

An amicable replacement of 40 percent of the party leadership of the Danish CP was one of the most important results of the party's 26th Congress which concluded Sunday in Brondby outside Copenhagen.

The congress was also a recommendation to party leaders to change their priorities with regard to party efforts so that political actions and collecting money and signatures don't take up so much of the time of the approximately 9000 party members that there isn't enough time left over for internal political discussion.

The re-elected party chairman, Jorgen Jensen, who together with party ideologist Ib Norlund was unanimously re-elected to the party's Central Committee concluded by calling the congress "strong and good."

"We have shown that we can replace leaders and make decisions on the basis of what we believe to be correct and not on the basis of pressure from others," said Jorgen Jensen.

The congress did not mean any change in the ideological basis of the party. The Danish CP is still a revolutionary party trying with all its might to mobilize the working class in order to change Danish society into a socialist society.

Critical of Peking

The Danish CP is still strongly linked ideologically with the Soviet version of world communism and Sunday the party marked its position in a manifesto by rejecting the "Maoist leadership in Peking," which is "actively opposed to detente and has allied itself with the blackest forces of imperialism."

"Through support of NATO and EEC, armed aggression against Vietnam and fanatic opposition to disarmament in any form the Chinese leaders are fighting against peace and progress," the manifesto said.

The 49-member Central Committee which is the party's highest daily authority between the congresses held every 4 years acquired 12 new members at the congress. But only one of the Central Committee members seeking re-election was defeated. Eleven of the seats were vacant due to expansion of the committee by two members, death, expulsion, resignation and retirement due to age.

Some of the criticism at the congress was directed at the budget compromises the Danish CP had participated in last year in Arhus and Copenhagen.

The compromise in Copenhagen was defended by environmentalist mayor Ivan Hansen among others but the 404 congressional delegates showed their dissatisfaction by placing Ivan Hansen and two other Danish CP members of the Copenhagen City Council far down on the list of those elected to the Central Committee. Thus with 285 votes Ivan Hansen was number 43 out of the 49 who were elected.

Top scorers in the election were party chairman Jorgen Jensen and party ideologist Ib Norlund who both received all the 396 valid votes cast. Dan Lundrup, chairman of the Copenhagen division of the Danish Typographers' Union, got 393 votes and Harry Osborn, chairman of the Copenhagen division of the Masons' Union, got 390.

The new Central Committee has eight women members compared to five on the old committee and the generation shift was marked by the fact that eight of the 12 newly-elected members have been Central Committee candidates before.

Mogens Hover Out

One of those who was not elected to the Central Committee was the deposed head of the Danish Lithographic Union, Mogens Hover. But he and two others were re-elected as Central Committee candidates while 12 more were elected for the first time. The biggest vote went to one of the newly-elected members, pianist Anders Ahnfeldt-Ronne of Copenhagen. At

the congress he criticized party members for resorting too often to bulldozer tactics in agitating for party viewpoints.

There were no big surprises in the party leadership elections or other voting at the congress. Before a vote was taken all proposals were reviewed by a congressional committee made up of representatives of the party leadership and of party districts across the country and the recommendations of these committees were followed.

Fewer Workers

One of the areas in which the Danish CP intends to make an active effort in the future is on-the-job actions against cuts and income policies. This will also help strengthen party representation of workers from the LO sector. Their percentage of party membership fell from 44.8 to 38.4 percent during the last 4 years.

Activity in the union movement is also one of the methods the party will use to strengthen its position with the electorate. This position remains weak and in the latest Gallup poll, published last Sunday in BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, the Danish CP was still below the 2 percent barrier.

Self-criticism

In the Central Committee report to the congress party chairman Jorgen Jensen said that the election defeat in October was mainly due to the absence of working-class movements centered on the Danish CP's political proposals and attitudes.

"It was also due to many coinciding factors, an overestimation of the party's political opportunities, anticommunism, erroneous estimates and political conflicts," he said.

The political conflict that led last fall to the resignation of the party's city council group in Helsingør and the expulsion of the chairman of the Seamen's Union, Preben Moller Hansen, was mentioned very little in the debate at the congress.

Only 25 Percent in Unions

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 5 Apr 80 p 5

[Text] The Danish CP has gained 3500 new members since its last congress in 1976. Total membership figures after subtracting resignations were not released but the net growth was 9 percent since 1976.

Party secretary Poul Emanuel revealed that while 55.7 percent of the total Danish CP membership lived in the capital in 1976 and 44.3 percent

came from the provinces the corresponding figures were now 50.8 and 44.3 percent respectively. In September 1976 34.7 percent of the members were women. Now this has increased to 38.5.

The average age of members is now 40.9 years compared to 42.3 in 1976. One-fourth of the members have positions of confidence in some mass organization, mainly union organizations. But party leaders are not satisfied with the occupational composition of the party. The percentage of union-organized workers in the party has fallen from 44.8 percent in 1976 to 38.4 percent now.

Central Committee Elected

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 6 Apr 80 p 3

[Text] At its congress in Langbjergr Hall in Brondby Strand the Danish CP continued its discussion yesterday of the party's situation following the parliamentary election last 23 October when the party lost its representation in parliament. Many participants in the debate pointed out that party influence cannot be measured solely on the basis of seats in parliament. The party is fighting for the working class and is a part of it. This provides a basis for regaining seats in parliament, the speakers felt. They also pointed out that the vast majority of the people hold antimonopolistic views and to this extent they are in agreement with the Danish CP.

The Central Committee election was a renewal to some extent and a move toward younger membership, but it was not a radical change. All the Central Committee members who ran for re-election got in with the exception of former Communist Student chairman Annelise Bach Jensen. But the organization's present chairman, Frank Aaen, was voted in.

Of the 87 members running for election all 47 who won had been recommended by the congressional committee.

Former MP's Elected

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 8 Apr 80 p 7

[Text] There are many new names among the new party leaders elected by the Danish CP at its Easter congress, but the general opinion in the party and in circles with some familiarity with internal party conditions is that the big change in personnel--around 40 percent of the 49 Central Committee members--did not indicate any political change of course in the party but merely a natural desire to get younger people in.

Former member of parliament Jorgen Jensen who became temporary chairman in 1978 when Knud Jespersen died was now elected chairman of the newly-constituted Central Committee with no opposition and the congress greeted this choice with cheers and applause.

The highest votes in the committee election went to Jorgen Jensen and party secretary Ib Norlund who each received 396 votes. Close behind in terms of votes received were Copenhagen Typographers' Union chairman Dan Lundrup, Copenhagen Masons' Union chairman Harry Osborn, Danish CP union secretary Bo Rosschou, chairman of section 14 of the Smiths' Union Jorgen Madsen and former member of parliament for many years Villy Fuglsang.

One of the first-time members elected to the Central Committee was former member of parliament Tove Jorgensen and this meant that the party's entire parliamentary group from the time before the election on 23 October 1979 in which the Danish CP lost its place in Folketing was elected to the Central Committee.

6578
CSO: 3106

NIELS HELVEG PETERSEN, RADICAL LIBERAL LEADER, PROFILED

Stockholm NORDISK KONTAKT in Danish Vol 5, 25 Mar 80 pp 387-388

[Text] It is a party with the wind at its back which the political leader of the Radical Liberal Party, 41-year-old chairman of the parliamentary group Niels Helveg Petersen now heads.

After the party lost seven seats in three successive parliamentary elections in 1973, 1975 and 1977, reducing the parliamentary group from 27 to 6 in the space of 6 years the party Niels Helveg Petersen inherited in 1977 was seriously threatened by the 2 percent barrier in the election law. The election in October 1979 turned the tide and now the party has 10 seats--with Gallup poll prospects of gaining even more.

And "inherited" is an apt word.

Niels Helveg Petersen came into the world in the historically fateful year of 1939--but the place stood in promising contrast to the time, for he shared his home town with H. C. Andersen. But while the career of the Odense shoemaker's apprentice 150 years ago was a fairy tale it must be said that Niels Helveg Petersen's looks like a "natural and almost predestined thing." As the son of the Radical Liberal Party's ideological firebrand for more than a generation, former Education and Cultural Affairs Minister K. Helveg Petersen, and former mayor Lilly Helveg Petersen he grew up in a political greenhouse and must therefore suffer the disadvantage now of having his career--political spokesman as 29-year-old and party leader at 40--regarded as the obvious fulfillment of justified expectations.

There is only one thing that is hard to understand in this dossier, the fact that it does not include a ministerial portfolio. But political circumstances have dictated that so far Niels Helveg Petersen's platform has been a seat in parliament and not a cabinet seat. While a few years ago he may have been hungry for a ministerial post, eager to gain direct political administration responsibility, today he seems to put more

weight in his role as parliamentarian. The combination of the recreated central position of the Radical Liberals in political life and the craftsmanlike political ability that is part of Niels Helveg's baggage undoubtedly also served as an object lesson that the biggest political influence does not always depend on a ministerial portfolio; at times one can exert just as much from the benches of Folketing.

And Niels Helveg has been in Folketing since 1966--broken only by the 3-year period 1974-77 when he was cabinet chief for the Danish member of the EC Commission, Finn Gundelach. When the party's leader for many years, former Prime Minister Hilmar Baunsgaard, decided to leave Danish politics in 1976 Niels Helveg inherited the certain Radical district in Middelfart from Baunsgaard. The inheritance was complete in November 1979 when he was elected chairman of the parliamentary group and thus became the formal political leader of the party as well.

Niels Helveg's recipe for solving Denmark's economic ills is not a "miracle cure" but a consistent indication that Denmark is in the kind of economic situation in which no economic measures can be overlooked. Niels Helveg does not share the skepticism the Danish Employers' Association and several prominent Liberal politicians have recently aired on the propriety of continuing the income policy. But he feels that the income policy cannot have the proper effect unless it is combined with a democratization of working life in the form of implementing a mandatory distribution of profits so that the employees of individual firms are guaranteed a share of the value increase that should result from wage restraint. And if we can talk of a political favorite of Niels Helveg's it is "joint ownership reform for wage earners."

Niels Helveg's interest and participation in Nordic cooperation is well-known. He was also part of the Danish delegation to the Nordic Council meeting in Reykjavik.

6578
CSO: 8013/1056

RADICAL TURKISH ISLAMIC GROUPS IN FRG SURVEYED

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 11 Apr 80 pp 14, 15

[Excerpt from a DGB [German Labor Union Federation] study entitled: "Background of Turkish Extremist Islamic Activities in Germany"]

[Excerpt] Turkish Islam in the Federal Republic of Germany

Resembling Christianity in this respect, Turkish Islam is not a well-structured or uniformly organized religious community. Thus, in the Federal Republic as well as in Turkey, there is the large minority of the Moslem Alivites, which constitutes approximately 25 percent of the Turkish population. The Alivites cultivate their own lifestyle; they have no religious institutions, and in the Federal Republic, they generally encounter fewer difficulties in regard to integration than their Sunnite fellow believers.

The majority of the Turks of the Sunnite creed in the Federal Republic of Germany attribute greater importance to the exercise of religious rites than they ever did in their homeland. They try in this way to establish their national identity through their religion, because they fear their children could be alienated from them and their culture. However, they want separation of religion and politics. What they are looking for they will hardly be able to find in the Federal Republic of Germany. There is no authorized spiritual care by Islam nor are there any mosques or religious organizations that are not subject to the control of sects or political groups.

Of special interest for the present study are the extremist Islamic sects, which in the FRG are Islam's controlling representatives. These sects are organized as follows:

1. The Nationalist Movement Party (MHP--Milliyetci Hareket Partisi)
2. The Hurdzu sect
3. The National Salvation Party (MSP--Milli Selamat Partisi)
4. The Suleiman sect

MHP Organizations

The followers of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) established organizations such as the "Turkish Culture Club," "Turkish Culture Center," "Idealist Workers' Club" and as a parent organization, the "Democratic Federation of the Idealist Workers' Clubs." In the Federal Republic, these organizations are frequently called "Gray Wolves." Occasionally, these MHP-oriented associations have tried to launch Koran courses. So far, they have not achieved any lasting results, even though during the Ramadan period the clubhouses are used as prayer halls. The MHP followers try continually to abuse the religious leanings of the Turkish population for their political objectives. It is well known and has also been confirmed by the managing directors of the other Islamic groups that the MHP followers try to make political propaganda in the religious organizations and to get on the boards of directors of these organizations, in order to gain control and to exploit for their purposes the possibilities offered by these organizations.

The Nurdzu Sect

Another fanatical group, the Nurdzu sect, which we discussed in the preceding chapter, operates in the Federal Republic in various business premises and houses which call themselves "medrese" (religious school). Nurdzu groups are for the most part established under cover names. As regards attendance, it is difficult to make any estimates, since the Nurdzu sect shuns any public contacts.

MSP Organizations

The second largest extremist Islamic organization in the Federal Republic was established by followers of the MSP (National Salvation Party) under the name of "Organization of National Perspective" (Milli Gorus Teskilati). The first publicly known group of this organization in the Federal Republic was established in 1977 in Cologne under the name of "Turkish Unity in Europe" (Avrupa Turk Birligi). According to information supplied by this group, its organization in the FRG presently comprises 126 clubs. The "Unity of Islamic Youth in Europe" (Avrupa Islama Genelik Birligi) is affiliated with this group.

The National Salvation Party (MSP), the chairman of which is Erbakan, was established as a successor party to the "Party of National Order" (Milli Nizam Partisi) which had been outlawed in 1971. Since that time, it has played a key role in the Turkish political arena. In 1977, the CHP (Ecevit) formed a coalition government with the MSP. Subsequently, the MSP played an active role in the governments of the "Nationalist Front," which were carried by the MSP (Erbakan), the AP (Demirel), the MHP (Turkes) and the CGP (Fevzioglu). The political objective of the MSP and its "European Organization of National Perspective" is to create a system based on Sheriat law. The MSP holds that it is necessary to establish an Islamic

defense pact--which should include Turkey as well--that Turkey should maintain relations only with Islamic countries and that all Islamic states should strive for the establishment of an Islamic world state. The MSP maintains close relations with the "Rabitatul Almalil Islami" organization, which was established in 1962 with funds supplied by the "Aramco" oil concern and which is headquartered in Mekka. This organization supports all of those Islamic states that of late have attracted attention on account of their anti-imperialist policy. It is not least on account of this that the MSP demands that Turkey break off diplomatic relations with Israel. The MSP considers the development in Iran to be an important step on the road toward liberation of Islam.

The MSP followers, organized in the "National Perspective," maintain numerous mosques in the Federal Republic, which also offer karate lessons for children.

In this connection, mention should be made of an assembly that was staged on 8 April 1979 in the Duisburg-Hamborn Rhein-Ruhr Hall and which was attended by 4,000 people. Two observers submitted to us the following written report:

"In front of a large banner bearing the inscription 'we are here to die for Allah and to fight for Islam,' cassettes, books, journals and newspapers were displayed. The members present were from various regions. Hundreds of people prayed on the rugs spread in the hallways. Thousands of people filled the large hall and dozens crowded around the stage, in order to tape the speeches on small cassette recorders. The crowd was awaiting Kadir Misirlioglu, a spiritual teacher and one of the most important theoreticians of the reactionary Turkish-Islamic movement, who in his writings calls for return to the Ottoman Empire. The opening address was delivered by Sevket Zengin, the representative of the 'European Islamic Department of Youth Culture.' He stated: '...nowadays people die for their ideas. A communist dies for his cause; a capitalist dies for the cause he is concerned with. We must likewise be able to die for the great cause that we are concerned with... Our cause is to inculcate faith in the heart and mind of every individual in the world. Anything material belongs to God. Some day justice will make falsehood disappear.' Later on, Hasan Damar, secretary of the "European Organization of National Perspective", took the floor, stating: "You religious fighters in foreign parts, no matter whether you are knowing or unknowing, you are carrying out the Sunna (Sunnite struggle). You are on a pilgrimage ... The dailies TERCUMAN, HURRIYET and MILLIYET refuse to report, since otherwise they would have to say that Kadir Misirlioglu delivered a speech before an audience of 5,000." Subsequently he stated in regard to the massacre in Kahraman Maras--which at this time was a topic of immediate interest--that two communist teachers had been cut down by the Moslems, that the true Moslems had refused to grant the communists a religious funeral and that for this reason blood had to be shed. He said that the Moslems therefore felt they had to become even more aggressive in their struggle; it would be rash to conclude that the thousands of

listeners reflected the views of the speaker. "However, in such an agitated atmosphere, there is a constant threat of physical violence. It is difficult at such inflammatory assemblies to keep the people under control. Thus it is reasonable to assume that such an agitated crowd will generate clusters incapable of discussion and that bloody clashes will take place."

The Suleiman Sect

In the Federal Republic, this sect--under the name of "Islamic Culture Center"--appeared before the Turkish public in 1974, when it established mosques in various places. In 1975, the "Islamic Culture Center" (IKZ) was established in Cologne; at present, the IKZ is the hub of the movement. Suleiman Hilmi Tunahan is considered the founder of the movement. Kemal Kacar, the son-in-law of Suleiman Hilmi Tunahan, is the sheik of the order and a deputy of the "Justice Party" (AP). The "Islamic Culture Center" has representatives in all parts of the Federal Republic and is the largest Islamic sect. There are more than 150 branch establishments in the FRG, with North Rhine-Westphalia alone accounting for 63. In a number of cities, the Center maintains several mosques. By now, the majority of these mosques have their own clubs and the remaining ones are about to establish clubs. Each mosque has approximately 100 to 300 members. Suleiman Tunahan, the sect's founder, said that "wherever he goes, every brother must launch a Koran course and ensure that five additional courses be started," hundreds of followers of the order are members of several mosques and clubs. It is impossible to quote exact figures regarding the enrollment in the Koran courses given at the mosques. There is no division by grades or similar formalities. Since the beginning of the 1979/1980 school year, the state schools have reported an increased incidence of truancy on the part of Turkish students, whose parents state by way of apology that the student attends a Koran course in the morning. In support of this claim, they submit an attestation to this effect by the Islamic Culture Center.

At present, 12 high-ranking functionaries of the Suleimanists live in Europe, with the majority residing in the FRG. Suleimanism has made its largest gains among the Turks living in the Federal Republic of Germany. In Belgium and Austria, problems such as are encountered in the FRG do not exist. This is because these two countries officially recognize Islam as a religion and because a special organization was established. This organization closely collaborates with the Administrative Council of Islam in Turkey. In other words: In those countries, only those accredited by the Administrative Council of Islam in Turkey can hold a religious office. The Administrative Council of Islam in Turkey exclusively appoints preachers who in addition to having received religious training are certified teachers. In addition, they must contract to learn within 3 years the language of the respective country. Since none of this applies to the FRG, the religious care available to the Turkish citizens is insufficient. Most of the followers of the Suleimanists do not know what Suleimanism stands for and what are its objectives. Certain individuals are portrayed as saints and they are blindly followed.

In 1979, on the occasion of Ramadan, 26 representatives of the Administrative Council of Islam visited Europe. According to the State Ministry of the Turkish Republic, 100 MHP preachers were in Europe at this time, while the MSP and the Suleimanists had each dispatched 150 preachers.

There are still some Suleimanists who within the apparatus of the Administrative Council of Islam are active as preachers, imams or muftis. If their religious orientation is disclosed, they are immediately relieved of their offices. Subsequently, they are invited by the Islamic culture centers in the Federal Republic, offered positions as preachers or head imams and paid DM 1,500 per month. To join the Suleimanists is a tempting proposition for any preacher in Turkey--if only for financial reasons. Even the head imam of the Cologne IKZ, Harum Resit Tuyluoglu, was relieved of his office of Mufti of Konya, because he had disseminated Suleimanist propaganda.

Financially, the Suleimanists, who in the FRG are organized by the IKZ, are well-off. On religious holidays, they collect large contributions from the believers; in addition, since they have their own administration of justice, they derive income from disputes among the Suleimanists. Moreover, they are said to receive financial as well as moral support from Libya.

The Relations Among the Extremist Islamic Sects in the FRG

The Nurdzu sect and the Suleimanists have concluded a kind of coalition or truce. On the other hand, there are clashes, especially between the groups of the "National Perspective" and those of the "Islamic Culture Centers"; occasionally, these clashes result in bloodshed. According to the followers of the "National Perspective" organizations, the Suleiman sect recognizes as Moslems only those who have taken Koran courses. Furthermore, the "Organization of National Perspective" claims that the Suleimanists collaborate closely with the MHP: The "Islamic Culture Centers" reportedly send believers to the MHP clubs, because these clubs perform a kind of social service (filling out of forms, etc.) The Suleiman sect has also been accused of collecting money in the mosques and of using these funds for launching Koran courses in Turkey that are "illegal there." The Suleimanists accuse the "Organization of National Perspective" of abusing religion for political purposes, claiming that they themselves do not engage in politics: "Our religion is above the states and parties."

A member of the Suleiman rank and file stated: "We do not prefer any party; we are merely told what party we are to vote for, and then we go and vote for that party."

It is only because the Suleimanists present themselves as nonpartisan that they have met with considerable response on the part of the Turkish population in the FRG. The Turks in the Federal Republic, who do not receive any kind of spiritual guidance, are glad to have found a mosque, the leaders of which outwardly say that they do not want to have anything to do with political parties. However, these Turks do not recognize the real objectives

of the Suleimanists or the Islamic Culture Centers.

In regard to the political objectives of the Islamic Culture Centers, the sect informs only those, who are ardent Suleimanists and who have gained the trust of the head imam. These believers blindly follow any orders of the head imam, who on his part blindly follows the instructions of Kemal Kacar, the sheik of the sect.

The Islamic Culture Centers and the Organization of National Perspective are agreed on the true objective, namely abolition of the laicist system in Turkey and establishment of an Islamic state based on Sheriat law. However, they differ in regard to the means of attaining this goal. The Organization of National Perspective holds that the takeover should be effected through a political party, i.e. the MSP (Party of National Salvation). The Suleimanists claim that as a political party the advocates of Sheriat law would never be able by themselves to come into power to carry out the Islamic revolution and that such arguments are therefore charlatanism of the Erbakan (MSP chairman) variety. According to the Suleimanists, Erbakan uses religion for his own benefit.

The Suleimanists hold that the advocates Islamic revolution must use any means to come into power: First of all, they should through Koran courses disseminate religion along the lines suggested by Suleiman Hilmi Tunahan; starting with the religious institutions, they must establish bridgeheads within the state apparatus and also in the political parties; by any means, they must try to influence the political parties. Thanks to their outward stance of nonpartisanship and their avoidance of violence and demonstrations, the Suleimanists have been able to mislead well-meaning Germans--state agencies as well as churches. To the German authorities and churches, they introduced themselves as follows:

- "1. The Suleimanists are tolerant toward other creeds.
- 2. They abide by the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany.
- 3. They are not nationalists or pan-Islamists, who oppose integration of the Turkish population in the Federal Republic of Germany.
- 4. They support a global policy open toward all sides.
- 5. They accept the basic democratic order and the legal system of the FRG and of their homeland.
- 6. They are not opposed to modern developments or novelty and they also accept scientific findings."

However, the following articles--which were written by various head imams of the Islamic Culture Centers in the course of a single year (1978/79)--evidence the deceitful attitude of the Suleimanists. Mention should be

made of the fact that these are personal articles by the head imams of the Islamic Culture Centers, which were published in the journal ANADOLU (organ of the Suleimanists in the FRG). There was no recourse to newspaper reports that could have led to misinterpretation. These are personal statements throughout.

In view of the fact that the head imams of the Suleimanists write articles of this kind for a publicly distributed journal, one can easily imagine the sermons they deliver in the mosques, among their own people.

The attempts to establish in the FRG totally apolitical mosques to be used exclusively as prayer centers have well-nigh failed. Very soon, a large number of these mosques came under the influence of rightist groups and thus could no longer pursue the original objectives. On account of the diverse religious sects and political views, the Turkish Government's representatives for religious affairs encounter great difficulties in the FRG. In the existing mosques, they have proved ineffectual; occasionally, they are physically threatened and expelled, and there are no "official" mosques. The German side is unaware of all this and is not asked for any assistance.

8760
CSO: 3103

ECONOMIC INSTITUTE VIEWS SHORTER WORKING HOURS

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 10 Apr 80 p 1

[Article by Alfred Heueck: "What is Socially Acceptable Is Not Necessarily Appropriate"]

[Text] Munich--Even if there is reason to believe that shorter working hours could reduce unemployment, this goal is not rendered just by over-stressing employment policy arguments, according to the Munich Ifo Institute for Economic Research. Stressing the "necessities of the job market policy" could also serve as an argument for an extension of working hours when a labor shortage would develop, which could make the implementation of social goals more difficult, according to an Ifo expert opinion which was prepared on behalf of the Federal Ministry for Labor and Social Affairs.

With this note the Ifo Institute comments on the statement that in the present situation the employment aspect is the prime target of discussion, thus giving the old employees' demand for shorter working hours new momentum. So far the debate had been conducted with purely social arguments, it reported.

According to further reports of the Ifo Institute contained in its most recent news letter, corporate surveys showed that the widespread opinion that the effects of shorter working hours were minute was not necessarily correct. While the companies largely resorted to short-term overtime work and rationalized to the utmost degree in the areas of organization and production, a number of additional full-time employees would be employed under a medium-term scheme. Reducing the flexible retirement age was said to have the strongest effect on employment, and 50 to 70 percent of the surveyed companies would replace the retirees by newly hired full-time employees.

The answers which all experts interviewed as well as employees gave when asked whether shorter working hours could be implemented were positive, provided that goals in the realm of social policy were to be pursued. Yet it remains contested what type of working hours reduction would be most

adequate, taking the aspects of timing and economy into account. According to the Ifo opinion, those measures would cause the most resistance on the part of the employers which would bring about a reorganization within the company and an increase in costs. Moving up the flexible retirement age is the item that will most likely be approved.

Employees, however, strongly approve of any type of reduction of working hours, although there are marked differences between the various groups. In a representative survey 80 percent of all employees said that they were willing to support a reshuffling of the entire labor volume by means of a reduction of their working hours, while only 30 percent would tolerate losses in their income in doing so.

The survey also showed that the willingness to work less, in solidarity with the unemployed, increases with the level of education and income. Shorter working hours would particularly meet with wide approval if there were no reductions in income, at least in the lower wage groups.

Summarizing its findings the Ifo Institute states that there is no clearcut solution to the question as to which type of working hours reduction is the best for the goals set for social policy, "because the measure that is most sensible as far as social policy is concerned may not be the most adequate one in an economic sense, and vice versa." Besides, the present state of knowledge on the economic effects of shorter working hours leaves open whether the common goal of social and economic policies to reduce unemployment is at all attainable by means of shorter working hours.

According to the Munich Ifo researchers the evaluation of the economic aspects of shorter working hours shows that the available literature frequently attributes increases in productivity to shorter working hours. This, however, was in contradiction to the desirable effect of an increase in the number of employed. In order to fully understand the effects on employment, a model was required analyzing supply and demand on the job and goods market. Such a model was neither available, however, nor could one resort to experience.

9544
CSO: 3103

ARMY INSPECTOR DISCUSSES ROLE OF NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICERS

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 15 Apr 80 p 4

[Interview with Army Chief of Staff Lt Gen Hans Poeppel by FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU
Editor Ulrich Mackensen: "Subordinates Must Become More Involved"]

[Text] In the military decisionmaking process, subordinates should be made to participate to a greater extent than has been the case up to now. This is the opinion of Chief of Staff of the Army, Lt Gen Hans Poeppel, in an interview with FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU Editor Ulrich Mackensen.

[Question] In the course of maneuvers it occasionally becomes evident that military superiors hesitate to assume responsibility or that at least they show little initiative. In addition, during normal duty periods unit commanders are so burdened with paperwork that the men are neglected. To improve this situation, you are advocating a new style of leadership in the army. What are your main reasons for this and what are the features of this new style?

[Answer] Our young commanders are not at all shirking responsibility during maneuvers. On the contrary, especially on those occasions and during combat training they demonstrate very satisfactory drive and considerable effort. On the other hand, in everyday garrison life there is indeed a certain tendency toward bureaucracy and toward playing it safe. There is insufficient recognition of the fact that leadership can be taught and learned and that intuition is only a smaller component of it. On the other hand, our leadership training is too much set in concrete. Leadership techniques are overemphasized. This works to the detriment of interpersonal relations. I am not at all advocating an entirely new style of leadership. Apart from reemphasizing proven leadership dogma I would like, however, to highlight certain features in various areas. This includes a rethinking of our concept of loyalty. What I mean to say is that we tend to have a very one-sided understanding of loyalty, namely that it is directed solely toward individuals. We should see it applied to a greater extent to matters to which we feel a commitment: our basic constitutional laws, our military mission and our closely circumscribed community. This in no way excludes the personal aspect. To me, loyalty is a two-way street: where the leader shows himself committed, it is easier for the subordinate to do likewise.

Additionally, I want to make certain that subordinates will become more closely involved in the decisionmaking process. Every level of leadership has its own competency, and this must be enhanced and exploited to the fullest. In this way, supervisors can delegate certain details which can be more easily dealt with by the expert, and this constitutes motivation for the subordinate.

I am of the opinion that our leaders will have to make greater efforts to explain their orders. This creates confidence and authority, extending even to those cases where explanations are impossible. I would like the leaders also to follow up their instructions with greater interest than they have in the past; not to merely give orders, but to be in a position of ascertaining whether the subordinate has the capacity of complying and where he needs assistance. Finally, I feel that our leaders must resist the temptation of making unnecessary demands on their subordinates. That is because the more time the subordinate spends on behalf of his superior, the less time he has available for his own subordinates. And just this type of communication is mandatory. Leadership is a task which must be accomplished on an interpersonal basis.

[Question] What is your general impression of the officer corps? Do you not find an occasional tendency toward accommodation and whitewashing?

[Answer] On occasion we must deal energetically with occurrences which show such tendencies. This of course starts at the top. By their own example, superiors must encourage their subordinates to develop their own opinions and initiatives. We also demand that they express their opinions openly and that they support those of their subordinates who propose their own solutions to a problem without worrying about what others may think.

[Question] Do you see a connection with the promotion and utilization freeze in all this? In this context, what do you think of a statement by the Bundeswehr Society to the effect that this problem could even impair combat readiness?

[Answer] I do not deny that the utilization freeze can lead to increased pressure for achievement and competition and that this could lead to a tendency for accommodation, as is the case outside the Bundeswehr as well. We did not need the Bundeswehr Society to tell us that an aging leadership is a danger to proper functioning and combat readiness. We have carefully investigated this problem in the army—the utilization freeze is primarily an army problem—and we have concluded that in certain key functions certain age limits must not be exceeded. This was confirmed by an expert in work physiology. Physical and psychological demands, existing especially in field forces, therefore require timely retirement. The utilization freeze to me is therefore not primarily a career or social problem. For the sake of the army's combat readiness it must therefore be speedily resolved.

[Question] What is your experience with officers who enter the service straight from college?

[Answer] We are impressed with the eagerness and commitment of our young officers. We realize that these days an officer must have a broadly based education. Therefore, college studies as a part of the training process have proven their worth. Today's young officers join the army full of theoretical knowledge. Obviously, it is hardly possible for them to acquire the necessary professional experience during their academic studies. In his initial assignment as a platoon leader, the young officer requires about 6 months under good leadership (some require a bit more time) until he obtains sufficient practical experience enabling him to be a leader and set an example for his men.

[Question] On your orders, the training time for noncommissioned officers has been lengthened. In your opinion, what would be the next logical step to enhance the performance of a squad leader of combat troops, for example?

[Answer] I am very satisfied with the decision to improve the training of our young noncommissioned officers. This new training will result in strengthening the young noncommissioned officer's authority and self-confidence. In addition, it will particularly help him to be a better leader of men than in the past. The new training may well take care of this requirement. But it is not sufficient for the quantum leaps in the needs for tactical leadership and technological familiarity with complex, expensive, high-performance weapons systems. The latter's potential effectiveness cannot be optimized by short-term noncommissioned officers. The task complex of these weapons systems usually requires the services of an experienced leader. At this moment we are engaged in completing an exhaustive study of this subject and will then be able to come up with a conclusive report.

9273
CSO: 3103

PAPER COMMENTS ON IRAQ EMBASSY'S INQUIRY ON JEWS

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADEN in Swedish 2 Apr 80 p 2

[Editorial by Jan-Magnus Jansson]

[Text] Since the early and mid-seventies, Finland has been endeavoring to establish firm relations, commercial as well as political, with the Arab countries. The result may be described as successful. Some of the gestures with which we have been accompanying the process may have had a tinge that Paris was a fair. But, in the long run, it is proper and far-sighted to establish connections with a world which, at an unprecedented pace, is in the process of emerging from the last 500 years of degradation. The Arab renaissance is a fact.

In the relations with the Arab countries, however, one has to move along substandard and shallow channels. This is partly due to the internal strife and instability in the Arab world, which have the effect that good relations with one group, by no means, automatically guarantee good relations with another group. But, above all, it is, of course, due to the unsolved conflict between Israel and most of the Arab countries.

We had an unpleasant reminder of this state of affairs last week when it became known that the Iraq embassy in Helsinki had presented a number of firms with a questionnaire, asking, among other things, whether 'Zionists or Jews' were included in the management of the enterprises concerned.

Iraq is still one of our most important trading partners. If Iraq wants to base its trade relations with us on other than purely commercial principles, this is deplorable, but it is, of course, something which that country will have to decide for itself. On the other hand, an inquiry sent to Finnish enterprises of a content as the one quoted cannot but be interpreted as an offensive interference in our country's affairs.

From a legal point of view, it may be pointed out that our country--fortunately--never has had a law which has tried to define who is a 'Jew' nor whether we know who belong to the Jewish faith. Furthermore, in

1970, we ratified the international convention for the abolition of all forms of racial discrimination, and, in 1974, we added provisions to the penal code, according to which 'incitement toward discrimination against minorities' shall be punishable under the criminal code.

We hope that the talks which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has announced will take place with the ambassador of Iraq as soon as he returns to the country, will solve the question in such a way as to preserve the honor of our country. We do not want anti-Semitism, which we have been keeping at a distance, to enter by the backdoor.

The question of Finland's relations with the PLO, which, in the course of the last few days, has been causing various complications, is on an entirely different plane. Some political parties and citizens organizations have, for some time, been active to pave the way for a visit by Jassir Arafat to Finland. In our opinion, such a visit, even if it were not entirely popular, ought actually to be acceptable as an expression of Finland's desire to listen to the different parties in the Middle East conflict, as is natural in a free democracy.

However, political prestige has now entered into the picture. Through a representative, the PLO has let it be known that Jassir Arafat can only accept an invitation from the Finnish government. This is on a line with the intensive efforts on the part of the PLO to raise its status also in the West, an endeavor which, of course, has not been without success. The organization recently took a similar position on the question of a visit by Jassir Arafat to France.

In a speech given in the Paasikivi Society in November of last year, Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen refrained from going into details on Finland's position on the entire conflict in the Middle East. He here pointed out that 'such a recognition of the PLO which is now being sought in many countries of the West, has, already for years, been a fact in Finland.' The foreign minister stressed, however, that Finland gives actual diplomatic recognition to states only. He also drew attention to a number of gestures in the direction of the PLO, from President Kekkonen's well-known speech in December of 1973 to the fact that PLO representative Farouk Kaddoumi was received by the president in 1977 (whereas a similar favorable attitude was not shown to Moshe Dayan). Paavo Vayrynen, who balanced the pro-Arab viewpoints with viewpoints in favor of Israel, concluded his speech by stating that Finland has not had to make any sudden changes in its Middle East policy but has been able to uphold its line.

It is in the obvious interest of the PLO to seek to create competition among Western European countries, when it comes to showing increased friendliness toward the PLO. To Finland, the most important thing, of course, is that our general political line retains its credibility. It is in our own interest to keep up closely with developments, but the situation of our country does not require either that we stand on tiptoe for every signal.

SIITOIN FOUNDS NEW FASCIST PARTY

Helsinki HUVUDSTADSBALDET in Swedish 3 Apr 80 p 15

[Text] Pekka Siitoin, who was sentenced for the attack on the Communist printing house, Kursiivi, has founded a new party since his former party, Isanmaallinen kansainliike (the National Popular Movement), was dissolved as Fascist. The new party is called Kansallisdemokrattinen puolue (the National Democratic Party) and has Fascist features as well.

The platform of the party says, among other things, that the party strives to thwart the activities of the Communists in Finland. The Marxist trade unions are to be dissolved, strikes are to be prohibited, those unwilling to work are to be put into labor camps, and abortions on healthy women are to be prohibited.

According to the secretary of the party, Juhani Tuomilusto, the party was founded in the fall of 1978 when Isanmaallinen kansainliike was dissolved. According to him, the party now has approximately 3,000 members. Requests for registration must, in the future, be submitted to the party registrar.

We are continuously following the activities of Pekka Siitoin and his supporters, says the assistant chief of the security police, Seppo J Pylkkänen. Pekka Siitoin himself is in custody, pending the decision of the Supreme Court.

According to him, the name of Kansallisdemokrattinen puolue is old. But the fact that they have again started sending out pamphlets is a new development.

7262
CSO: 3109

MARCHAIS' REACTION TO BERLINGUER-MITTERRAND STRASBOURG MEETING

Paris L'HUMANITE in French 25 Mar 80 p 5

[Text] When questioned yesterday at Le Havre, where he is taking part in the French Communist Party's national election congress, about the Strasbourg meeting between Enrico Berlinguer and Francois Mitterrand, Georges Marchais stated: "Obviously, in principle I have no observations to make. Nevertheless, we think that the time and place have been rather poorly chosen.

"On one hand, as the final session of our central committee emphasized, our party and its secretary general are the victims of a politicking conspiracy in which Francois Mitterrand is taking an active part on the side of the reactionary Giscard and Chirac forces, whose clearly formulated objective is to weaken the French Communist Party. Up to now, they have not managed to do so. All of their efforts are now centered upon the presidential elections, accounting for their stubbornness toward the Communist Party and its presumed candidate.

"I must add that, in gathering all our strength in order to make this plot fail, we are basically fighting against the degradation to our political customs. We can see very well from Italy's example just how far that degradation can go.

"On the other hand, it is truly regrettable that Enrico Berlinguer and Francois Mitterrand chose to meet in Strasbourg. For, at present, an extraordinary session of the Assembly of European Communities is being held there, whose reactionary and socialist majority is preparing to deal a new and very heavy blow to the rural population and French agriculture. It is very true that Tuesday morning the French farmers will show their firm opposition to this harmful project. I know that the French Socialist Party and the PCI [Italian Communist Party] have obvious convergences on European agricultural policies and on the Community's expansion into Greece, Portugal and Spain, while we, the French communists, are firmly on the side of our farmers in the struggle to achieve their demands and to protect our agriculture.

"I think it would have been good if our Italian comrades had realized the dual nature of the situation."

WORLD COMMUNIST LEADERS EXPRESS SUPPORT TO MARCHAIS, PCF

Paris L'HUMANITE in French 27 Mar 80 p 4

[Text] The anticommunist campaign which, all around Georges Marchais, is attaching all the forces of progress, continues to evoke numerous reactions from the communist and progressive parties throughout the world. In these messages of solidarity to Georges Marchais, the parties and movements are expressing their indignation in the face of hatred and lies.

The Japanese Communist Party

Kenji Mihamoto, president of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Japanese Communist Party, sent the following message to Georges Marchais, secretary general of the PCF [French Communist Party]:

"Dear Comrade: Our party denounces with indignation the actions of the French reactionary forces who are trying, by means of a harmful defamation campaign, to deal a deadly blow to the French Communist Party and the progressive French forces.

"We express our feelings of militant solidarity, on behalf of the Japanese Communist Party and myself, with your determined retaliation against this infamous plot."

The Portuguese Communist Party

Below is the text of the message sent to the PCF Central Committee by Alvaro Cunhal, secretary general of the Portuguese Communist Party:

"It is a universal experience that: when campaigns of hatred are waged against the leaders of the workers' movement, then those leaders will set up obstacles to the reactionary forces' activity and to the accomplishment of their plans. We express our feelings of solidarity to Georges Marchais and the French Communist Party."

The Communist Party of Finland

Aarne Saarinen, in the name of the Central Committee of the Finnish Communist Party, writes to Georges Marchais as follows:

"Highly indignant at the attacks and shameful slanders against Georges Marchais, secretary general of the French Communist Party, we express to you our most fraternal solidarity."

The Martinique Communist Party

Armand Nicolas, secretary general of the Martinique Communist Party, addressed this letter to Georges Marchais and the French communists: "Dear Comrade Georges Marchais, dear comrades in the French Communist Party: The workers, the Martinique communists, have learned with indignation of and condemn the slanderous denunciations made by the falsifiers of L'EXPRES, as relayed by the Giscard government's henchmen, against the secretary general of the French Communist Party.

"The reactionary circles are using the classic distraction of anticomunism in order to hide the malevolent policies of the Giscard government and to divert the workers' anger, to divide and make ineffective the forces of progress, and to try to insure the survival of the decadent capitalist regime.

"In Martinique also, faced with the growth of popular struggles and the national liberation movement, the Giscard government, which is sending in hundreds of mounted police and brandishing the threat of repression, is attempting to hide the total failure of its colonialist policy by venting its lies through an alleged 'communist subversion' agitated from outside by Cuba.

"The infamous Revel operation could not withstand the truth. The campaign to discredit the French Communist Party and its secretary will turn upon its authors. The French Communist Party, the main opposition force against the power of the monopolies, has the confidence of millions of French people. This confidence will continue to expand.

"In tomorrow's struggles, the Martinique and French communist parties will further strengthen their international solidarity."

Marcel Gargar, Senator of Guadeloupe

Mr Gargar, senator allied to the communist faction of the Senate, sent the following message to Georges Marchais:

"Following the shameful slanders and the campaigns of disparagement against your person and your glorious party, many communists and progressives of Guadeloupe, including myself, express our total solidarity for, and our deep confidence in the victorious outcome of the struggle waged against the great bourgeoisie, colonialism, and in the DOM's winning the right of self-determination."

PCF EXPRESSES SOLIDARITY WITH EL SALVADOR

PCF Secretariat Message

Paris L'HUMANITE in French 1 Apr 80 p 9

[Text] The PCF [French Communist Party] Secretariat yesterday addressed the following message to the "Revolutionary Mass Coordination" (1) in San Salvador:

"Shaken by the most recent massacre which, on Sunday, 30 March, struck the Salvadorean people during the funeral of its Archbishop Msgr Oscar Arnulfo Romero, a martyr of liberty, the French Communist Party sends you its brotherly condolences and repeats to you the assurance of its internationalist solidarity.

"We are at your side, with the working class and the democratic citizens of our country, in your struggle against a junta whose forces of repression and killer gangs go unpunished while they keep coming up with false promises of democratic reforms.

"We support your courageous resistance to interference in your country by the diplomacy of the United States, its agents, and its military supplies. Your struggle against the reactionary oligarchy of El Salvador, its military leaders and police, and against United States imperialism, which supports them, which provides arms for the assassins and whose military advisors participate in repression against your people--that struggle is the struggle of all revolutionaries. The 60,000 Parisians who on 27 March acclaimed the representative of the Revolutionary People's Bloc provided striking evidence of that."

Secretariat, Central Committee, French Communist Party

1. Revolutionary People's Bloc, Salvadorean Communist Party, Popular Leagues, 28 February, United Popular Action Front.

El Salvador Embassy Message

Paris L'HUMANITE in French 1 Apr 80 p 9

[Text] A delegation of the French Communist Party, consisting of Jean Garcia, member, Central Committee, and J. C. Negre, of the Foreign Policy Section, yesterday sent the following letter to the Embassy of El Salvador in Paris:

"The French Communist Party asks you to transmit to your government the expression of its highest indignation and solemn protest.

"The monstrous murder of Msgr Oscar Arnulfo Romero, Archbishop of San Salvador, the machine-gunning on Sunday, 30 March, of the crowd which was paying its last respects to that martyr of the people's cause, brought before the horrified eyes of the world the character of repressive violence of the junta you represent in Paris.

"These murders follow a whole series of massacres which, along with this junta, the government of the United States is responsible for after promoting its installation, supporting it with financial aid, while it arms its military and police forces. The murders, which continue to be committed by government units or extreme right-wing gangs, take nothing away from that responsibility because the groups of killers have been known to all for a long time and above all to your government and they never worried over their crimes.

"You thus represent a government which has become notoriously criminal and anti-national by virtue of that fact and because it is essentially supported by a foreign power, the power of United States imperialism which finances and arms it.

"The French communists expect that you, Mr Ambassador, will let the government know of the absolute condemnation of the workers and democratic citizens of our country."

Secretariat, Central Committee, French Communist Party.

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CSO:3100

PCF SECRETARIAT MESSAGE TO VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS

Paris L'HUMANITE in French 1 Apr 80 p 8

[Text] The Secretariat of the Central Committee of the PCF [French Communist Party] addressed the following message of condolences to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam on the occasion of the death of President Ton Duc Thang:

"Ton Duc Thang, president of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, is no more. This news pains us profoundly. With Ton Duc Thang disappears one of the most respected figures, also one of the most highly esteemed, of the Vietnamese revolution. Ton Duc Thang was one of those men without whom Vietnam would not exist today.

"Our emotion is all the stronger since his life was intimately tied to moments which count among the most glorious in our history. We will never forget that Ton Duc Thang, a machinist in the French Navy, was a participant in the mutiny in the Black Sea, when, in 1919, he refused, side by side with his French comrades, to fight against the Soviet revolution.

"His courage, the revolutionary fire which inspired him, the indomitable tenacity he displayed for the independence of his country, earned him the harshest blows from the French colonialists; Ton Duc Thang remained for 16 years in the sinister prison of Poulo-Condor, until 1945. He was one of the leaders in the anticolonialist struggle and then in independent and reunified Vietnam. A companion of Ho Chi Minh, he was called upon to fill the very highest government position, a responsibility he held until his death.

"This ardent patriot, this exemplary revolutionary, was also a simple man, loved by his people and all those he came into contact with.

"To the Communist Party of Vietnam, to the government and people of Vietnam, we address the expression of our brotherly sympathy at this painful moment and our dearest hope that the work to which Ton Duc Thang had devoted himself so well may be pursued with full success."

The National Secretariat of the Communist Youth Movement has sent a telegram of condolences to the Ho Chi Minh Youth and to the ambassador of Vietnam in Paris.

PCF CENTRAL COMMITTEE RESOLUTION ON FISZBIN'S CONTROVERSIAL BOOK

Paris L'HUMANITE in French 31 Mar 80 p 9

[Text] Paris Federation Bureau member Henri Fiszbin recently published a book. The Federation Committee therefore considered it useful to publish its viewpoint on that book.

The Federation Committee considers the book, which Henri Fiszbin has just come out with, to be a profoundly negative publication.

The Federation Committee is familiar, in detail, with the line of argument employed by Henri Fiszbin which he developed at length before the committee. It has already been discussed extensively there. It rejected this viewpoint by a very broad majority and democratically and objectively informed the Parisian communists about its debate during the section meetings and the district conferences.

It confirms its earlier positions and its approval of those of the Central Committee.

In full knowledge of what is involved, it must therefore make the following remarks.

Missing Ingredient

First of all, Henri Fiszbin disregards the background of the political debate, as it emerged and such as it actually took place in the Federation, before and after the meeting of the federation secretariat and the Political Bureau on 11 January 1979.

The big missing ingredient in his book thus as a matter of fact is an essential document: The report which he himself submitted at that meeting in the name of the unanimous Paris Federation Bureau.

This piece of writing was a part of the process of reflection launched by the Central Committee at the end of 1978, on the basis of the discovery

of an abnormal situation in the Paris region and in Paris regarding the development of the Party's influence.

This was a critical and self-critical reflection by the Federation leadership on its activity. But that document is not included in the book's annexes. It is reduced to 20 lines in a text of 250 pages.

The Federation Committee therefore must once again recall the content of this analysis.

It tried to answer two essential questions. On the one hand, how to create conditions enabling the Party to mobilize itself in order better to defend itself, to publicize and advance its entire policy. On the other hand, how to remedy an insufficient awareness and consideration of the needs of the population, its big and little concerns, the difficulties which render the daily life of hundreds of thousands of workers insupportable.

While recalling the Federation's positive achievements, this report emphasized the fact that one must draw certain conclusions from this experience which would make it possible to surmount the obstacles and detect the shortcomings and correct them.

These shortcomings, it added, do not spring from the orientations which guided the Federation's activity; instead, one must seek their origin in the implementation of that orientation which did not make it possible to surmount the difficulties inherent in the Paris region and in Paris. It stressed the fact that there is much to think about regarding the manner in which this orientation was implemented on all levels, about the insufficient endeavor to express it in practical terms in everyday life, regardless of whether this involved the ideological and political battle in the Party and among the masses, regardless of whether this involves the consideration of the Party's policy as a whole; regardless of whether this involves the organization of action, the care devoted to Party life, particularly the life of the cells and the quality of the leadership bodies.

It took note of the importance to make sure that the battle of ideas will develop properly so that the entire Party in Paris will profoundly assimilate our policy, so that it may be strongly united and so that it may be in accord on that policy. It is necessary to take into account the fact that the adversary's pounding also constitutes a burden on the Party in a permanent manner and that a specific effort by the grand bourgeoisie and the social democrats--an effort of unprecedented scope--is being made toward the communists themselves. The role of LE MONDE, of LE MATIN, and of LA LIBERATION was underscored; these publications are seeking to break up the foundations of the conviction and the commitment of the communists.

This report furthermore underscored the need for a strong defense against the opportunist interpretations given to the 22nd Congress. The interpretation which emerges most clearly is the one which challenges the class character of our policy, the role of the working class, the revolutionary character of our Party which blurs the aspect of the struggle in the union and which, finally, considered to be naught and even negative the contribution made to our struggle by the existence of the socialist countries and their overall record. And, it added, one must not overlook the fact that there are reticences even resistances, to the advancement of our policy which marked the 22nd Congress and especially in connection with the abandonment of the dictatorship of the proletariat and our condemnation of the attacks on liberties in various socialist countries.

The absence of that report in the book and the distorted summary given it falsify the entire meaning of the meeting with the Political Bureau because that was the basis on which it took place and on which it was concluded. Quite suddenly, this makes actions, concerning the situation estimate of the Federation leadership itself or based on them for the purpose of reflection appear as acts of aggression against the Federation.

Combined with a distorting dramatization, this absence completely down-grades the fact that, shortly afterward, the Federation Committee did meet and did discuss the situation, on the basis of a report summarizing the essential points in the Henri Fiszbin report, as well as the letter from the Political Bureau which marks the meeting's political conclusion. That report is not contained in the book's annexes either. (This text was published by the Federation Committee, for the information of the communists, during the Paris district conferences in December 1979.)

All of this leads to the presentation of a Manichean picture to the leaders: On the one hand, a Federation secretariat and some comrades decked out in all of the virtues; on the other hand, inquisitors and liars; at best, some hangers-on who relieve themselves of the trouble of having to think about the higher-level organizations.

Finally, the Federation Committee recalls that all of the thinking about the Party's activities in Paris was developed at length in the report to the Federation Committee preparing for the 23rd Congress.

A New Fact

This book nevertheless does introduce a new fact and that is the second remark which the Federation Committee wants to make.

In the book, Henri Fiszbin, on many pages, expresses numerous and serious points of political disagreement.

Until his resignation from the Central Committee last November, he advocated just one idea--as he did before the Federation Committee in October: According to him, there had been an injustice, a condemnation, a disavowal of the Federation and it was necessary to repair all that. Everything seemed to revolve around the disagreement on the meeting of 11 January.

Now, in his book, as well as in his letter of resignation to the Central Committee, he singularly enlarged that disagreement. He dismissed as being secondary those critical reflections which the Federation leadership had come out with regarding its own activity and, going back to March 1978 and 1977, he expresses a series of disagreements with the Party's policy such as it was spelled out and implemented. The excesses of his demonstration are striking.

Everything is bright on one side: The abundant initiatives, the sense of democracy, the clear-sightedness, the good common sense, the confidence in the communists. And he then wrote: "Paris scares everybody." "We are all suspects." "We are worried." What an elementary lack of modesty and objectivity!

On the other hand there is the side of the Party leadership: There is an accumulation of mistakes and even heinousness: "The leaden lid" which fell on the Party after March 1978; "The disregard of basic principles," "The easy arguments," "The bad quarrels," "The desire for a split among the communists," "The prohibitions."

Thus we see the development of a backward and anecdotic analysis which does not take into account the situation during a period of time when, after the election defeat in March 1978, while conditions were maturing only for the critical reflection to be engaged in by the 23rd Congress, enormous pressure was exerted from the right wing and from the Socialist Party "in a red-hot manner" upon the [Communist] Party in order to foist upon it the faults which are those of the Socialist Party and to create lasting splits. To hide the general political conditions in which the Party was placed; to examine the Party's internal--quite real and certainly natural--problems without reference to the class struggle and to the fact that weakening the Party is a fundamental objective of the bourgeoisie and the Socialist Party who think that the moment is now ripe--that sort of thing reduces the Party's life to the life of a politician in a goldfish bowl.

Henri Fiszbin here does not adopt the general viewpoint of a leadership body of which he was a member and which must cope with this complex situation. He casts a systematically critical eye upon the slightest gesture, the slightest move by the Party leadership.

Claiming to defend himself against a trial conducted against the Federation, he as a matter of fact conducts a trial--which is quite realistic for him--against the Party leadership which is accused of all kinds of wrongdoing.

In this respect, he hints that the Paris Federation leadership was in permanent and concealed conflict with the Party leadership on the issue of the implementation of the 22nd Congress. Now, such an idea was never the subject of a debate, either in the Bureau or in the Federation Committee.

Concerning the 23rd Congress, the positions which he expresses are, to say the least, equivocal. Ceaselessly affirming his agreement with it, he describes its preparation in such a manner that one cannot understand how a good Congress and a good line could have emerged from the initiative of a leadership which he considers to be so bad and which supposedly stifled the debate on ideas during its preparation.

This demonstration is essentially already to be found in his letter of resignation addressed to the Central Committee. This is the reason why the latter considered that it was not correct to reopen--on that issue--a debate which the 23rd Congress had cut off.

Through this book, the new fact is that Henri Fiszbin publicly commits himself to this kind of disagreement.

The Present Record is Being Written Now

The third remark of the Federation Committee deals with the fact that, throughout the entire book, the leadership of the Communist Party and the Federation are pictured as being inspired by a single desire: To conceal the situation which has arisen from the communists.

The only regret which Henri Fiszbin has--he writes--is that he participated in the effort to conceal the reason for his resignation. But he admits that, as of the evening of his resignation, on 11 January, he had arrived at the conclusion that it was necessary to do it this way and several days later he wrote to the Party leadership after having expressed his disagreement: I am sick, draw your own conclusions from that.

But, dissociating himself from an expression of regret and from the decision he had made, he shifts, throughout the book, all of the consequences upon the leadership of the Party and upon the Federation leadership. Always the same thread keeps running through it.

Now, a complex situation developed following his resignation. The record of the present is being written now. A leader expresses his disagreement and resigns. He is in effect ill and his departure from the Federation, upon his request, is expected during the months to come. At the time, he does not express the political disagreements which he states in his letter

of resignation to the Central Committee 10 months later. And there are no indications to the effect that his disagreements will take over his entire field of vision.

The current situation was not written out in advance.

It is certain that this experience offers a lesson. But that it should be used in order to accuse the Party's and the Federation's leadership, which lived through that situation month after month--while having to run the cantonal elections, a Party Congress, a European election campaign--to accuse them of premeditated dissimulation of a desire to lie to the Party, that is adulterating the truth. This is an unfounded accusation.

So, to back up his idea, Henri Fieszbin touches up reality. He does not underscore the fact--in the face of a new resignation of a Federation secretary--that the secretariat and the Federation's bureau decided in October to put an end to all of this equivocation and to open a debate in the Federation Committee and in the Party--something which was indeed done.

Profound Disagreement

Finally, and this is the fourth remark by the Federation Committee--we come to the question of the successive resignations of Henri Fieszbin from his post as Federation secretary, as member of the Central Committee, and then as chairman of the communist group in the Paris Council.

To be sure, the resignation of a militant is always possible, especially since our struggle calls upon everybody to exercise his responsibilities fully.

But how can Henri Fieszbin at the same time recall that he defended the idea that one could be elected to a leadership body although one may be in disagreement on an important issue--which is correct, implying here that democratic centralism calls for the implementation of the policy adopted--and how could one fail to note that it is this practice which took place during the 23rd Congress with his election to the Federation leadership and the Central Committee.

He presents his resignation as inevitable. Now, at every moment, far from pushing him into this, it was suggested to him that he should assume all of his responsibilities, while preserving his disagreement.

In fact, Henri Fieszbin did not want to or did not know how to maintain political disagreement in its proper place while taking into account the one thing that is essential: The struggle and policy of the 22nd and 23rd Congresses.

He did not make a good choice. He tells us that we do not know any more how to handle disagreements and at the same time continue to hold a responsible position. But what did he do in this case? What he did at that moment was anything but constructive.

Right now, in this escalation and "by raising the bar," this book constructs an entire edifice which presents the life of the Party and its leadership bodies as machines that turn out lies, grinding up women and men.

The adversary--we must note clearly--in fact is a machine of war against the Party.

The reactionary commentators, who exploit this book as an element justifying their anticommunist theses, unfortunately have no need to distort its content. All they have to do is quote from the book and delve into it deeply.

Henri Fiszbin did anticipate that the adversaries of the Communist Party would seize upon this but the essential thing, he writes, is that the truth be made known.

How this is to be accomplished he does not tell us.

He is thus committed to a bad battle--in bad company, in these times of rampant anticommunist campaigns--and the Federation Committee regrets this.

The Federation Committee must express its total disagreement with this book, with this long, distorting, unjust, and unjustified list of charges.

On the Offensive .

The Federation Committee finally must underscore the fact that, far from presenting the image of crisis given here, the Communist Party keeps developing, in Paris and throughout the country, an intense effort in the service of the workers; it contributes to the development of the struggle and the political and ideological battle and it firmly responds to the anti-communist campaign against the Party's secretary-general.

It has recorded positive results in the drive to strengthen the Party and to disseminate L'HUMANITE DIMANCHE and REVOLUTION, and it calls upon everybody to pursue these efforts with tenacity.

Taking this into account, along with the gains of the Federation and the lessons learned from critical reflection, the Federation Committee calls upon all Party organizations at the same time to develop an aggressive political and ideological battle and a stepped-up activity in support of the demands and needs of manual laborers and intellectuals in the capital.

In all areas, the moment has come for an offensive deployment of the Party's entire activity.

Paris, 28 March 1980.

(Subtitles supplied by the editors of L'HUMANITE.)

5058
CSO: 3100

BARRE'S 29 FEBRUARY DEFENSE SPEECH TO IHEDN

Paris DEFENSE NATIONALE in French Apr 80, pp 9-13

[Speech by Prime Minister Raymond Barre at the closing session of the 60th regional meeting of the Institute for High National Defense Studies (IHEDN), at Lyon, on 29 February]

[Text] It is a real pleasure for me to participate in Lyon in the final proceedings of the 60th meeting of the IHEDN and to bear witness to the interest the government takes in the work of your institute.

I am happy, because of the bonds which tie me to Lyon, to see here assembled alongside the highest civilian and military authorities representatives of the primary sectors of activity in the region who have for a month agreed to devote a significant part of their time to collective reflection on national defense problems. I should like to stress the beneficial nature of this institution which brings together in a multidisciplinary framework men from the most varied fields who each bring a sense of experience and responsibilities.

General Marty, after explaining how your cycle of studies has unfolded and how it fits into the general framework of national and regional meetings of the Institute for High National Defense Studies, gave a very edifying presentation of the fundamental principles of French foreign policy: independence--loyalty to our alliances--pursuit of detente while remaining vigilant; the building of an integrated Western Europe which is master of its own destiny; development aid for the countries of the Third World. He very properly emphasized the basic notions of independence and freedom, and the apparently paradoxical character of such concepts in an international community which in reality is more and more interdependent and which feels this interdependence ever more keenly. In the case of the European community, on which you have particularly focused in this meeting, he brought to light the limits and the conditions of a multinational structure; he showed that our insistence on national independence is both a political necessity and a moral imperative; that it neither inspires nor permits isolationism; that it respects our country's historic and universalist calling to play its own part in the world.

Finally, he most aptly summed up the spirit of defense which should animate all Frenchmen, appealing to the profoundly authentic feeling of respect and attachment which the French have for France.

I note how these remarks bear witness to a remarkable continuity in French policy and especially in our country's defense policy. The great principles laid down by General de Gaulle have for 20 years constituted the foundations of the policy followed by the Fifth Republic—I should say that they have been almost eternal principles of French foreign policy. The criticism and opposition of the first years have given way to a nearly unanimous consensus of the various factions of public opinion; foreign analysts do not fail to remark on the exemplary nature of such a consensus.

But I observe also that present circumstances, here at the beginning of 1980, show us the wisdom of our choices and lead us to persevere in our directions.

We begin the new decade, really, in a climate of serious economic problems on a worldwide scale and of a heightening of international tensions. These dangers have brought about a new public interest in defense problems; the public is concerned about the dangers which threaten our country due to our economic vulnerabilities and our dependence on foreign sources of energy; and it sees the risks of destabilization and confrontations which could degenerate into armed conflicts.

So many perils, so many challenges, for our generation. But the greatest challenge of the eighties will unquestionably be the challenge of peace.

This is why the overwhelming majority of Frenchmen support the sustained and coherent efforts our government has made in the past and continues to make on behalf of our forces. In a particularly difficult economic period, the fiscal effort, to dedicate a growing percentage of the national wealth to the defense budget, translates into a continual strengthening of the capability of our nuclear forces and the preparation of second-generation strategic and tactical systems. But we are also pursuing, with the same determination, the modernization of our conventional military forces. Neither of these components is sacrificed, for defense policy cannot rest exclusively on the threat of massive retaliation; the commitment to defense and our determination find expression [as well] below the dramatic threshold of extreme situations. The existence of armed forces capable of defending our interests in the face of minor aggressions, able to demonstrate our solidarity with our allies or to support our friends, is the indispensable complement to our nuclear forces. We all still remember recent examples of French action in international crises.

The concept of our military defense apparatus has taken into account the changes of our time. The time has gone when international political and economic relations were ordered according to stable and clear terms of reference. We lived through the era when, in a world dominated by the

confrontation of two blocs, the actions of the United States and the USSR were relatively predictable. We lived through the time when [national] economies were based on a currency whose strength was undisputed and whose stability was a fact, the dollar, and when the cost of energy was not subject to brutal increases.

Today, in all these areas, uncertainty and the unforeseen are the rule: new centers of decision, new arenas of ideological and religious conflict are profoundly changing political and economic relations. Henceforth, our policy must be able to deal with unexpected developments; we must have the capacity to react quickly, to make the right response in the most diverse situations.

These are also the new demands on our defense. You pointed out, General, that there can be no military defense without the preservation of the overall demographic, economic, and social balance of the nation. Government action in all these areas is completely based on a determination to deal with all eventualities; not only to respond to events in the short term, but also to act in such a way that, in the middle and long term, our country will have the capability to react in all kinds of situations. This concept is enshrined in the charters which provide for our national defense; the ordinance of January 1959, which remains the foundation of our organization, proceeds from a similar inspiration and recognizes that defense is multi-faceted and concerns all of the nation's activities. It works and trains in normal times so that our structures will be able to deal with situations of increasing gravity, in diverse contingencies of international crisis.

If uncertainty and the unforeseen are the rule today in the international arena, an added problem appears with the necessity of making profound changes in thought and action.

I will take economic affairs as an example.

France was rebuilt, modernized, developed, after the end of World War II, as never before; it experienced constant and regular improvement in the standard of living; Frenchmen constantly expected better and more. It was natural that, in such a psychological climate, Frenchmen would not at the very start understand the need for the efforts asked of them in dealing with the complete reversal of the situation which followed the first oil shock of 1973-1974. But when one observes with some detachment the evolution of times and events, one realizes that the French, contrary to the idea that some people are trying to promote, are intelligent and courageous; their persistent efforts over the last several years are enabling them today to begin to reduce their energy dependence, to meet international competition with renovated industries, and to sustain the power and stability of their currency.

In the social and economic context of today's world, initiative and responsibility are the essential virtues; the gradual reforms which are introduced

in the state, the administration, in the economic sector, in social relations, must all be going in the same direction, so that the country shall be able to preserve what it has attained, handle all contingencies, and control the future.

Such are indeed, in the final analysis, the goals and conditions of a modern defense: lucidity in the face of the new conditions in a troublesome international situation, courage and determination to meet the challenge of peace without surrender or complacency, confidence in the virtues of initiative and responsibility which are inseparable from an authentic concept of freedom.

Providing for the security of France is not only a matter of preserving our patrimony, safeguarding our territory, and protecting our property and citizens. It is also a determination to build the future.

The problems and the perils of the present time invite us to look the realities in the face, to concern ourselves with the basic options, the essential decisions among the innumerable pressures of a political present which is too often futile.

I ask you, who have been reflecting for several weeks on matters of French defense, to continue your reflections and your daily efforts to consolidate the structures and the vital forces of the nation. It is a labor which we must all pursue together to secure the future for our children and to enable France to cope solidly and effectively with the challenges of the final years of the Twentieth Century, and to maintain its position into the Third Millennium.

Having for more than 3 years led the government of this country during particularly difficult circumstances, I am convinced that our people can find, in their own unique nature, the resources of courage and imagination to enable them to meet this challenge.

9516
CSO: 3100

ADVANCED MILITARY TRAINING OUTLINED

Paris DEFENSE NATIONALE in French Apr 80 pp 152-57

[Article by Emmanuel Gepeyre--passages between slantlines published in italics]

[Text] Since the beginning of the century, scientific knowledge and technological capabilities have taken prodigious leaps forward. In their wake, the world has become more open and ideas found ways and means of being spread with growing speed and intensity. In this context, methods of training the officer who will tomorrow take on some of the responsibility for the security of their fellow citizens must be changed. This is what the land army has just accomplished in its advanced military training, by adapting both the substance and the form of its first and second degree training to conform with the realities of our time.

A growing gap was threatening to form between the training given and the needs of the land army; the training system became too complex and risked compromising the unity of the officer corps; equality of opportunity among all officers was no longer always a reality.

A major reform was needed to adapt the system of continuous training of officers which aims at valorizing manpower and permanently maintaining a sufficient number of cadres capable of assuming tasks of different levels in time of peace as well as in time of war.

The advanced military training (EMS) of the land army consists of two levels: EMS 1 and EMS 2:

EMS 1 aims at giving officers already possessing considerable military experience training as much in the scientific area as in that of staff techniques.

EMS 2 aims at three complementary objectives:

--the availability of men who in both the scientific and personal area have the competence necessary for the exercising of responsibility;

--exposing the important leaders of tomorrow to the facts and ideas of the contemporary world so that they can discern innovative trends, most particularly in the tactical area;

--improving the general level of culture of the cadres to make them comfortable with command, by giving them access to broader views and enabling them to integrate their reasoning and intuitive faculties.

Advanced Military Training at the first level

This consists of two parts: preparation for the technical diploma, and the staff school.

/Preparation for the technical diploma/

The aim is to train officers who have special qualifications in certain techniques or disciplines and who are suitable for specialist positions in very diverse areas: research and experimentation with materiel, holding responsible positions with the engineering corps, data processing, chemistry, intelligence, teaching in the schools, etc. This training is rewarded with the issuance of a technical diploma (DT).

Admission to the DT course is first of all dependent on the merit of the officer: it is also dependent on having the knowledge required to undertake advanced studies. This is ascertained through an examination for aptitude at the level of the first diploma obtained: the baccalaureate, first or second year of the DEUG [expansion unknown].

Studies are organized into two cycles:

--the first cycle (preparatory training) is to give officers lacking it the level of knowledge required to begin advanced studies under favorable conditions; training lasts 1 year;

--during the second cycle (specialized training), which lasts from 1 to 2 years, candidates should acquire, in military engineering schools or at the university, an engineering degree, a license, or a technical diploma from the university.

Outside the normal assignments they carry out in their branch, the DT officers are basically posted to technical positions or inter-service functions related to testing of materiel, research and study, training, or certain staffing positions.

/Training at the staff school/

The mission of the staff school is to train officers for staff work both in time of war and time of peace:

--study, understanding, and analysis of problems to resolve;

--preparation of documents, presentation of options, the clear, precise, and concise formulation of orders;

--knowledge and practice of communications techniques.

The staff school, just re-opened at Compiegne, each year organizes two 5-month courses. Each course is open to about 150 officer students, men and women, of whom 25 officers are foreigners.

Training at the school is addressed to officers who have held command as captain or exercised equivalent responsibilities. These officers thus have several years of military experience, their character has developed, and they are able to benefit from their own training in a context where their initiative can be augmented. Most of them have taken the captains' course and are to a large extent familiar with the methodology of global missions which has developed within the land army a participative pedagogy.

Staff school is open to all officers regardless of how they came into the service: Saint-Cyr, interservice military school, rank, reserve officers, technical officers. The age limit for entry into the school is fixed at 42 years, and the officer must be a captain or major.

Admission to the staff school is determined by a competition. After a night march of 20 km designed to take into account the effect of a prolonged strain on intellectual capacity, candidates must pass the following tests:

--a textual analysis;

--a topographical study;

--a test of general knowledge.

The training is divided into two primary and distinct parts:

--the study of staff techniques;

--their application to artificial problems.

Staff techniques include general techniques of communication and their application to specific staff problems:

--analysis;

--written and oral communication;

--special techniques for staff cells;

--utilization of audiovisual and data processing resources.

The simulation exercises are aimed at enabling the techniques studied to be put into practice in a setting which approaches as closely as possible the real thing and which requires, in addition to speed, continuing contacts between the different bureaus or cells.

There is general training throughout the course. It is more especially keyed to sensitizing [the students] to subjects of present-day general or military interest: political studies, economics, sciences and technologies, history.

/Pedagogy at the staff school/

Pedagogy is conducted in accordance with four ruling principles:

--participative leadership through objectives which call forth the dynamism, the imagination, and the determination of the students. The school establishes for each officer concrete goals to attain. It then monitors progress by means of "meetings on objective";

--freedom of action left to the students in choosing how to organize their work, which is limited by inherent constraints in staff work;

--concrete and practical training which diminishes the part played by lecture courses and which is implemented by placing the students in concrete situations;

--enriching the work environment by dividing the students into groups of 15, constituted so that they are representative of the diversity of recruitment origin of the officers.

Advanced military training at the second level (see chart)

EMS 2 aims at training superior officers destined to hold important commands or leadership functions and hold responsible positions in headquarters staffs, positions demanding a high level of competence.

These officers are recruited by competition, and the EMS training can take place along two tracks.

/The entry competition/

The competing candidates for entry to EMS 2 must fulfill the following conditions:

--have less than 15 years of service as an active officer;

--have completed the period of command customary for officers in the branches, and for the others to have at least 5 years of seniority at the rank of captain;

--not being an EMS 1 student at the time of the competition;

--having satisfactory grades.

The competition is in two large parts: the general aptitude tests (EAG), on the one hand, and the optional tests (EAO) and physical tests, on the other.

The general aptitude tests aim at selecting the candidates. They consist of a test of general culture and preparation of a memo. An aptitude score is added to the results of these two tests to determine admissibility. These will take place for the first time in September 1980.

The optional tests are given about 6 months after the EAG's and are only taken by candidates determined to be admissible.

Their aim is to refine the selection and reveal the officers best equipped to follow the different courses of study. There are four options:

--engineering sciences;

--the human sciences;

--languages and foreign studies;

--military science.

A candidate has the right to compete in one or two fields. The additional points are added to the results of the EAO in the case of grades higher than 12 on the physical tests, a score for particular aptitude is entered by the committee, and the results are published by track and option.

/Tracks of EMS 2 training/

According to whether the officer successful in the competition has chosen the track leading to awarding of the Certificate of Advanced Military Training (BEMS) or that which leads to the Technical Certificate of Specialized Advanced Studies (B.TESS), the course of EMS 2 training is different. In both cases the training is usually staged over 6 years.

The BEMS track followed by the majority of officers consists of four steps:

The first consists of study contracts which last 2 years. These contracts are of two types:

--study contracts;

--staff contracts.

The study contracts are for the most part aimed at full development in the engineering sciences. They are also used in the human sciences and in the study of languages and foreign countries.

The study programs are carried out in the big civilian colleges, institutes, and universities.

The staff contracts are implemented by a stay in the general staff of a large unit. During this time, all the while participating in the staff operations, the student must perform special work to improve his general culture and develop his military understanding.

The second step is a posting with a body of troops during which time the officer competes for admission to Advanced War College.

The third step is the competition. This begins with testing of the general level of culture by means of a written examination and sometimes by an oral interrogation in a foreign language. This verification is followed up by physical tests identical to those conducted for those competing for EMS 2.

The competition finally consists of three military tests, all oral:

- the test on the service sub-division covers training of the same type as that where the candidate is posted;
- the service test covers his branch in an overall context of staff and support;
- the test of knowledge of command and instruction in peacetime.


The last step is that of the Advanced War College. This course lasts 2 years for all officers; the beginning of the second year is concerned with the advanced inter-service course. The BEMS is awarded at the end of the course.

The BTESS track:

This differs from the preceding track first of all in the study contract, which is in all cases a contract for more than 2 years of study.

This training consists of extended specialization and the acquisition of knowledge in depth: the study program can be prolonged by a course or employment in the branch of specialization. The military component of the advanced training for officers oriented toward the BTESS is handled by the Advanced War College. The diploma is awarded at the end of the course or of the first employment and at the earliest 5 years after admission to EMS 2.

SCHEMA DE L'E.M.S. 2



27 (1) Les officiers peuvent être candidats à deux reprises

Modernization of the staff school and reform of advanced military training at the second level demonstrate in their turn the effort of adaptation of the land army to contemporary needs and they are demonstrated in the renovation efforts undertaken in recent years. Knowing that "knowledge is the first responsibility of the leader," the officers brought to follow these cycles of training should find in their training the necessary foundation for their future responsibilities, for assertion of their authority, and for the blossoming of their personal character.

KEY:

1. Flow chart of EMS 2
2. Advanced War College
3. 2 years
4. BEMS (Certificate of Advanced Military Training)
5. BTESS (Technical Certificate of Specialized Advanced Studies)
6. Period with troop unit or employment in specialized field and short ESG [Advanced War College] course
7. 80 of 140 candidates accepted (1)
8. ESG competition
9. Assignment with active unit
10. 2 years
11. 2 to 3 years
12. Study
13. 15 officers
14. Study contract (academic)
15. 55 officers
16. 2 years
17. Staff contract
18. 55 officers
19. Study contract
20. Optional tests
21. Engineering sciences
22. Human sciences
23. Language and Area studies
24. Military science
25. General aptitude tests
26. 125 out of 500 candidates accepted (1)
27. (1) Officers can apply for both

9516

CSO: 3100

BRIEFS

WARNING ON LEAKS--For the third time since November, the prime minister has just reminded ministers and state secretaries that they must personally make sure there are no leaks in reports elaborated at high levels of the administration. [Text] [Paris LE POINT in French 21 Apr 80 p 55] 9516

KREMLIN WATCHING PCF--By giving the green light to a conference of European communist parties in Paris 28 and 29 April, the Kremlin is trying to reaffirm its authority over those who remain faithful to it. Moscow is primarily interested in obtaining support for its foreign policy at the Paris conference. [Text] [Paris LE POINT in French 21 Apr 80 p 55] 9516

SDECE KREMLIN REPORT--The SDECE (Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence Service) has just submitted a report to the government on the influence of Soviet military men in the conduct of affairs in the Kremlin today. This report indicates, notably, that the military men may be gaining more and more ground on the civilians. [Text] [Paris LE POINT in French 21 Apr 80 p 55] 9516

COMMUNIST YOUTH USSR VISIT--A delegation of the Communist Youth Movement of France yesterday left for the USSR. Headed by Pierre Zarka, secretary-general of the MJCF [Communist Youth Movement of France], the delegation in particular will go to Siberia and will visit "Cosmos" city. [Text] [Paris L'HUMANITE in French 29 Mar 80 p 7] 5058

EMERGENCY PACKAGING--The Ministry of the Interior has just sent a letter to all the nation's weapons suppliers asking them if it would be possible for them to do an emergency packaging job on all their weapons and ammunition in the event of an insurrection, such packaging to consist of distinctly recognizable containers. The suppliers all agreed in their reply that it would be impossible. [Text] [Paris LE POINT in French 5 May 80 p 55]

KRAFLA VOLCANIC ERUPTION LEAVES 5 KILOMETER CREVICE

Power Station Believed Safe

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 18 Mar 80 p 4

[Text] The most violent volcanic eruption in the Krafla area of north Iceland since volcanic activity began there 5 years ago took place Sunday. The eruption ended in 7 hours, and the new volcanic crevice which was formed is 5 kilometers long, and the part of the crevice which produced flowing lava is estimated to be 1500 meters long.

The fact that the activity was greatest in the northernmost part of the area is favorable, because to the south at about 8 to 10 kilometers distance is the town and an industrial area. Krafla power station, which is not yet operating because of uncertainty about volcanic activity, is about 4 kilometers from the new crevice.

In the area of Krafla and nearby Myvatnssveit there have been constant earthquakes since the eruption began on Sunday. Sunday evening the quakes became more violent, and the largest were measured at 3 to 4 on the Richter scale. At one time there was concern that the flowing lava within the earth was on the point of flowing southward toward Bjarnarflag, where the diatomite factory is located, because it was noticed that the ground level at Krafla had sunk rather severely. At about midnight it began to rise again, so that danger seems to have passed.

One good sign is that each time an eruption occurs in the Krafla area the activity moves farther north--and farther from the inhabited areas. If there should eventually be a really powerful eruption in the area the danger of injury to people and damage to homes and factories is diminished.

No matter what one says about the eruption in Iceland, it is a superb sight. Icelanders have learned to live with the danger from volcanos, but from the first stirrings at Krafla they have expected an eruption that would release the forces which obviously exist in that area. Now there is a certain disappointment that there was not a major event this time either. They ask, "When is the big eruption finally coming to Krafla so that we can begin to count on a little peace and quiet--maybe in one or two centuries?

Eruption Believed Over

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 18 Mar 80 p 4

[Text] The danger from the new volcanic eruption near the power station at Krafla on Iceland appears to be over for this time. The earth where the eruption took place is now rising again, and that is regarded by experts as a good sign that conditions are stabilizing and there will probably be no new eruptions in the near future.

Experts from the Nordic Volcanological Institute visited Krafla on Monday, and they are now studying the ground and testing the lava, which flowed 500 meters from the point of eruption. Experts from the institute told AFTENPOSTEN that the ground sinks during an eruption, lava is released and flows out. But when the underground flow of lava replaces the lava that has been released the empty space under the ground is filled up again and the surface will rise. And that is exactly what is now happening. The impending danger of a new eruption is now over, but that will not prevent the experts from carefully following events at Krafla.

Even though nobody was injured, and there were no reports of damage to material or buildings, the latest eruption is considered serious. Earlier, in 1975 and 1977 similar eruptions occurred at the same place--at Leirhnjukur--but on a somewhat smaller scale. The situation causes concern because it affects power production at Krafla to a significant degree. Power production is based on steam from the bore holes in the area, and it was planned that by 1976 the power station would produce 30 megawatts. Later production was expected to rise to 60 megawatts. But so far Krafla produces about 3 to 6 megawatts, and nobody can say if it will ever deliver the expected amounts of power.

Krafla cost 210 million kroner and was to furnish electric power to northeast Iceland. But ground conditions are not stable, it has not so far been possible to utilize the enormous amounts of steam deep in the ground, and many fear that construction of Krafla was a momentous mistake, because construction was begun without sufficient advance investigation of conditions there.

The Myvatn area, where Krafla is situated, is famous for its volcanic activity. There have been enormous eruptions, including the one which formed the lake at Myvatn 2000 years ago. Major eruptions also occurred during the years 1724 to 1729 near the area where the power station now stands.

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PLI, PSDI DISSATISFACTION OVER POLICE REFORM STRESSED

Milan IL GIORNALE NUOVO in Italian 2 Apr 80 p 1

[Article by Francesco Damato: "PLI and PSDI More Distrustful of New Government"]

[Text] The first, unclear leaks concerning the agreement between Christian Democrats, socialists and republicans on police reform were enough to accentuate, rather than to reduce, the concern and suspicions of the liberals and social democrats. This is why there seems to be a consolidation of the opposition of both against the new government that Cossiga hopes to form next Friday.

Speaking of police reform and particularly of the planned "liaison" between the independent police trade union and other trade union organizations, the social democrat Belluscio emphasized the danger of unexpected Italian demands for "security." In regard to these matters, Belluscio said, "Errors whose repercussions would be felt by all the citizens cannot be tolerated."

Liberal Assistant Secretary Biondi, who handles public order, said that "We cannot understand--or rather we understand only too well--the meaning of that special relationship which, according to information on negotiations between Christian Democrats, socialists and republicans, is expected to wed the independent police union to the federated trade unions, CGIL-CISL-UIL [Italian General Confederation of Labor-Italian Confederation of Labor Unions-Union of Italian Labor]. It would be a serious matter if from the beginning there were special relations, perhaps even unnatural relations, in regard to the individual, exclusive tasks--which cannot be used as instruments--of those in charge of public security. Either the police trade union is independent, internally pluralistic, but not guided from afar by the large or small trade unions, or it is not," Biondi insisted.

While the liberals and social democrats are influenced by the first leaks on the program to distrust the new government even more, the Alto Adige parliamentarians representing the Volkspartei seem to be oriented toward support for the DC-PSI-PRI [Christian Democratic Party-Italian Socialist

Party-Italian Republican Party] coalition, from which, however, it today officially requested "assurances concerning the publication of certain regulations still lacking in the autonomous regional package."

The negotiations on the program among Christian Democrats, socialists and republicans, which are reported separately, proceed with intense activity among contending groups in the DC and the PSI for the designation of ministries. Among other things, it is an activity that is complicated by the fact that the designations representing those groups are threatened by the danger of Pertini's refusal to sign the required nomination forms. In fact, it has become known that after having talked about it recently with Cossiga personally, as we reported in our newspaper, the head of state fell back on his constitutional prerogatives by writing a letter to the prime minister.

Particularly, Pertini recalled that Article 92 of the constitution prescribes that even though the proposal may come from the prime minister, it is the prerogative of the chief of state to name the ministers. And he intends to reject the nomination of persons who are not morally acceptable.

"The political forces did not need anyone's help to carefully select the members of the government," DC Secretary Piccoli said Friday in commenting on the first rumors concerning Pertini's proposals of "vigilance" in a careful selection of the ministers. Evidently Pertini meant to reply to Piccoli when he wrote Cossiga a letter which was sent to the prime minister at Villa Madama, where negotiations among the parties on the new government program are taking place.

The initiative by the president of the republic, which truthfully was advertised with questionable taste by his supporters, earned the plaudits of some parliamentarians, including the socialist Bassanini, the independent leftist Gozzini, the liberal Biondi, and the Christian Democrat Silvestri. But it also earned the displeasure and reservations of others who are concerned that there will be the de facto establishment of a so-called presidential regime which would no longer be responsive to Parliament and the parties, but only to the chief of state.

The independent leftist Rodota, for example, said the prime minister and the party secretaries are "completely free to ignore" the statement by Pertini even though that cannot be censured on the formal plane. The ultraleftist deputy Milani said he "did not understand" the gesture made by the chief of state because "to begin with it is always taken for granted that members of a government will be honest." Milani added, "If Pertini has a list of persons who can justifiably be suspected, he is invited to take action according to the institutional paths of investigation."

Perhaps in an attempt to block embarrassing polemics, PSI Secretary Craxi, like Solomon, interpreted the chief of state's action as "a very correct and timely recommendation of principle" and stated that the parties, at least those involved in the formation of the new government, "share Pertini's opinion."

PAPER SEES 'EXCELLENT' ALLIED COOPERATION IN ANORAK EXPRESS

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 17 Mar 80 p 48

[Article by Knut Falchenberg: "General Appreciates Cooperative Civilians"]

[Text] It is difficult enough to make oneself understood over a radio when one is wearing a gas mask. It is no easier when one is breathless from running. The voice is drowned in panting and puffing, and we can barely see the eyes through the windows in the rubber mask. When the "gas attack" is over, the masks come off. Captain Olav Oterholm can again speak freely. Oterholm explains, "We are in the front lines. The enemy is close to the front." But because it is operation "Anorak Express" we of course hear nothing. There are no resounding shots being fired.

Captain Oterholm belongs to the "Southern Group," whose task is to stop the advance of the "Northern Group." Over the radio he directs his soldiers, who are all in for refresher training.

It is difficult for these soldiers to comprehend the major outline of the exercise, where 9,000 Norwegians and an equal number of allied foreigners participate. The private soldier often sees no further ahead in the battle plan than the nearest hilltop.

"It looks to me like a great chaos, and here in the front lines it is mostly wait, wait, and wait some more," said refresher training soldier Ronald Johansen from Moi Rana. "But we are well off anyhow, with sunshine and the Easter vacation spirit. Our dinner is brought out to us in large containers. And even if the food gets tepid before it reaches us, it tastes good when you are hungry," said Ronald Johansen. He said that his squad spends the night in a wall tent. But the nights are short.

"Last night I think we slept 2 or 3 hours in all. The night before we only slept 1 hour," he said.

"We went over to the 'enemy.' The soldiers were waiting there too, but it looked like most of the marines had learned their own technique. As soon as the column of tracked vehicles stopped, most of the guys pulled out their paperback books. Then they would advance a little ways, and at the next stop they would relax again."

"A man has to have something to pass the time with," said Corporal Joseph Zapata. He belongs to Alfa Company of the United States Marines, the company which is using Norwegian field uniforms to compare them with its own winter equipment.

"I think Norwegian equipment is OK. Except for the boots. They are colder than ours," said Corporal Zapata, lying there behind his machine gun at the side of the road, just outside of a local store, where children play without noticing the warriors.

These American professional soldiers are young, often much younger than the Norwegian refresher training soldiers. An American spokesman says that the soldiers who participate in this exercise have an average of 18 months experience in the military. But he insists that the training is hard and tough.

Farther along route 855 near Finnfjordvann there is the explanation as to why the Americans' advance has been halted. Here the southern point of the attacking forces met an unexpected obstacle, a mine field. Umpire Oddvar Berg is there, and he has a fast conference with the American umpire. Both are neutral, and decide that the American advance can not proceed until they have brought up mine sweeping equipment. That must come from the rear area, and that will take time.

In the meanwhile five M60 tanks are standing in front of the mine field. They swing their cannons threateningly, but on the inside the tank crews know that they are very vulnerable when they are not moving. Most of all they are afraid that the Southern Group will blow them up with artillery or missile fire. And they glance apprehensively up at the sky to see if enemy fighter aircraft are on the way.

That is how the "war" goes, troops are on the move day and night. The neutral umpires move along them, evaluating all the strengths and weaknesses and sending their reports back to the chief umpire over their own communications net.

Coat of Arms to Farmers

The cooperation between the civilian population and the foreign forces who are fighting in inner Troms is wonderful. The commander of NATO's mobile forces (AMF), General Alexander M. Weyland, commemorated the cooperation on Sunday by presenting the NATO coat of arms to two area farmers.

The commander of the AMF sent his Norwegian liaison officer, Major Brustad, to present the coat of arms to farmers Asbjorn Pedersen and Ola Kjellmo at Olsborg. The farmers had put their farms and property at the disposal of the NATO soldiers, and at one of the farms the soldiers were invited in for waffles and traditional Norwegian food.

On Monday Crown Prince Harald will visit the Norwegian and foreign forces which are taking part in NATO exercise "Anorak Express" in Troms.

STATOIL DIRECTOR JOHNSON: ERA OF PROFITS TO BEGIN

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 5 Mar 80 pp 22-23

[Article: "Statoil Will No Longer Lose Money. Now the Money is Coming!"]

[Text] A continuing flow of income.

Investments of at least a couple of billion kroner each year.

Statoil will lead the development of a field in the North Sea for the first time.

Refining and Marketing of oil products will get a stronger position.

Statoil and the Norwegian government will together be the largest owner in the North of one of the world's most important raw materials.

These are some of the perspectives for Statoil, the government's own oil company, in the 1980's.

Statoil was established in 1972 and has become the businesslike instrument which the authorities believed they needed when the oil activity started on the Norwegian shelf. Statoil has grown to approximately 900 employees and will continue to grow through the 1980's.

Today Statoil is involved in all sections of oil activity. From the prospecting phase to production, sales and reprocessing.

Statoil has at times been a controversial company. Especially in the political discussion. Throughout the 1970's it may also have seemed as if Statoil has been an enormous absorber of money. Now this will be changed. The income is coming.

Administrative director Arve Johnsen in Statoil says in a conversation with ARBEIDERBLADET:

"The flow of income will be continuous through this new decade. The income will only increase from year to year, and the sales will be doubled many times. Already this year there will almost be a balance between income and expenses. From next year on there will be a surplus of close to one billion.

"This will to an increasing degree make it possible for Statoil to finance its projects by itself.

"Statoil will be in a situation where we can harvest all the time. At the same time we will continue with big investments. A couple of billion kroner annually. Much of what we harvest must be used for new seed grains."

The Statoil director adds that there will be a constant recruiting of people for the company. Personnel who will not only assist in the oil prospecting, but who will also be responsible for developing and operating fields in the North Sea. The point of emphasis will be shifted.

[Question] But when will Statoil itself be in charge of the development in the North Sea?

[Answer] During this year we will announce a field where we will run the operation. It is a little early to say which field it might be. Drilling is carried out in a couple of blocks which are promising. When the development is approved, Statoil will for the first time also get into the driver's seat with regards to this side of the activity. In addition, we continue to work with a view toward taking over as operator in the Statfjord field in 1984-85.

[Question] And you are able to take over these projects?

[Answer] Yes.

[Question] What about the prospecting activity?

[Answer] It will go on with great force. We will at any time have four drilling platforms in operation.

[Question] Norol will now come in as part of the company. What meaning will that have in the future?

[Answer] As a result of this, we will get more of our activity directed to the refining and marketing of the oil products. Statoil-Norol will as a company primarily emphasize the Norwegian market, but will also gradually get into the Nordic market. We want to market our crude oil in Europe and also in North America.

Gradually we also want to emphasize getting an increased degree of processing for the oil products via the refining activity in Mongstad at Bergen.

Our development plans there must be seen in this perspective. Today we know that the light fractions of the oil products fetch a higher price.

"We have the crude material basis and can plan for the long range," says Arve Johnsen and adds: "Now we can see that the policy which was proposed at the beginning of the 1970's is sensible.

"Society will through Statoil and the oil which the government will have available be the biggest raw material owner in the North. The Norwegian society gets a series of advantages on their side. There will be tax and duty income and raw materials. One does not have to worry about the market situation and one gets insight and means for developing Norwegian industry further. Remember that 70-80 percent of all contracts go to the Norwegian industry."

[Question] But will this be profitable investments?

[Answer] No investments anywhere in the 1980's will be as profitable as those which can be made within the petroleum activity.

[Question] Is it not possible that Statoil may get a too strong role and become a too large power factor in the Norwegian society?

[Answer] Then one must ask the question, Who controls the power? I do not consider it impossible that Statoil can become a power factor, but it will be the government--society--which will have this power.

And we can measure it against another power factor: the multinational companies. Even in 10 years Statoil will be 'small' as compared to those on an international scale. This should really be the reference framework. Statoil will be a big company in Norway, but internationally we will still be small.

And within the Norwegian society it will not be possible to exercise the power more than what the politicians want. The alternative is power in private hands--without any form of political control. There is no intermediate solution.

[Question] Some people will maintain that Statoil becomes a tool which can be used to socialize Norway. Any comments?

[Answer] It is nonsense to call this socialism. Statoil will be managed according to businesslike principles and will be directed politically the way the majority in parliament wants it at any time. The majority in parliament is again a result of democracy in elections. It will be the currents in Norwegian society which will form the foundation for the goal which parliament sets up for Statoil activities and where it will be up to us to carry out the government's business interests in the petroleum sector in the best way within the framework of the political guidelines.

[Question] How will Statoil use its oil income?

[Answer] The debt will be paid off first. We will pay tax and dividends to society, and we will invest in new projects.

[Question] How should the Norwegian society use its oil income?

[Answer] Society will in the last half of the 1980's get into a situation where one can afford to further develop joint assets. At the same time, Norway will become a real exporter of capital. Instead of being a nation of borrowers, we can become a nation of lenders. We must not take more out in the Norwegian society than what is sensible at any time. We must not place ourselves in such a position that we break the cost limits and make ourselves uncompetitive. We should use the oil money for sensible investments abroad. We can go into projects in the developing countries. We will have means for that. I myself believe we should emphasize bilateral agreements with other countries so that we get direct responsibility relationships and possibilities for transferring our insight to the developing countries. We should not be satisfied with just giving away money.

[Question] Can't we use the money to subsidize ourselves?

[Answer] I am afraid we will get some big problems if we do that. We will only confuse the economic realities if we use this to subsidize the industry and our own income. Then we will not be able to compete once the oil age is over.

[Question] Do we still need the foreign oil companies?

[Answer] We do not profit from isolation. That does not give the impulses we need to develop ourselves. My main point of view is that it serves our interests--and also the foreign companies--if we can learn from each other. The form of the collaborations can be evaluated at any time. The property rights which the foreign oil companies have in the raw material can be reduced gradually but they can get access to it in other ways.

It is desirable to collaborate with a limited number of well established foreign companies. It does not have to be a large number.

[Question] Oil prospecting will soon start north of 62° latitude. What can that lead to?

[Answer] We may search year after year before we finally find anything. It is a big question what may be found. We know there are layer formations, but is there oil or gas? It will be an exciting time, but at the same time we must realize that it will take years before we can get production. At the earliest in the 1990's even if we make the discoveries quickly now. Says administrative director Arve Johnsen of Statoil.

STATOIL REVEALS PLANS FOR GOLD BLOC DRILLING

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 26 Mar 80 p 26

[Article by Hans Chr. Erlandsen: "'Gold Block' Platform Can Be Built in 1982"]

[Text] Stavanger, 25 March--The construction of a platform for the "gold block," or block 34/10, could be started in 1982 with start of production in 1986-87. This became evident in a press conference Statoil held today in connection with presentation of the annual balance sheet.

"Statfjord C is not in danger as a consequence of the increased tax burden," established administrative director Arve Johnsen. He pointed out that 1979 was the last of Statoil's 7 lean years. A balance or possibly a slight surplus is expected from 1980 on. In 1979 the total deficit was 217 million kroner after subtracting financial and extraordinary expenses. The operating result shows a surplus of 13 million kroner.

"Production in 34/10 can start 1 year after Statfjord C, which in accordance with the plan will produce from 1985-86," said vice administrative director Henrik Ager-Hanssen.

The possibility of selecting a platform more or less as an exact copy, for instance, of Statfjord C, is absolutely present, and according to what AFTENPOSTEN understands, Statoil has carried out analyses of such a concept.

In the press conference today the Statoil representatives indicated that the reserves in the part of 34/10 which is of most interest are on the order of magnitude of 1 billion barrels or one-third of the exploitable reserves in Statfjord. The plans for developing the field are estimated to be ready toward the end of the year.

"If 34/10 is developed with a view towards production 1 year after Statfjord C, it would fit nicely into the industrial-political picture in Norway," Ager-Hanssen believed.

The biggest individual event for Statoil was the start of production in Statfjord A on 24 November of last year. The platform is a profitable

operation for the owners of the field, and it is expected that it will be paid back during the first 2 production years.

With regards to Statfjord B, which now is under construction, Ager-Hanssen was able to establish that all indications are that one will make up for the delays which have occurred, and the towing out to the field will take place as planned in 1981. However, it was made clear that it is probably necessary that work be carried out on Sundays, even beyond the exemption from the regulation on working hours which was obtained up to July. Arve Johnsen hoped that such a permission would be possible.

Statoil's results after tax will be reduced considerably as a consequence of the tax bill for the oil activity which the government has presented in parliament.

"The new taxes may make private financing of the project in the North Sea difficult, but I do not believe that they will be of any significance for the activity level on the shelf," said mercantile director Jacob Oxnevad.

The company agrees with the calculations which the Statfjord operator Mobil has carried out about the low profitability for Statfjord C if the tax bill is passed. But Statoil does not believe that the profitability question will cause Statfjord C to be postponed or replaced with another solution.

In Statoil it is expected that the fiscal year 1981 will give a surplus of between a half and three-quarters of a billion kroner. This is far less than the results one would have been able to show if the tax had not been raised. In the company one is now of the opinion that the tax increase can make the questions about special arrangements for the transfer of Statoil's surplus unnecessary. As is well known, a committee with representatives of several departments is now looking into how the government can get parts of Statoil's expected surplus transferred in an advantageous way.

That Statoil's total sales have now reached approximately 330 million kroner after an increase from 1978 of more than 60 percent is to a great extent due to the increased prices on petroleum and petroleum products.

Statoil's total investments in 1979 constituted 2,850 million kroner, of which more than 70 percent was associated with the Statfjord development. So far one has invested approximately 9,700 million kroner within the company's various fields of activity. Last year Statoil took up five government guaranteed loans abroad corresponding to approximately 2,310 million kroner. This year the authorized guarantee is for up to 1,420 millions. As Statoil's most important project gradually starts to operate, the capacity for self-financing will be significantly improved. At the end of last year the net proprietary capital on the books was 2,181 million kroner, with a proprietary capital fraction of 21.5 percent.

From and including 1980 StatOil has a proprietary interest in Norol of 73.63 percent, and the two companies will in the future constitute one company. The sales for the two companies will this year be approximately 9 to 10 billion kroner, increasing to 16 to 17 billion in 1984. The corresponding figures for StatOil are 6 and 14 to 15 billion, respectively.

According to director Oxnevad, the sales price for raw materials which StatOil will deliver to Norol will not be stated in the future balance sheet for the two companies. "But there will be no room for manipulation because we will use market price in the accounting," said he.

While the refinery activity gave a surplus for StatOil last year, the petrochemical activity had a deficit. However, for the longer range the possibilities are estimated to be promising. "Petrochemistry is an important field for us because we have access to the raw materials," emphasized administrative director Arve Johnsen.

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NORSK HYDRO DIRECTOR AAKVAAG DISCUSSES DEVELOPMENT PLANS

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 5 Mar 80 p 19

[Interview with Director Torvild Aakvaag in Norsk Hydro: "Might Consider Larger Work Projects in the Future: Hydro Gets a Big Oil Surplus"]

[Text] Norsk Hydro is entering a period where the company will get a considerable deficit in crude oil for the refinery at Mongstad. From 1983 and 5 to 6 years further on we will not have adequate oil supplies ourselves, and we therefore hope that we will be able to buy duty oil from the government during this period.

This is what director Torvild Aakvaag in Norsk Hydro tells ARBEIDERBLADET. He points out that Norsk Hydro is now participating in the Ekofisk field and in the Frigg field. The company is also participating in some blocks where there are comparatively good possibilities for operation, but it will take time. In the meantime the production in the Ekofisk field will drop.

Towards the end of the 1980's we believe there are possibilities for developing other discoveries, where we are participating, and which may come in and replace the Ekofisk field. In the meantime we will have a period with too little oil available, says Aakvaag.

He emphasizes strongly that one of the main reasons why Norsk Hydro in the 1960's went into oil prospecting was to secure the supplies of important raw materials which Hydro needs in its production.

[Question] How big might the shortage of crude oil be?

[Answer] This depends upon how much the oil refinery at Mongstad will be developed. If the capacity is to be expanded from 4 to 5 million tons annually in accordance with the plans, we will need 1.5 million tons of oil annually to cover our share of the refinery. Then our shortage in Crude oil will vary between 0.5 and 1.0 million tons. The Ekofisk production covers us completely a couple of years into the future, but then it drops.

[Question] What can come in as replacement?

[Answer] We participate with shares in blocks where discoveries have been made, for instance, 34/10, 30/6, and the gas discovery in 31/2. We can probably expect that toward the end of the 1980's we will get oil from 34/10 (the gold block) as replacement for the Ekofisk oil. It is the only thing we see in today's situation.

[Question] Thus you would like to participate in several new blocks?

[Answer] We would like to have a comparatively high activity level in our development of the oil and gas resources.

[Question] Will Norsk Hydro today be able to stand as a leader in the development of a field in the North Sea?

[Answer] We believe so, and for us it is an important goal. Since the middle of the 1960's, we have gradually built up a considerable staff. We feel that it is important to be able to give this staff new tasks, new challenges. In Norsk Hydro we also have broad experience from the operation and development of installations on land, such as petrochemistry. We believe that this entire broad foundation of experience should be put to use in this industry. And we are therefore ready to go to work on development projects.

For our employees there is a direct line from the exploration in the North Sea to the development and operation of the installations. We feel a need to be able to see such a line. Unfortunately, we have no projects in view so far.

[Question] Last year the government proposed that StatOil should develop the biggest field in the North Sea as the Norwegian operator and Hydro was to develop the other field. Of course this gives you opportunities?

[Answer] Yes, this was an arrangement which we appreciated very much. But unfortunately it does not give concrete openings at this time. We fully accept the fact that StatOil is the leading company in Norway today and will be so in the future. But we would also like to see projects in the future for Hydro.

[Question] What about the so-called "silver block," block 30/6?

[Answer] There are interesting possibilities there, but it is still uncertain if and when it can be placed in operation.

[Question] How long can you manage to keep the staff?

[Answer] In our organization we have a pronounced identification with the company and a very strong loyalty. But if our organization is to retain its dynamics, it must see that there are development possibilities in its future. It is an important task for us to obtain such possibilities.

[Question] When will Hydro start prospecting outside northern Norway if parliament gives the go-ahead signal? Are you ready?

[Answer] We are now establishing an office in northern Norway. We are obtaining drilling rigs and supply ships. We are working at full steam to process all information we have on the places where we will drill. I believe we will be ready to start as planned this spring if the political decisions are not delayed too long.

[Question] Are you expecting special problems when the drilling gets started?

[Answer] Naturally, there will be some problems which are special. The rigs must be moved farther, and the prospecting expenses will be higher, but from a safety point of view there is no significant difference.

[Question] Are you optimistic about the possibilities for discoveries?

[Answer] We are. It is not certain that we will find anything in the first drill holes, but the blocks which have been selected should give hope if we do not have to wait too long for the confirmations. The lower the drilling rate, the more time will the activity take.

[Question] Do you believe it is necessary to get started?

[Answer] In a world where energy becomes more and more scarce it will be a question how long Norway can sit on these potential resources without utilizing them. But it would be best if it could be done on our own conditions.

[Question] Do you need new assignments of blocks?

[Answer] Most of all we need continuity in order to be able to plan into the future. Continuity in the employment of our people, in procuring the raw materials for our factories and in the company's profits. It therefore suits us well that the authorities in the oil report recommend an even assignment of new blocks in the future.

[Question] Besides this, what is your evaluation of this oil report?

[Answer] It has become an important document. It shows what enormous importance the oil activity will have for our society in the future.

[Question] How does industry today evaluate the effect of the oil activity on the rest of the industry?

[Answer] One of the serious problems in connection with the oil activity is associated with the effect on other industry. What can we do so that this other industry will be unhurt or preferably strengthened through the

changeover in the economy which the oil will result in. This question was asked by the government several years ago in government report No 25, and the answer was unambiguous: we must as far as possible isolate the national economy from the effect of the large government income from the oil and thus protect ourselves against a cost increase which will follow from increased public and private consumption. Capital export was emphasized as a suitable means.

For my own account I would like to add: we must make sure that the country's industry gets possibilities for investing and thus keeps up its production apparatus and improves the productivity and our international competitive ability. To the extent that oil money is used in this way, they can get lasting and positive effects have on the country's economy.

[Question] Why do we need Hydro and for that matter Saga in the Norwegian oil environment? Would StatOil not be enough?

[Answer] One needs primarily a broad and all-around oil environment in Norway. This industry has such a fundamental importance for the national economy that it must be correct to utilize the industrial forces which are available in our society in the service of this industry. Norsk Hydro and Saga represent through the experience they have acquired from many years participation and through the organization they have developed a resource which the country should utilize. This is also clearly stated in the oil report.

We have also built up an industry on the utilization of oil and gas, and we need to secure the supply of such raw materials in the future too for these industries. This involves installations which give work to thousands of people in Porsgrunn, Bamble, and at Menstad.

[Question] What do you think about the new tax proposal from the authorities?

[Answer] We are discussing the proposal with them and hope to get somewhere with our points of view. We hope that the final tax law will be such as to give the companies incentives for investments on shore in Norway.

[Question] Many will maintain that a license to Hydro is at the same time a gift to Hydro's foreign stockholders?

[Answer] We know the problem. However, experience shows that there is a big risk associated with the development of the fields in the North Sea. We do not look at a license as a gift, but as a widespread technical and financial engagement, which, of course, can give good results, but which can also--and in many cases will--lead to losses. When Hydro's stock ownership is pointed out, it must also be remembered that the foreign stockowners have contributed to make Hydro grow to become a secure place of work for more than 10,000 people in Norway, and the yield these

stockowners have received in the last 30 years is considerably less than the capital they have contributed in this period.

The foreign owners have also helped to make Hydro's name well known beyond the country's borders so that we have been able to finance our expensive activity and secure our market position outside the country's borders. Says director Torvild Aakvaag in Norsk Hydro.

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SAGA PETROCHEMICALS TO BUILD CENTER AROUND NATURAL GAS

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 27 Mar 80 p 4

[Article: "Saga Petrokjemi: Plans about Industrial Installations for Four Billion"]

[Text] A petrochemical industrial installation for 4 billion kroner can be ready for production in 1986 if the plans Saga Petrokjemi is now working with become a reality. Director Roar Skjaeggestad in Saga tells AFTENPOSTEN that if Norwegian industry can be guaranteed the wet gas from the Statfjord field as raw materials, one will be able to both guarantee the supplies for the Bamble installation and build a new installation of a similar order of magnitude.

The plans Saga Petrokjemi now is working with assume collaboration with Norsk Hydro and Statoil. It is these three companies which stand behind the installations which have been raised in Bamble.

According to Saga's plans they are planning an ethylene factory or a "cracker" with an annual production of 300,000 tons and subsequent installations based on ethylene from this cracker: production of 140,000 tons of soft plastic and 60,000 tons of hard plastics annually. In addition, either a propylene oxide factory for 45,000 tons annually or an MTBE factory for 120,000 tons. Propylene is used in plastics production while MTBE is a gasoline additive which increases the octane number. The MTBE can replace lead in gasoline and becomes more and more interesting as lead discharges from car engines are prohibited.

This installation will not be quite as big as the one which was built in Bamble because it does not include a chlorine alkali factory and a factory for so-called VCM.

"We have collaborated with Statoil and Hydro for several years on the possibilities for utilizing the resources from Statfjord," says Skjaeggestad.

"Late last fall we started to look closer into where a petrochemical industry could be located. A series of areas are under evaluation, but those of

most interest are Sotra and Mongstad in Hordaland, Karsto in Nord-Rogaland and Haroysund in More og Romsdal.

Agreement on Raw Materials

"We assume that the wet gas from Statfjord will be guaranteed through a raw materials agreement according to the same principles which are used as a basis for the Ekofisk agreements," says Skjaeggestad and denies that the wet gas which is being delivered to Bamble in accordance with this agreement is subsidized in any way.

The reason why Saga works so intensively with plans for a new petrochemical center is that one wants to avoid getting into a tight time schedule when it is finally decided where the gas from Statfjord will be brought ashore. It is believed that if one knows that one will get hold of the wet gas, one can make decisions so that neither the industrial companies affected nor the municipalities which possibly get the installations will be rushed unnecessarily.

The wet gas constitutes 20 percent of the gas which can be produced from Statfjord. The plans Saga is working with assume use of all this gas, which still does not constitute more than 2 to 3 percent of the total amount of energy in this large field.

The basis for petrochemical products can be either wet gas or naphtha. The price of naphtha has in recent years shot up sharply, while wet gas has a price which in any case for the quantities which are delivered to Norway follow the price of crude oil. Companies which concentrate on wet gas therefore have a competitive advantage, and if one in addition has a safe source of raw materials, Norway can get into a unique position in the petrochemical market.

Saga Petrokjemi A/S & Co. has been responsible for the planning, construction and operation of the plastics raw materials factories in Bamble. Today the company is operating these factories with 600 employees and annual sales of more than 1 billion kroner. The company is also co-owner of the ethylene factory in Bamble.

Large portions of the Norwegian industry represented by industry, banks, and insurance stand behind Saga Petrokjemi. The biggest owner is Saga Petroleum A/S (56 percent), while the industrial companies Elkem-Spigerverket A/S, Dyno Industrier A/S, A/S Hafslund, ASV A/S and A/S Sydvaranger own 8 percent each. Akergruppen, A/S Norcem, A/S Jotungruppen and A/S Selvaagbygg also participate. Approximately 100,000 jobs and more than 50,000 shareowners stand behind Saga Petrokjemi.

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BRIEFS

ENERGY SAVING RESULTS--The national Building and Property Directorate has since 1978 carried out projects with energy savings which have turned out to be very successful. The projects have led to a savings in the energy consumption of up to 30 percent. The interdepartmental committee for energy economizing proposes that the Consumer and Administration Department is studying expanding the work with energy economizing measures in government buildings. The committee emphasizes the importance of having the government being in the front in this field. Chief engineer Ingar Dahle in the Building and Property Directorate tells NTB [Norwegian Wire Service] that the projects have mainly concentrated on recovering heat through ventilation installations. Modernization of individual heating installations and automatization of heating installations have also been carried out. [Text] [Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 26 Mar 80 p 4] 8958

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FUTUROLOGISTS SEE STILL 'RICH' SWEDEN IN YEAR 2020

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 19 Mar 80 p 29

[Article by Karin Berglund]

[Text] Soil, forest and fresh water will be the scarce resources in a future world of 7-9 billion people. Sweden has, on the average, the most soil, forest and water in the world. Sweden will, from this point of view, remain a rich country. Let us therefore build the future society with these natural resources as a base.

This is what Professor Karl Erik Eriksson and Bjorn Eriksson, a civil engineer, say in a study of the future which is almost ready at the Center for Interdisciplinary Science in Gothenburg.

The study is called "Sweden in the Year 2020," and is part of a larger study financed by the delegation for energy research. It is a detailed description of a future society.

It depicts a Sweden which makes itself economically independent and acquires for itself a wide range of action nationally by relying upon its own resources. The undeveloped country perspective permeates their entire study. The development on which it is contemplated to build is in the first place that all people have the same right to their own piece of the world's pie.

"If we continue a development which is based on the gaps remaining, we shall have a world community balancing on the edge of a catastrophe," Karl Erik Eriksson says. "In Sweden we are far from misery. But just as we cannot imagine a Sweden with poor people in the north and rich in the south, we cannot accept such a global system."

Great Unrest

Their description of the future is marked by a great confidence in the ability of people to find solutions. In anybody else's mouth the description of international developments to 2020 would seem like the misery of miseries, a description of the fall and collapse of the market economic system, back to the stone age.

But they have instead got it to sound like a description of how people take things in their own hands and arrange everything for the best.

"Most people think that we live in a good society," Karl Erik Eriksson says. A constructive desire to save society rather than strong opposition induces most people to find alternative solutions.

They imagine a country with a high material standard able to produce food for the world's catastrophe stockpiles. Wood products, paper, machines, tools can be exported. Oil and nuclear power are not needed. An adequate development of wind power has taken place.

We can take more immigrants and political refugees than at present. They anticipate a population of about 10 million compared with possibly just about 9 million, without any emigration or immigration.

Since the basis for the economy will be the forests and the land, the increase in population must be channeled to those places where there is agricultural land, forests and water. The largest part of the population will live in small and middle-sized cities. But they will be different places than the present centers to which people are moving. Hundreds of small suitably located places can be made into medium-size cities.

They anticipate that the export of iron ore will decrease. Hence, mining communities such as Kiruna will decline.

Wood pulp, building material and propellant fuel for automobiles will be produced from the forests.

The manufacturing of goods will take place in a sort of ring system. The neighborhood will be responsible for the cultivation of vegetables, simple repairs and minor construction.

The municipality or city (10,000-50,000 people) will be responsible for a larger part of the immediate production.

This involves, for example, some of the foodstuffs, building material and consumer goods.

There will also be industrial centers with large factories, for example mines and processing plants for metals, paper, cement and chemicals. Here also will be the export-oriented segment of the wood industry.

The work day will be shorter, but it is calculated that each person must do more work to produce personally that which is needed for maintaining life. The dirty and demanding industrial jobs will be divided up among the population. Shift work will be rare.

Less Meat

What shall we eat?

More vegetables, potatoes and grain than today, about the same amount of fish, eggs and dairy products, but considerably less meat and fats.

The three conditions for the calculations holding up are:

That the consumption of meat is reduced,

That private automobiles are eliminated,

That defense and the defense industries are abolished.

Karl Erik Eriksson does not think that the proposals should be so challenging.

"Actually it is more of a challenge to keep the automobile society and armament industry," he says. "Every time any one attacks the automobile society, people become very upset. We do not want to eliminate the automobile or traveling--we want to make them more effective."

With a proper communication system, short trips can be made by streetcar and bus much more than now, and the longer ones by train and boat.

We can introduce an auto-pool system whereby each car will be driven 50,000 kilometers as at present. With such effective utilization 200,000 cars will be needed in comparison to 2.9 million in 1977. In contrast 30,000 buses will be needed, compared to the 13,000 in 1977.

Waste

Karl Erik Eriksson is a physicist, and he points out that every other physicist in the world works for defense or for the defense industry.

"An enormous waste which is only possible because we presuppose that the world will remain unequal," he says. But we can anticipate another kind of defense.

"In the community we are contemplating, people are active and have initiative. Such people are harder to push around, and can perhaps offer stronger resistance than people who let themselves be commanded by officers."

"The Change Must Come From Below"

Karl Erik Eriksson and Bjorn Eriksson view international developments to 2020 as follows:

The economy of the industrial countries will stagnate further. The development of a super technical society will decline--there is not enough money. When governments try, for example, to force breeder reactors on the people, they have to give up--resistance is too strong.

The workers in the Western industrial countries will cooperate to do the job. The new trade union strategy is to demand more meaningful production.

People will have less to do with but there will not be any serious or long period of need, even if the politicians vainly seek to find viable solutions to the economic crises.

People will take a more active part in what is happening.

They will cooperate to obtain good food at reasonable prices, repair living quarters, arrange transportation to and from work.

People will be forced to share expensive capital goods.

Consumer and production societies will be established. These will attract many people. They will counteract social dissolution and further disruption.

"Initially, an industrial sector will develop in the under-developed countries as an extension of the multi-national corporations."

But it will take only a portion of those who lose their jobs in agriculture.

More and more people will regard as unreasonable the fact that the only alternative being offered is the big-city slum. They will begin instead to develop the countryside.

Conflicts

Explosive conflicts with the landowners and demands for land reform will follow immediately. Forests will be planted to arrest the advance of the desert. Solar stoves and works to ferment methane gas will be introduced to save wood and cow manure (of which there is a shortage). Water pumps will be operated by wind power, infectious standing water will be drained off, agricultural land restored.

This is hard work, and many people will be required. But they will be better off than in urban slums or in the multi-national corporations, whose activity requires extremely low wages.

Rural development will decrease the movement to the cities. The multi-national firms will find it difficult to get labor, the trade unions will be strengthened, and the wage level pushed upwards. The expansion of traditional multi-national industries will be checked. In some countries where heavy-handed regimes hinder rural development, industrialization will continue. But industry will have to struggle.

The crisis will continue even after 15 years, that is to say, in the middle of the nineties. No lasting economic solutions have been found. The price of oil goes up and up.

Military Coups

The multi-national corporations, with military coups engineered from abroad, will try to cope with the opposition. But they will suffer defeat because of the unexpectedly strong and effective mobilization of the people. It also becomes impossible to recruit reliable military forces in the west.

The armament race will be checked, and some disarmament begun. This will stem primarily from the increasingly broader popular opinion in the West against nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and the cost they entail.

Military forces will be converted into international catastrophe units. Catastrophic stockpiles of foodstuffs will be built up under the auspices of the United Nation's newly-created international organizations.

A more sweeping industrialization will start throughout the world. From the very beginning it will be built up with a technology which at least in many places will be subordinate to the workers.

"It is to be expected that those who at present have power will defend themselves," the authors of the study say.

"Don't think that industrial leaders, governmental departments or the military will bring about the change. It must come from below," say Karl Erik Eriksson and Bjorn Eriksson. "If we want to end waste, we must begin to do something ourselves."

This Is What We Can Do Ourselves

-Refrain from unnecessary consumption so there will be money left over which can be used for humanitarian assistance or for development projects in and outside Sweden.

-Do not buy unnecessary or dangerous products and goods of poor quality or which are produced under unreasonable labor and environmental conditions.

-Eat food which does not support the animal factories or the multi-national food enterprises.

-Organize sensible waste removal, arrange for garden plots.

-Cycle to work or car pool, if collective transport is not suitable. Or create with neighbors or friends a car pool in which 10 cars will be sufficient for 50 households.

-On the national level electrical heating can be prohibited in new building; develop a program for the replacement of electrical heating over a 15-20 year period.

-Within 20 years, shift all land transport between the administrative provinces to railroad or boat.

-Sweden should leave the United Nations' atomic energy program (IAEA), the OECD's nuclear energy program (NEA), the EG's atomic research collaboration (Euroatom) and the Oil Club (IEA).

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MILITARY'S ADVICE ON NUCLEAR PLANT SITING, DISPERSAL IGNORED

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 20 Mar 80 p 4

[Article by Lt Col Jarl Lundgren]

[Text] It is strange that nuclear power has not been debated from the viewpoint of defense policy, despite the fact that the highest leadership in the defense establishment has often taken a position on nuclear power questions. It is, however, obvious that nuclear power is significant in regard to defense policies. Therefore, the military aspects should be weighed in a total evaluation of nuclear power.

According to prognoses of the electrical energy needs in the future, made by the Central Operational Leadership (CDL) in 1972, society's need for energy in wartime was about 45 percent of its peacetime needs. It was considered desirable at that time that a couple of nuclear power aggregates be kept in operation in a war situation. The 1972 prognoses were reduced by about 30 percent late in the seventies.

Shutting Down

The minister of defense, Eric Kronmark, anticipates that before an outbreak of war one will be able to shut down the nuclear plants, a security requirement. The problem is unfortunately not solved by merely shutting down. Radio activity remains--how long is uncertain. In the meantime, the reactors must be cooled, for this electrical power is needed; if the current is broken....

Our dependence upon oil is serious, and imports must be reduced for defense reasons. But for that matter nuclear power is not domestic. Uranium can, to be sure, be mined in the country, but we depend upon imports for enrichment. No plans for Swedish enrichment plants have been presented, among other reasons because of the cost.

Vulnerable

Director-General Gunnar Nordback of the National Board for Economic Defense showed how important it is to reduce our dependence upon imports by relying upon alternative domestic sources of energy at the 1979 annual meeting of People and Defense.

The nuclear power program is frighteningly vulnerable even if we can, in wartime, forego a large part of our electricity production. Sweden should be able to function both in peacetime and in the shadow situation between peace and war when different kinds of pressure and violence at a low level can be directed against our country.

Nuclear power plants are located in a few places. The production of electricity will not derive any increased geographical distribution if the number of reactors increases from 6 to 12. All the new reactors will be concentrated in the present four localities: Rosmark, Oskarshamn, Ringhals and Barseback, all situated along the coast.

Widespread Sources

Even the distribution of electricity is sensitive. The 800 kilovolts transmission lines along the coast which will tie the four sites together and go directly through central Sweden north of Mälaren, Hjälmaren and Vanern will be vulnerable.

A system of energy production, spread over the whole country, utilizing alternative abundant sources of energy and which can be tied into the large distribution networks will be significantly more difficult to damage in a war. Isolated breaks in small-scale production systems will not have the country-wide effect as the elimination of separate nuclear power plants would entail.

After a war, peace at last comes. Then the destroyed society must be rebuilt. Can a bombed-out nuclear power plant be on the whole reaspired? What damage to the environment occurred when the power plant was destroyed?

Inside the Country

As early as 1959 the military were critical in connection with the discussions concerning Marviken. The then chief of the defense staff maintained that atomic power plants should be located deep in the country.

Similar positions were taken on several occasions during the sixties and seventies. Locating the installations along the coast was particularly criticized, exposing the power plants to air attacks and coastal invasions.

The commander-in-chief has criticized the faulty level of protection and demanded that nuclear power plants be placed in mountain shelters. The C-in-C, in views presented in connection with the CDL's study, "The Defense Aspect of Power Supply," in 1971 stated that neither his demand for inland

locations nor mountain shelters had been met. The latter demand was made several times in the course of the succeeding years. As is known, the demand in this regard has for that matter not yet been complied with.

Other Criticism

It would be altogether too lengthy to give an account of all the military objections. Criticism has also been directed at locating them near centers of population and at inadequate protection in the transportation of waste material. One has also demanded the evacuation of the area surrounding nuclear power plants with the outbreak of war and increased appropriations for civil defense measures.

The C-in-C has never opposed expansion of nuclear power here in the country; that is outside his sphere of responsibility. But not even his objection that the nuclear power plants have been located in some of the areas most likely to be invaded has been heeded.

The defense establishment has devoted extensive work to the question of survival in an atomic war and has seen the risk of nuclear power clearer than the politicians. The defense establishment has shown greater responsibility than society in general.

Dispersal

The increased vulnerability of society is often discussed in the debates in military circles. It is no secret that vulnerability poses a difficult problem for defense. Concern naturally involves not only nuclear power but also the development of society in many other categories: data processing, centralization of production and distribution, concentration of the economic life to the coastal area and cities.

A dispersal of society's resources would therefore be regarded as a positive factor from the point of view of defense. A decentralization of the production of energy makes easier a decentralization of the economy. A less centralized society is one of the best prerequisites for an effective military defense.

This connection is rarely noticed in the mass media. The real problems of defense in a highly industrialized society are not discussed. The military criticism of the nuclear power program has been noted even less. It does not even appear to be known.

Re-allocation

What conclusions should be drawn from the view of the defense establishment before the plebescite on 23 March? It involves ultimately what societal development we are aiming at: continued large-scale production with all its known weaknesses, not least vulnerability in war, or the beginning of an effort to spread the resources of society.

A re-allocation of 10-20 billion kroner from the nuclear power program to a venture on new electrical energy production and on alternative propellants makes society in the long run safer in peacetime and increases the prospects of surviving when there is not peace.

Perhaps the energy policy will turn out to be a compromise, in which technical difficulties of initiating alternative solutions will delay a winding down, while more detected flaws in the nuclear power industry will dampen it earlier.

Finally, a couple of questions which also involve defense and nuclear power. Do we want Swedish soldiers to be used in peacetime to guard nuclear power plants? Must we defend nuclear power with weapons against sabotage and demonstrations? This is already occurring close by. Such a society is not only difficult to defend, it is also in many eyes less worth defending.

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VPK'S RIKSDAG BILLS TELL MUCH ABOUT COMMUNISTS' AIMS

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 20 Mar 80 p 3

[Article by Bengt Lid, formerly on the staff of SVENSKA DAGBLADET and provincial assembly politician]

[Text] It is understandable that even members of Parliament have a poor overall view of the motions which are made during a spring session, since they can be numbered in the thousands. But it is profitable now and then even for those on the outside to take a deep dive into the sea of paper. But in view of everything that is said concerning the need to keep an eye on the leftwing communists since as a result of the Center Party's unfortunate maneuvers they have a chance to play a role in the plebescite campaign, I have overcome a good deal of reluctance and actually read all the VPK motions which have been printed in 1980.

Space permits an analysis of only a few points, but one main impression can be clearly stated; even if the Communist Party is not a branch of Moscow in the old, unpleasant manner, it gives a frightening impression of being estranged from our democratic society, which strictly speaking according to the motions does not exist.

No one should imagine that Mr Werner and his fellow introducers of bills have a picture of Sweden as a free country with free organizations, a vital political democracy, and despite the crises of the seventies still with a very high standard of living. No, what exists here, according to their view, is first and foremost a gigantic "capitalist" conspiracy to exploit the working people, a plundering of the country by profit-seekers, for whom the bourgeois politicians, and sometimes also the Social Democrats, are available as willing tools.

Serious Intentions

Werner's motion on the economy and the budget is a good illustration in this respect. Is there a serious purpose behind the efforts to save the state of well-being by promoting exports and giving them new competitive strength? The VPK says no.

The purpose is only to make "profit interests of the leading capitalists" identical with the nation's interests. The government commands society to salute the house of Wallenberg, unemployment shall be made more widespread, social scrapping and a culture of poverty accepted. The oil crisis may be mentioned only as a conspiracy, in this case, by some American corporations, while OPEC and its price policies appear to the VPK in transfigured light. The oil shaykhs with their strong strain of feudal princes would presumably be amazed if they observed their communist allies in the Glass House at Sergels Torg.

Shady Forces

Thus, it is clear from the VPK point-of-view how the oil crisis and budget problems are connected. In addition, international economic connections are considered in a series of VPK motions, and the main theme is clear: the Swedish crisis stems from international factors in that the country is part of the capitalist world and above all because Sweden is a capitalist society ruled by "the laws of evolution of capitalism." The muddy argument is made clear in the party's motion concerning support for the undeveloped countries--we are economically "tightly bound to the imperialistic system dominated from the USA" where shady forces pull the strings and Swedish puppets dance. No Leninist-trained theoretician behind the Iron Curtain could formulate the theses better.

The Question Is Disturbing

One would think that the existence of trade union organizations in our country would make it difficult for the VPK motion-makers to work out in detail the caricature of present-day Sweden. Do the Swedish Federation of Trade Unions and the Central Organization of Salaried Employees, among others, allow what is depicted as the enormous Swedish and international impoverishment of our "working people" just to go on?

It is plain that the question troubles the motion-makers, and they are forced to resort to certain evasive moves. It is not easy to rationalize away the importance of the trade union movement in a country where the development of corporate power has become so strong in recent years that the political side of democracy is finding it hard to function effectively.

Werner and his friends consequently go to the trouble--it is evident in their tax propositions--to recognize that the labor organizations are not altogether powerless. "The trade union strength of the workers and employees," it reads, "makes it difficult to put through direct demands for wage cuts." That is indeed a modest statement, in any case if it includes the reality from the mid-seventies when the wage movements almost overturned the export industries. We can put that question aside. The interesting thing is how the communists view the way the "exploiters" operate to manipulate the power of the unions.

Gross Demagoguery

The answer is as simple as it can be, and it is developed in several motions: the capitalists have discovered inflation. If they cannot prevent wage increases, they can always with diabolical cleverness undermine wage increases by price increases, the market operations of multi-national corporations, etc.

According to this way of looking at things, wages are in no way a significant factor for the course of inflation. One hears from the VPK's national economic truth-tellers that "since work is actually production, it is unreasonable to regard it as a cost of production." Thus, wages are, presto, out of the picture; and Bohman and Mundebo are regarded as showing "an incapacity to analyze," not to mention a propensity to "gross demagoguery" when they speak in warning language about wage movements both now and in the past. Furthermore, the VPK's fight against inflation includes an utterly crazy idea, a demand for immediate low interest policies (at a time when it is a question of hindering speculation regarding the krona and protecting the foreign exchange reserves).

That is thus the VPK's view of society with complementary international additions. It need only be pointed out that it is just as fanatical as sectarian. That is no surprise. One would doubtless come to the same result by analyzing the VPK's motions from some other angle. The stripes never change, and really there is no sign that the VPK now considers itself in the least way loyal to present-day Sweden.

Create Unrest

The goal is--it is said with refreshing honesty from many points--to overthrow Swedish society. The long list of socialization proposals testify to that. When "nationalization" is not directly demanded, models for strait jackets are presented. They may then be called "concession boards" or something else which are as state-socialist as possible.

Nothing points to a will to compromise. It is said right out that cooperation is evil, that the slogan for the day is "class struggle," and politics involve "irreconcilable class interest." In other words, the crisis will be used to create unrest and confusion.

This attitude is notably sharp in regard to the labor market. Some samples. Participation in strikes or other militant measures, legal or not, shall never be, according to the VPK, the basis for dismissal or firing. Illegal absenteeism, refusal to obey orders or undesirable behavior shall "only in the most extraordinary cases" be grounds for dismissal. If a trade union and an employer act in accordance with the MBL in a matter but cannot agree, a firm cannot, as at present, make a decision after confirming the absence of agreement, unless the trade union has an unlimited right to take local militant measures.

No Joint Agreement

According to VPK's motions the obligation for peaceful settlement from 1928 should be eliminated. No punitive actions shall be taken for violation of collective agreements. "The class struggle" may not be "legislated out of existence." The very idea of joint decision is false and is characterized as a reform illusion. There shall be struggle and no joint deciding. No strikes shall be prohibited. If the VPK won support for its demands, it would obviously be impossible to have any collective bargaining agreements in the labor market. The system of agreements would almost certainly be destroyed, and that is also the purpose.

What one asks oneself when one reads the VPK party motions is how such horrendous logic can in the long run be practical in present-day Sweden. How can it have any appeal to young intellectuals who have grown up in a society with political freedom, freedom of speech, the right to travel abroad, to read and study anything without blinders or censorship. It is easy to understand Gosta Bohman when he stated in a recent speech in Lund that increased support for the VPK, which public opinion polls seem to suggest, is a threat to the intellectual climate in our country.

Awakened Late

Part of the explanation to the state of affairs is apparently that many people are not clear as to what the party stands for. Many people read neither party programs nor parliamentary motions, and in regard to the debate on nuclear power the question is often more a matter of emotions than reflection. But one cannot be content with such a way of verifying things. If a part of public opinion is asleep, something is lacking in the democratic parties. The Social Democrats have often been accused of letting down their guard on the left, for tactical reasons in Parliament, and now are waking up belatedly.

Another and more psychologically based fact is rarely noted. Our elected people not only in Parliament but elsewhere often avoid purely political debates with the VPK. It is simply embarrassing for many people to have to react publicly against an ideology, according to which many of the ordinary decent politicians would be servile tools in the hands of misanthropic exploiters.

And naturally it can often seem meaningless to waste time on such nonsense. But, on the other hand, the silence can be too deep. It is a salutary task to speak up--on behalf of self-government by the people.

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PAST PLEBESCITES' STUDY INDICATES PROBLEMS FOR N-VOTE WINNERS

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 21 Mar 80 p 2

[Article by Olof Pettersson]

[Text] "It is of interest to the yes-parties to establish a strong tie between party loyalty and attitudes in the plebescite. The more the plebescite is like an ordinary election, the more it favors the yes-side. But research from Sweden in 1957 and Norway in 1972 shows that plebescites can have other results in the long run. The more the plebescite is like a general election, the more likely it is that those who vote against the party position will also leave the party for good." Thus Olof Pettersson writes.

Suddenly, an official study, more than 20 years old, is pertinent.

In connection with the plebescite in 1957 on the pension question the constitutional commission gave to Bo Sarlvik, a veteran in government service, the task of investigating opinion formation and voter behavior. The result was published in 1959 in a report, full of statistics, accounting for how the plebescite went as it did.

Sarlvik's polls showed that a majority of the voters was undecided or completely uninformed even a few months before the plebescite. The very campaign before the voting had a great significance. Only 40 percent of those who participated had a definite position at the beginning of the campaign. Those who went from one position to another were about 15 percent. The rest was made up of voters who at the beginning were uninformed or undecided and then took a position which they held until the voting.

Even if line 1, the Social Democratic proposal, successively strengthened its position during the campaign, no drastic changes in opinion occurred. Sarlvik discovered that behind the measurable changes in opinion there were large groups of voters who were influenced by the debate. The trends in opinion took different directions and to a degree canceled each other out. Many people also delayed in taking a position. About a fifth of the voters made up their mind or changed their view in the very last week before the plebescite.

The political parties were some of the most important participants in the struggle for support of a position. Naturally, a key question is how successful were they. Did they convince their supporters to vote for the alternative which the party championed? Bo Sarlvik's data shows that formulation of a position in the plebescite corresponded to a large degree to the vote in the previous election: 79 percent chose their party's position. But the parties were not, however, completely successful. Every fifth voter voted for another party's line or blank.

Deserted Party

The parties had competition. The climate of opinion in the voter's immediate environment was significant. The parties had particular difficulty in mobilizing voters who belonged to socially periferal parts of their base. If the influence of different opinion groups corresponded to the voters' previous party sympathies, the effect naturally strengthened support for their own party line. But when the influence was in the opposite direction, the result was that many voters deserted their party. Rival demands for loyalty often led to a change of opinion in the last moment or to a no-vote.

Bo Sarlvik also discussed consequences of the plebescite for the political parties. The interviews showed that 91 percent of those who voted for their party's line were loyal to the party. But among those who had a different view on the pension question only 60 percent were sure that they were going to vote for the same party as formerly. Sarlvik drew the conclusion that defections in the plebescite "had a significant influence on party shifts within the electorate."

It is not possible to draw off-hand any general conclusions from this data. The 1957 investigation involved only the pension issue, and the results largely reflected the special political situation at that time. It is, however, worthwhile to note a study of the Norwegian plebescite in 1972 on the European Economic Community. The investigation, which was made by the Oslo researchers Nils Petter Gleditsch and Ottar Hellevik, showed results parallel to those of Sarlvik.

Boomerang Effect

As in Sweden in 1957, the Norwegian parties were to a large degree able to get their supporters to vote the party line in the plebescite. But in Norway also local opinion played an important role. It was particularly difficult for the parties to get the socially periferal segment of their supporters to go along. Efforts to influence opinion had at times a pure boomerang effect. Pressure on the part of the parties to bring about a change in position had at times the result that it was party preference and not viewpoint which changed. From the short-range point-of-view the EEC question had a powerful effect on the Norwegian party system. In the 1973 parliamentary election the Labor Party suffered a huge loss, the Liberal Party split into two small parts, and the parties to the left of Social Democracy gained strongly.

It is difficult to make any guesses regarding the movement of voters and the effects of opinion in connection with the Swedish plebescite in regard to nuclear power. The answer will be eventually obtained from the polls which are being taken by Soren Holmberg and his fellow-workers at the Political Science Institute in Gothenburg. But it is, nevertheless, profitable to note the investigations of previous plebescites. Thus, for example Bo Sarlvik develops argument in principle on the relationship between plebescites and general elections.

A voter does not have to share his party's views on all questions. An election among political parties puts the citizen in the situation of choosing a "basket," the content of which the voter as a whole accepts without his or her necessarily wanting everything the basket contains. Therefore, it is not certain that the elected assembly will be representative in all political questions.

Sarlvik points out that the institution of the plebescite, on the other hand, gives voters the possibility of taking a position on a definite question, irrespective of their attitude on the position of the parties in other questions and irrespective of their view of the general objectives of the parties. The question is to what degree then does a plebescite operate in such a way that the voters differentiate between their position on the question and their general party sympathies. It should, Sarlvik holds, be so expressed that the voters do not change their general party sympathy because in the concrete plebescite question they defected from the party line. To the extent that it is not the situation, the difference between a plebescite and a general election is reduced.

Party Loyalty

It is apparent that the parties confronted with the plebescite on nuclear energy are seeking to win their voters for the "right" position by playing upon their traditional party loyalty. It must be admitted that this effort on the part of the parties has come in conflict in part with the desire to give the plebescite such a form that the meaning of the people will be most clearly expressed.

To speak plainly, if any student at my institute had used the three plebescite alternatives as a means to determine attitudes on the nuclear power question, the person involved would not have received a passing grade. The formulation of the alternatives conflicts with a basic rule in opinion investigation; namely, never to ask about more than one thing at a time.

The two chief alternatives, 6 or 12 reactions, are in themselves acceptable. The strange thing in the plebescite is the division into line 1 and 2. The Social Democrats and the Liberals want to show that they desire the future electric power plants to be publicly owned, etc. But the point in putting these supplementary demands on the ballot must reasonably be to find out the views of the people. Plebescites are to determine what the people, not the parties, think.

The result can be interpreted only in case an alternative gets over 50 percent of the votes. In other cases, it is not known if people said no or yes to state-owned power plants, directly working electrical heat, etc. The problem is those who selected line 3 did not get any chance to express themselves.

If the Social Democrats and the Liberals had really wanted to find out what people thought about their supplementary proposals, it would have been simple to make a ballot with several questions: one on the number of reactors, one on the questions of ownership, one about electric heat in a new community, etc. Then all, voters would have been able to express their opinion, and the results could be interpreted.

The yes-parties have a strong interest in establishing a strong connection between party sympathy and taking a position in the plebescite. If all follow the party line from the 1979 election, the yes-side would get a comfortable victory with 75 percent (the combined votes of the Social Democrats, Conservatives and Liberals). The more the plebescite is like a general election, the more it favors the yes-side. This division into two yes-lines, unsatisfactory from the point-of-view of a plebescite, should be seen in this perspective.

In the short run, the yes-side gains from the game with alternatives. But the tie between party preference and taking a position in the plebescite will not be, nevertheless, 100 percent. Some of the voters feel so strongly about the question that despite everything they will vote against their party's line.

Investigations from Sweden in 1957 and Norway in 1972 show that plebescites can have long-range effects. The more a plebescite is made like a general election, all the more likely it is that rebels leave their party for good.

6893
CSO: 3109

ENERGY PRODUCTION, CONSUMPTION FOR 1979 GIVEN

Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German 10 Apr 80 p 23

[Article by sda: "Energy Balance 1979"]

[Text] Bern, 8 April--Switzerland's energy consumption declined by 1.9 percent or 13,100 Terajoules (TJ) in 1979 compared to the previous year, amounting to 660,700 TJ. The reduction is said to be mainly due to the increased energy consciousness of the consumers. While the consumption of oil products declined by 4.5 percent, the ultimate use of electricity rose by 4.0 percent.

The Federal Department of Transportation and Energy Management (EVED) reported further last Tuesday that the proportion of oil products in the total energy use amounted to 73.0 percent (75.0 percent a year ago). The consumption of liquid heating fuels declined by 6.5 percent, and the consumption of liquid motor fuels was reduced by 0.7 percent.

Electricity use in the country increased by 1.32 billion KWH or 3.7 percent to a total of 36.9 billion KWH. Final consumption, i.e. after the losses incurred in transmission and distribution, increased by 4.0 percent. Households, trade, agriculture and services increased their usage by 4.4 percent. The proportion of electricity within the total energy consumption rose to 18.4 (17.3) percent.

24.7 Percent of Electricity Stems From Nuclear Plants

Total energy production rose from 42.4 billion KWH to 45.6 billion KWH (an increase of 7.6 percent). Hydroelectric plants produced 32.3 billion (32.5 billion) KWH, or 71.0 percent; conventional thermal power plants 2.0 (1.8) billion KWH or 4.3 percent, and nuclear power plants 11.2 (8.0) billion KWH or 24.7 percent of the total domestic electricity production.

Compared to the previous year the nuclear plants produced 3.2 billion KWH more (an increase of 40.6 percent). A decisive role in this development was played by the Goesgen Nuclear Plant, which became commercially operative in February 1979, and delivered 3.4 billion KWH by the end of the year.

The three other fully operational nuclear facilities, Beznau I and II, and Muehleberg, reached an exploitation level of 87 and 88 percent respectively, which represent an international record. At the beginning of the year there was a supply shortage that was compensated by a reduction of electricity exports and an increase in imports. Thus 352 million KWH of electricity represented the net excess of electricity imports in January, and in February that figure was 73 million KWH. In the succeeding months there were constant production excesses, namely due to the entry of the Goesgen nuclear facility. For the entire year electricity exports exceeded imports by 7.0 billion KWH.

Gas Consumption Increased

Gas consumption increased by 13.3 percent. Gas represented 4.3 percent of the total energy consumption, exceeding last year's figure by 0.6 percent. Wood, coal and industrial byproducts contributed 3.4 percent to the total energy consumption, and were thus able to slightly improve their role that in the previous year had stood at 3.1 percent. The proportion of solar energy remained at the previous year's level of 0.9 percent.

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CSO: 3103

PLANS TO SHIP GOODS TO IRAN VIA CYPRUS, TURKEY

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 29 Apr 80 p 4

[Text] While the economic embargo that the U.S. placed on Iran--and intends to broaden due to the hostage situation--continues, an effort will be made to ensure the shipment of goods to Iran via the Greek Cypriot Government and Syria in order to meet Iran's needs.

According to information gathered from diplomatic sources, the issue was discussed between the Iranian and Syrian governments prior to the implementation of the U.S. embargo. Contacts on this matter were intensified after the start of the economic embargo, and it was taken up in contacts made by Iranian Foreign Minister Ghobtzadeh in Damascus on the weekend. Ghobtzadeh spoke with Syrian President Hafiz Assad and Foreign Minister Abdulhalim Haddam. Afterwards, Ghobtzadeh went to Lebanon. Because the position of European countries on applying economic sanctions against Iran has not been finalized, the shipment of goods from these countries continues. In addition, the Soviet Union, socialist countries, and India will increase their shipments to Iran. Within this framework, exports from Turkey continue following the Turkish Government's announcement that it will not join in the embargo.

In the formula developed to enable Iran to meet its needs in light of the U.S. economic embargo, the Greek Cypriot administration becomes the first link in the transport chain. Goods that come from there will be sent to Syria and then to Iran.

How the final link in this transport chain will be made remains unclear. It could be done in two steps from Syria to Iran. The shortest route would be shipment through Syria's neighbor, Iraq. Because of the tension between Iraq and Iran, however, it is unlikely that Iraqi officials would allow this through their own territory or airspace. The Iraq-Syria border, moreover, is closed in the wake of unsuccessful efforts to unify the two countries.

As a second alternative, Turkey becomes the final link in the chain. At this juncture, another alternative is sending goods from the Greek Cypriot sector to Iskenderun and then shipping them by railway to Iran. Despite the Turkish Government's announcement that it will not participate in the embargo, it still is not clear what position Turkey will adopt on this matter.

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